You’ll get no argument from me that Israel’s punitive campaign against their Hizballah tormentors is long overdue and should continue until the terrorists are severely crippled in their ability to harm Israeli citizens.

But “Operation Just Reward” is also imperiling almost a year’s worth of hard, slogging work done by a few heroic individuals in Lebanon who have braved assassination threats (and attempts), risked their political hides, and at great personal cost, carefully tried to maneuver through the minefields of Lebanese politics in order to give this tragic country a real shot at something all of us here in America devoutly wish; a secular, free market democracy in the Middle East.

While our attention here has been rightly focused on the struggles for democracy and security in Iraq, Lebanon has been going through a wrenching process of self examination and national dialogue that at times has threatened to shatter the fragile coalition of disparate groups who came together in the wake of the assassination of the former Prime Minister, the beloved Rafiq Hariri. Much more comfortable fighting each other than planning an electoral coup, these groups representing all religions, clans, regions, and interests were able to drive millions into the streets to protest Syria’s stranglehold on their country. Their unity led to the premature withdrawal of Syrian forces and a surprising electoral victory for their coalition, the March 14 Forces, a year ago.

Things have not gone very smoothly since then. Wrestling with a bloody past, trying to get beyond a civil war that lasted nearly a quarter of a century, the factions have squabbled over ministry appointments, failed to unite in an effort to oust the Syrian stooge President Emile Lahoud, nearly dissolved over a new electoral law that would do away with much of the artificial sectarian divisions in politics, and most importantly, failed to confront Hizballah and their allies in government over a multitude of sins.

Israel’s raid into Lebanon to retrieve their captured soldiers and their call for the Lebanese government to rein in the terrorists who operate within their borders are making Prime Minster Fouad Siniora’s life extremely difficult. A Sunni Muslim and long time friend of the Hariri family, Siniora has guided his quarrelsome government with competence but, many critics allege, without much imagination. This may be an unfair criticism because most of the stickiest problems facing Lebanon can be traced to the divided loyalties of some of its most powerful factions.

Syria’s departure left a power vacuum that Hizballah was only too ready to step in and fill. It’s simplistic to refer to them as a terrorist group given the fact that they have become a symbol of resistance to the Israelis as well as a huge provider of government services in southern Lebanon. Their spiritual leader, Hassan Nasrallah, is one of the most popular political figures in the country, although that popularity is being sorely tested thanks to his unilateral decision to commit aggression against the Israelis. Their influence on the majority Shia population extends far beyond their rather meager representation in Parliament. And, when it comes right down to the nitty gritty, they’re one of the only ones with guns in the country. It is widely thought that they are Syria’s representatives in government which doesn’t seem to hurt them politically as much as it should.

There is also divided loyalty found in in the army as several officers have been implicated in the assassination of Rafiq Hariri. President Lahoud, himself an ex-general, may even have been involved in Hariri’s killing. In this atmosphere of distrust and recrimination, the Lebanese government is almost totally helpless.

Walid Jumblatt, the canny, old Druze warlord and head of Lebanon’s Progressive Socialist Party, pointed to Hizballah’s divided loyalties as part of Lebanon’s larger dilemma:

“They don’t make independent decisions,” he said. “Lebanon is being squeezed on one side from the Israelis and on the other side by the Iranians and the Syrians through proxy. Unfortunately, now Lebanon is a battleground.”

The other part of Lebanon’s dilemma is that the government’s writ simply doesn’t run in the southern part of their own country. Asking the Lebanese government to prevent Hizballah from carrying out attacks simply isn’t feasible. The army is not powerful enough to take them on. Nor is the political will there to force them to disarm. Hence, Nasrallah has skillfully played his role as both independent operator and aligning Hizballah with the March 14 Forces by participating in the political process. And he was strengthened last February when another independent player, former Prime Minister Michel Auon, formed an alliance with Hizballah outside the national dialogue that is proceeding at a snail’s pace to reform and reshape the government. The larger than life Auon has been critical of the March 14 Forces for trying to force Hizballah to disarm. Auon also has his eyes on the Presidency and having a force like Hizballah on his side certainly doesn’t hurt his cause.

But the ultimate question has to be who controls Hizballah? Much has been made of Iranian and Syrian support for the group but some analysts see Nasrallah’s aggression against Israel as triggered by domestic politics more than foreign instruction. Nasrallah had been delaying any serious talks with the government about disarming his militia for almost a year, dangling the prospect of folding Hizballah into the armed forces in some way. He has also maneuvered in Parliament by having the legislature declare Hizballah “The Resistance” rather than identify them a a militia. But pressure had been building for Lebanon to comply with UN Resolution 1559 that calls for the disarming of all militias and the extension of control by the Lebanese government over all of Lebanon. If Nasrallah was feeling the heat, he may have initiated action against Israel to solidify Hizballah’s position.

Instead, if in fact Nasrallah took the soldiers – an operation planned for months – thinking Israel, tied down as they were in Gaza, wouldn’t seriously retaliate, he has gravely miscalculated. The Israelis are visiting ruin upon the terrorists and could weaken Nasrallah’s army to the point where the Lebanese army could move in and occupy positions in the south:

After a cabinet meeting Thursday, the government said it had a right and duty to extend its control over all Lebanese territory. Interior Minister Ahmed Fatfat said the statement marked a step toward the government reasserting itself.

Other government officials, speaking on condition of anonymity, went further, calling it a first move in possibly sending the Lebanese army to the border, a U.N.-endorsed proposal that Hezbollah has rejected. The officials described the meeting as stormy and contentious but said both sides—Hezbollah and its government critics—were especially wary of public divisions at a time of crisis.

“It is becoming very clear that the state alone must bear responsibility for the country’s foreign policy,” said Samir Franjieh, a parliament member who is close to the Hariri bloc. “But our problem now is that Israel is taking things so far that if there is no help from the international community, the situation could get out of hand.”

One wouldn’t expect Nasrallah to concede without a fight unless he literally had no choice. And that’s why the government, angry at the Israelis as they are, may not be too broken up at the prospect of a vastly weakened Hizballah. In effect, the Jewish state may be helping to solve their problems for them. While it won’t bring the two nations any closer, substituting the Lebanese army on the Israeli border for Hizballah will go a long way to ease tensions between them.

At the moment, no one knows whether this latest crisis will lead to a stronger central government in Lebanon or whether the pro-Iranian and pro-Syrian forces will become ascendant and set back the cause of Lebanese democracy for years. Either way, Israel’s intervention in order to punish its Hizballah tormentors couldn’t have come at a worse time.