OK, it took us a little longer than we imagined, but here are the first set of Yakish Endorsements for the 2005 Weblog Awards. Vote early, vote often.Note that we reserve the right to w

However, I must address a couple of factual errors and erroneous assumptions.

First, the CIA wasn’t far off with their assessment of the Soviet atomic weapon program in 1949. The problem was that traitors in our program gave the Soviets enough info to make their own bomb. We had won the “war” with the Soviets of capturing the most Scientists (including those that immigrated before the WWII), so we had a large technical and scientific head start. That was all for naught though, as we gave the Soviets a complete bomb design plus a lot of technical information on uranium enrichment and plutonium production. So the blame for this really belongs to the FBI, not the CIA.

The same could be said for China in many respects. They received a lot of outside assistance which we weren’t aware of until after the fact.

Finally, a NIE is not a CIA document, so any conclusions in one cannot be blamed solely on the CIA. An NIE is a document representing the views of all the players in the intel community, of which is the CIA is now a small part. Other parts of the intelligence community came to the wrong conclusion as well. If you want to see wildly off-base capability and intent analysis, read what the state department puts out.

Third, you make a conclusions Iran will use nukes against us that I feel are way off base. The primary motivation for Iranian nuke development is self-preservation. After Bush’s “axis of evil” speech, and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (both of which border Iran), Iran feels cornered and they view the nuclear option as a way to guarantee their security. They are not stupid, “crazy” people as many portray them - they are calculating and very smart. The idea they would cause a global economic meltdown and ensure the destruction of their own government by pre-emptively nuking the US is ludicrous. The fact is, the Iranian nuclear program went into high gear after Bush’s Axis speech. I think this will be seen as a major foreign policy blunder.

Fourth, your mention of the Tor-m1 systems doesn’t belong in this article and really has no bearing. The Iranians have been buying weapons from the Russians since the early 1980’s. As their US equipment starts to fail due to age and lack of spare parts, the Iranians replace it. The Tor-m1 is not a major upgrade to their air defense.

Fifth, Russia selling the Iranians nuclear fuel is a good thing. Under international law and treaty, the fuel would be used and monitored in Iran, then returned to Russia for reprocessing. The IAEA and other organizations ensure that the fuel isn’t used for plutonium production or reprocessed before it gets returned. Both the US and Russia use this method to provide nuclear fuel to “non-nuclear” countries, and it’s perfectly legitimate and legal. So your contention that once Iran had the fuel they could use it make weapons is innacurate.

The danger we’re facing now is that Iran does NOT want to buy fuel from Russia, because they know they couldn’t reprocess it or spike it with uranium for plutonium production. That’s why they want an indigenous fuel supply with the ability to enrich it - it won’t be subject to international oversight. In fact, it’s a lot more expensive for them to develop and maintain an indigenous supply as nuclear fuel is fairly cheap on the international market.

1. The CIA is like any government agency, a bureaucracy. For the most part, its personnel remain the same regardless of which political party controls the White House or the Hill. There are reasons for this, damned good ones, but pitfalls as well. Remember, a bureaucracy will do everything it must to propagate itself, and nothing more. That’s a s true of the CIA as it is of the Post Office or the DMV.

2. The CIA was created to fight a different war. Like the military, the culture and structure of the CIA is based in the Cold War, to play the spy game against the Soviets. Like the Military, much of what the CIA learned about how to do its job against the KGB is completely useless in its efforts against our current enemies. Unlike the Military, when the CIA screws up, CNN isn’t usually rolling. When the military makes an operational mistake based on outdated doctrine, the results are usually apparent, painfully so, and thus more quickly and effectively addressed. When the CIA makes such mistakes, they can usually cover it up, at least long enough so that those responsible are long gone. The immediate motivation to fix it rather than CYA is diminished. It takes a mind-bogglingly spectacular disaster, like passenger planes flying into skyscrapers, before anyone really takes notice.

3. While the CIA as an agency is an (ostensibly) apolitical bureaucracy, its poersonnel, like the personnel of ANY bureaucracy, are human beings, and by nature have political leanings. The difference is that in the CIA, these individuals are often equipped with job-related skills and resources that allow them to use their positions politically. I’ve heard rumblings that many at Langley are no fans of the current party or administration, and the number of tears they’ve shed over these intelligence “failures” is mitigated by the damage they’ve done politically.

Anyone have thoughts on this?