Comments on: OF CHESTNUTS AND SUN TZU http://rightwingnuthouse.com/archives/2006/08/13/of-chestnuts-and-sun-tzu/ Politics served up with a smile... And a stilletto. Thu, 30 Apr 2026 15:09:39 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.7 hourly 1 By: Ted http://rightwingnuthouse.com/archives/2006/08/13/of-chestnuts-and-sun-tzu/comment-page-1/#comment-287441 Ted Mon, 14 Aug 2006 16:32:17 +0000 http://rightwingnuthouse.com/archives/2006/08/13/of-chestnuts-and-sun-tzu/#comment-287441 Iran/ Syria provide a nuclear/atmoic weapon to Hiz in Lebanon. They provide a pretext to recommence hostilities. On or around August 22, they let fly with a long range Zelzal or similar to Tel Aviv. Possible? Iran/ Syria provide a nuclear/atmoic weapon to Hiz in Lebanon. They provide a pretext to recommence hostilities. On or around August 22, they let fly with a long range Zelzal or similar to Tel Aviv.

Possible?

]]> By: Chris http://rightwingnuthouse.com/archives/2006/08/13/of-chestnuts-and-sun-tzu/comment-page-1/#comment-286817 Chris Sun, 13 Aug 2006 19:50:09 +0000 http://rightwingnuthouse.com/archives/2006/08/13/of-chestnuts-and-sun-tzu/#comment-286817 The next 48 hours will be intensely interesting. I believe Nasrallah comes from the Iranian-theocracy school. He'll hold the reigns but never actually take the title of the leader of the nation. Now, you leap to the conclusion that this is intended to affect the Lebanese government. It very well might be so. However, Nasrallah has made the appearance of cooperation with the government once the PM stopped complaining about Hezbollah and started to complain about Israel. I think this 48 hour of uncertainty is designed to provoke Israel into additional strikes, after agreeing to the ceasefire. Now, I hate Hezbollah and I want them destroyed, but they are attempting to appear like the defenders and not the aggressors to the Arab world. That demographic is so biased that it will work, unfortunately. In this case, Nasrallah may have constructed the golden bridge for more attacks. But my remarks are pure speculation. Time will tell. The next 48 hours will be intensely interesting. I believe Nasrallah comes from the Iranian-theocracy school. He’ll hold the reigns but never actually take the title of the leader of the nation. Now, you leap to the conclusion that this is intended to affect the Lebanese government. It very well might be so. However, Nasrallah has made the appearance of cooperation with the government once the PM stopped complaining about Hezbollah and started to complain about Israel.

I think this 48 hour of uncertainty is designed to provoke Israel into additional strikes, after agreeing to the ceasefire. Now, I hate Hezbollah and I want them destroyed, but they are attempting to appear like the defenders and not the aggressors to the Arab world. That demographic is so biased that it will work, unfortunately.

In this case, Nasrallah may have constructed the golden bridge for more attacks.

But my remarks are pure speculation. Time will tell.

]]> By: Andy http://rightwingnuthouse.com/archives/2006/08/13/of-chestnuts-and-sun-tzu/comment-page-1/#comment-286810 Andy Sun, 13 Aug 2006 19:08:34 +0000 http://rightwingnuthouse.com/archives/2006/08/13/of-chestnuts-and-sun-tzu/#comment-286810 Also, I have to largely agree with the two latest posts from ThreatsWatch: http://rapidrecon.threatswatch.org/2006/08/the-warm-up-war/ http://rapidrecon.threatswatch.org/2006/08/re-warm-up-war/ Also, I have to largely agree with the two latest posts from ThreatsWatch:

http://rapidrecon.threatswatch.org/2006/08/the-warm-up-war/
http://rapidrecon.threatswatch.org/2006/08/re-warm-up-war/

]]> By: Andy http://rightwingnuthouse.com/archives/2006/08/13/of-chestnuts-and-sun-tzu/comment-page-1/#comment-286808 Andy Sun, 13 Aug 2006 18:59:27 +0000 http://rightwingnuthouse.com/archives/2006/08/13/of-chestnuts-and-sun-tzu/#comment-286808 I read the Totten piece too and I don't completely agree with the Israeli Spokesman. As long as Hezbollah receives support (weapons, training, etc) from the Syrians and Iran, Israel won't be able to decisively beat them militarily. The bulk of the Hezbollah leadership remains intact, and it won't take much for them to train replacement fighters, though they'll admittedly be less experienced. I'm frankly surprised that Israel has said and done so little about Iranian and Syrian support. Fighting proxy wars against state-sponsored guerilla forces has historically been a losing proposition, and this case is no different. There are no easy answers, but Israel must break the bond between Hezbollah and its sponsors if it wants to ultimately win. This is one area that the U.S. could provide direct assistance through a combination of diplomacy, coercion and other methods. Syria and Iran are not natural allies and a all the instruments of influence and power the US and Israel posses must focus on dividing them and ending their support for Hezbollah. Ultimately, though, it may come down to Israel confronting Syria directly and making a similar judgment as we did after 9/11 - that they will no longer make a distinction between the Hezbollah terrorists and the government of Syria, and that Hezbollah targets inside Syria can be attacked. A dangerous course of action, to be sure, but there may be few alternatives. As you alluded, the potential for a Hezbollah political victory is certainly there. We'll have to see if they are able to capitalize on the "victimization" mentality inherent in the Arab world and Lebanon (and enhanced by Israeli operations and civilian casualties) and the lack of a decisive Hezbollah military defeat. There are also long-term problems that may play into Hezbollah's hand - the war has pretty much ended the economic rebirth Lebanon in general, but Beirut in particular, were experiencing. A major part of that now dead economic boom was tourism, which is unlikely to recover anytime soon. The costs associated with rebuilding infrastructure combined with severely decreased economic activity may bring more radical elements into the government, particularly if Hezbollah is seen as the victim along with the rest of Lebanon. So if this latest UN agreement fails to work, which I believe is likely, then the entire scenario will probably be a net loss for Israel. They'll face a reconstituted and potentially more politically powerful Hezbollah, a weaker Lebanese government, and an emboldened Iran and Syria. Add those negatives on top of Israel's failure to achieve its strategic objectives in this conflict, and the situation looks bleak. I sure hope I'm wrong. I read the Totten piece too and I don’t completely agree with the Israeli Spokesman. As long as Hezbollah receives support (weapons, training, etc) from the Syrians and Iran, Israel won’t be able to decisively beat them militarily. The bulk of the Hezbollah leadership remains intact, and it won’t take much for them to train replacement fighters, though they’ll admittedly be less experienced. I’m frankly surprised that Israel has said and done so little about Iranian and Syrian support. Fighting proxy wars against state-sponsored guerilla forces has historically been a losing proposition, and this case is no different. There are no easy answers, but Israel must break the bond between Hezbollah and its sponsors if it wants to ultimately win. This is one area that the U.S. could provide direct assistance through a combination of diplomacy, coercion and other methods. Syria and Iran are not natural allies and a all the instruments of influence and power the US and Israel posses must focus on dividing them and ending their support for Hezbollah. Ultimately, though, it may come down to Israel confronting Syria directly and making a similar judgment as we did after 9/11 - that they will no longer make a distinction between the Hezbollah terrorists and the government of Syria, and that Hezbollah targets inside Syria can be attacked. A dangerous course of action, to be sure, but there may be few alternatives.

As you alluded, the potential for a Hezbollah political victory is certainly there. We’ll have to see if they are able to capitalize on the “victimization” mentality inherent in the Arab world and Lebanon (and enhanced by Israeli operations and civilian casualties) and the lack of a decisive Hezbollah military defeat.

There are also long-term problems that may play into Hezbollah’s hand - the war has pretty much ended the economic rebirth Lebanon in general, but Beirut in particular, were experiencing. A major part of that now dead economic boom was tourism, which is unlikely to recover anytime soon. The costs associated with rebuilding infrastructure combined with severely decreased economic activity may bring more radical elements into the government, particularly if Hezbollah is seen as the victim along with the rest of Lebanon.

So if this latest UN agreement fails to work, which I believe is likely, then the entire scenario will probably be a net loss for Israel. They’ll face a reconstituted and potentially more politically powerful Hezbollah, a weaker Lebanese government, and an emboldened Iran and Syria. Add those negatives on top of Israel’s failure to achieve its strategic objectives in this conflict, and the situation looks bleak. I sure hope I’m wrong.

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