I agree with rick that Nasrallah’s interests in Lebanon have begun to deviate from Iran’s, in that Hezbollah’s agenda has always been to forge a state-within-a-state whereby the Shiite bloc would either have a majority or at least considerable veto power over the other factions, especially the Sunnis. Civil war would openly antagonise Sunnis to confront Shias on the street, destabilising any sort of legitimate platform Hezbollah has so far cautiously sought to build.

Iran, on the other hand, could seriously care less should civil war erupt in Lebanon. Hezbollah is expendable - as long as there is chaos and anarchy in Lebanon, as long as there are Iranian patrons willing to take up the gauntlet from Hezbollah in Lebanon - and at the very least Iran will be contented with the proxy status of Shiite-Sunni violence ala Iraq.

Syrian interests speak otherwise, for the possibility of Hezbollah operatives working independently of Nasrallah’s authority running the risk of retreating to Syria - thus giving Israel and the Lebanese forces casus belli to strike at Syrian targets - will increase as the situation becomes untenable: imagine Sunnis in open revolt against Hezbollah agents, and without the necessary base of support and entrenched network of spies and imformants, Hezbollah’s position will be radically threatened. Furthermore, civil war is contagious, and Syria itself knows that its social fabric is a brittle, fragile one.

And this presents a viable opportunity whereby we can exploit the dichotomy between Syria and Iran - to Iran, Syria is just another puppet state, a proxy that will be sacrificed should existential threat be posed to Iran itself. Syrian interests lean towards an ‘uneasy peace’, while Iranian interests are more inclined to the mantra of “moderated anarchy” - any form of violence that can be buffered by states around Iran.

rick, as to whether Iran is truly concerned about not having more blood of Sunnis on their hands, their continued fuelling of ethnic cleansing in Iraq has only betrayed their intentions to exploit Arabs to kill Arabs. Funding of aQ, al-Ansar has only served to convince Shiites that Iran still remains fundamentally Persian, and any sort of violence between Shiites and Sunnis bodes well for Iran. A balance of terror, if you will. But of course, Iran is playing its cards much more carefully in Iraq, for there exists no buffer between the two nations.

And as I say in the article, Iran especially doesn’t want the blood of any more Sunnis on their hands. It is upsetting their overall strategy to unite Sunnis and Shias against the west.

Nasrallah also doesn’t want sectarian conflict. He wants the ability to veto the majority without upsetting the delicate confessional balance in the country. A Shia led or Shia dominated government would be unacceptable to the Sunnis and most Christians. And the Lebanese people, being dead set against another civil war, would unite against him if he was seen as starting one.

Neither side wants the violence and neither side can afford the violence politically. But it happened anyway and that is not a good sign.

Nasrallah’s (and Iran’s) goal is a change of government in Beirut. They are close to getting it because of the recent murder of Gemayal (forgot first name) which brough the Lebanese government close to the constitutional requirement for the government to fall.

Additionally, Nasrallah does not fear a civil war. Indeed, given the resupply effort by Iran, the irrelevance of the UN forces, the weakness and divided loyalty of the Lebanese army and the fact that last summer Hezbollah managed to stand up to the Israeli Amry, I am tempted to say that he would like a civil war, because he feels he can win.

It’s not rhetorical…why do you think this violence is unplanned and unwanted?