I was against the war in Iraq, even though I thought Saddam was a time bomb waiting to tick off. I was against it because I have lived and traveled extensively in the Middle East and I thought that a bloody civil war/insurgency was inevitable. For all the reasons that are now known, except for one: when a population as hot-headed as an Arab one has been brutally repressed for decades, hot-headedness will prevail. And I had no confidence that ANYONE in the Bush admin really understood this. Perhaps, if I felt that they really did understand the cultural and historical reality there, I would’ve been willing to consider the idea that an invasion made practical sense.

There was a window of opportunity to take Saddam out in 92, when we had the ground forces available as well as a real coalition to help pull off a real Marshal Plan. But that opportunity was squandered, for reasons I will never fully understand. My best guess is that it had a whole lot to do with the Saudis. Who were then, and are now, terrified of the idea of a Shiite majority democracy in Iraq–or anywhere else in the ME. This is an angle which deserves more investigation, imo.

That said, while I think that withdrawal is the only viable option left to us now (for all the reasons you have mentioned) I must admit, that as a bleeding heart leftist, I am uncomfortable with the idea that we went in there, smashed up the place, and bailed when the going got tough.

But, short of reinstituting a draft and raising taxes to pay for it–which would be the only moral way to continue this war, I don’t see how our meager presence there will do anything other than to prolong the suffering and carnage for our overstretched troops (and Iraqi civilians), while doing very little to improve the lives of the Iraqis.

The whole thing is beyond tragic. And in situations like this, pleading ignorance is no excuse. Our leaders could’ve and should’ve known and done better. And I bitterly regret that they did not, because all of us–the US & the Iraqis will be paying for this disaster for a very long time, I am afraid. All good options have been off the table for some time.

The surge isn’t the first positive blip we’ve seen in this war. We are not on the verge of winning. We must now think about good vs. bad ways to draw down forces in Iraq. The Army wants it, the public want it, everyone wants it.

Compromise from the White House may lead to a more permissive ability for a limited mission to keep an eye on Al-Quieda. A lack of compromise will only lead to further deterioration.

It’s interesting how you still lash out at those entrenched in reality, attacking them, calling them names and so forth. The hardest person to be honest with, is yourself, and that’s evidenced by this rant.

How about when the Taliban of Afghanistan were told to hand over al-Qeda or be destroyed? Let’s see, where are the Taliban rulers of Afghanistan now? Dead or living in caves.
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If that is the case, why is NATO currently having to assault Southern Afghanistan to take a Taliban Stronghold? Honestly, if you are unfamiliar with Afghanistani events, I understand, but to diminish the terror of the revitalized Taliban for personal political hackery is ridiculous.

For some reason, people just cannot open their historical apperture up widely enough. The issue facing our foreign policy in the aftermath of Soviet collapse, itself a placeholder for the collapse first of Ottoman empire and then the various British and French administrations, is how to coax a part of the world with its own forms of resistance to what passes for the post-WWII mostly economic, but at least also superficially, political order.

The precedents were: colonialism, imperialism, military administration, support/bribery for anti-Soviets or pro-Soviets, then support for dictators against less desirable dictators (Iran-Iraq), then leaving Afghanistan. All of these have horrible fallout, whether entirely figments of imagination or ones with clear economic and military consequences.

Let’s leave aside the other considerations, just for the sake of brevity.

Then came Afghanistan following 9/11, the routing of the Taliban, and the relatively peaceful if incomplete establishment of the Karzai government, with the consent of the loya jirga, and the support of the Europeans, more or less. This was very encouraging, that the “graveyard of empires” should be so amenable to a light invasion, should enjoy substantial cooperation from in-country opponents of the current government, and should transition out of criminality into a more traditional, and traditionally and appropriately introverted, relationship with the world system.

But look at Afghanistan now: the Taliban rehabilitate in Pakistan, which we cannot invade for fear of empowering radicals who clearly wield great authority and popularity in the country; opium production continues, partly coerced by the Taliban but also partly for basic economic reasons and lack of incentive not to produce this crop; Karzai’s government relies completely on NATO and international support. The Taliban have now won concessions of sovereignty from the Pakistan government in Waziristan and in Bajaur province; they have control over others, though less officially. Southern regions of Afghanistan still succor the Taliban, and sympathize with them on the basis of religious belief and tribal bonds. Bush just had to send 12,000 more troops there to contain the “spring offensive.” Afghanistan is clearly as close to collapse as Iraq is.

But in all this there is little attention to the traditional, historical character of these countries, and of the religion that goes with them - knowledge of which can provide the only basis for guaging our successes there.

“Don’t invade Iraq because the Arabs can’t get along” is not a reason not to invade. This is the source of our problem with them: their traditional culture. Our modern culture - even the conservative variety detested with such ferocity by so many - is incomparably liberal in comparison to life in any of these countries. Yet these countries cannot be simply indulged in their folkways while they also have oil to purchase advanced weaponry; while they remain the incubators of a mature virulent jihadi resurgence that has actually been everpresent in Islamic civilizations and in its current form arose with the crumbling of the Ottoman Empire towards the end of the 19th century and joined global intellectual commerce (almost invisibly) via the ingresses and egresses provided by the British emprie.

The point is this is much, much larger than the political affiliations dominant in the United States in the period of the 43rd Presidency, and yet the centripital force to regard it as such is so strong that almost no other context is actually ever considered.

Afghanistan is Afghanistan; Iraq is Iraq. The USA is the USA. There will be an Afghanistan after our forces leave, as there will be an Iraq. There will be a USA after Bush leaves office.

Clear your minds and begin again.

Hugh Hewitt’s interview of Max Boot who recently returned from Iraq is interesting as well as relevant to this discussion.

Let’s see, a guy who’s been consistantly and mind boggingly wrong on every aspect of the Iraq debate interviews an author who has been consistantly and mind boggingly wrong on every aspect of the Iraq debate.

I’ll pass.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of Shia fanaticism in the Middle East

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I Support Democracy In Iraq
Do you support Hamas as well?

Except that things are getting worse, and more Iraqis hate our guts. But from Bush’s point of view (f*ck it up, dump it in 2009), you’re absolutely correct.