No survivors, no prisoners. Most historical accounts use the oral histories handed down by the Lakotan people because they match up surprisingly well with the archeological evidence from the battle. The indians report no prisoners taken.

ed.

Grant Moves South is one of my favorite Civil War histories. Catton was a master of prose who had no equal until Stephen Ambrose came on the scene.

ed.

Custer and his men were *not* armed with “flintlocks.” Some Confederates early in the Civil War were stuck with flintlocks, and as late as Chancellorsville numerous Confederates used smooth-bore muzzle-loading muskets, but by the 1870’s the US Army was using cartridge rifles.

As far as Sioux weaponry is concerned, they couldn’t have picked up much from Reno’s troopers since he lost only about 30 men, give or take, in the dash across the river and up the face of the bluff. The Indians would have had weapons taken from ambushed travelers, and 80 rifles (including at least two 16-shot Henrys) from the Fetterman massacre. Apparently the Sioux got some rifles (called “Laramie carbines” by the soldiers) as trade goods following the 1868 treaty that ended Red Cloud’s War. Given how many Indians (okay if I use that word?) were in the battle, I suspect that the vast majority were armed with bows and arrows.

During the Civil War Custer’s cavalry were armed with 7-shot Spencer carbines, and they carried special cartridge boxes that had 6 tubes, each pre-loaded with 7 more cartridges. That’s a lot of fire-power. However the Army in its wisdom replaced the Spencers with single-shot (but still breech-loading) carbines. I’ve read the analyses of modern gun authorities, and they assert that the new carbine out-ranged the Spencer. However the cartridges were copper, not brass, and continual firing may have heated the firing chamber to the point where the copper cartridges jammed. It would have been hard to clear the jam under any circumstances, and while under attack from mounted enemies … I’ve also read that copper cartridges in leather cartridge boxes are prone to develop a greasy coating that would have burned in a hot firing chamber, making jams even more likely and much more difficult to clear. I don’t know if that’s true, but it does seem plausible. At any rate, after a short while the troopers would have been reduced to using handguns which are outranged by bows.

(And don’t forget that bows and arrows have a much higher cyclical rate of fire than single-shot rifles, so don’t feel bad for the Cheyennes and Sioux that used them in the face of Custer’s troopers.)

It’s not implausible to me that some of Custer’s men — many of whom were raw recruits — broke, threw down their carbines, and ran. I never heard of this happening in Viet Nam, but it seems to have happened in some battles in World War I. Nor is it implausible that some killed themselves or were in suicide pacts. Eyewitness accounts of Indian torture of living captives were well-known from pre French and Indian war days, and even if some tribes didn’t use torture before the coming of the white man, they would have rapidly glommed on to the fact that white men were terrified of torture and could be counted on to kill themselves instead of fighting to very end. Well, what would *you* do in their shoes (moccasin or cavalry boot, either one)? If you were falling back and saw a friend go down, still alive but too wounded to retreat with you and about to be taken captive — to die slowly and in excruciating pain — would you leave him to his fate or would you put a bullet into his brain? If you were down to your last bullet in your revolver and faced capture and torture how would you use that bullet? (Okay, I’d like to think that I’d use it to kill an enemy and hope to force them to kill me in the hand-to-hand fighting but I’m safely at a desk in front of a computer, some 1000 miles and 232 years removed from the decision faced by a trooper of the 7th Cavalry.)

As regards Custer, he comes across to me as utterly impetuous, and since he was effectively rewarded for it by being made a brevet general only a short time out of West Point, this negative trait was highly reinforced. There’s a story from the Civil War where his commander and staff were on the banks of river debating about whether it was fordable. Custer finally decided to end the debate by riding his horse into the middle of the river, where the water was about a foot below his horse’s belly. They he turned to his commander and yelled “This is how deep it is, General.” (Apocryphal? I can’t find a reference I trust.)

Also, he won the Battle of the Washita with hardly any casualties, so he probably expected to do much the same at Little Big Horn. Certainly the tactics look like a refinement of his attack on Black Kettle’s village. Does that resonate with anybody? The US took down Afghanistan with ease and had no trouble establishing a stable government that looks more like a democracy than anything since the days of Tamerlane. Why wouldn’t it work just as well in Iraq?

Your story about Custer fording the river is not apocraphal. It appears in Catton’s Mr. Lincoln’s Army and the “commander” Custer shouted his “This is how deep it is” remark was none other than General McClellan. Custer was absolutely disgusted with Little Mac’s dilly dallying on the Penninsula (he thought McClellan’s cautious approach cost them a huge victory and the capture of Richmond. He was right). As Catton tells it (gleaned from several regimental histories) Little Mac stopped the entire column and was pouring over a map looking for a place to ford. Custer lost his patience and found out for him.

ed.

Without these mistakes, for whatever personal failings may have created them, he might have survived, to what end no one knows. History is, as we all believe, fixed, and only interpretations differ. I was pleased to see that the National Park Service interprets this battle in reasonably objective terms, as the clash of two great cultures and two heroic leaders.

Good analysis. I agree with almost all of what you’ve written. Some of it was 20/20 hindsight such as shooting horses probably seemed a very good idea at the time to troopers who were exposed on a bluff with no cover and no time to dig in and surrounded by about 1000 Lakota and Cheyenne. But overall, you nailed it; bad intel, bad judgement, bad battle management. All of that equalled disaster.

ed.

Custer’s men had stopped earlier for a break from several hours of riding. The General gave permission for fires to brew coffee as he was aware the hostiles already knew he was there. Since leaving the fort, the band had been ordered to remain silent. But now, Custer was convinced the hostiles knew he was there, and on the previous evening Custer allowed the band to play a few songs. Custer reqested the last song, the Doxology.

Custer and his officers indicate the time was about 6AM, but also say that sunrise was 3 hours off. That would place the coffee break about 3-4AM by modern reckoning. There were no time zones yet and Custer’s watch was set to HQ time in Chicago which was roughly the same as Washington DC time.

Between the early morning break and the approach to the encampment, a crate was dropped from a mule in the supply train following the Cavalry. A few Indian boys out playing, watched the supply train pass and saw the crate fall. They went to see the dropped contents and while there a trooper returned for the cargo, fired on the boys, who then ran off. One of the boys, ran to his grandfather, Sitting Bull, telling of the soldiers. The village was now very aware of the soldiers. However, they did not know Yellow Hair was present, not until after the battle and even then were doubtful because of the short hair.

In the painting at the top of the post, Custer is shown in his buckskin pants. But, on this day, he wore the cavalry blue uniform breeches and a red flannel shirt. Just before continuing along the ridgeline, Custer had changed his blue shirt for the red flannel. He thought it important to be visible to his men during battle, hence his flamboyent style. One of Custer’s brothers wore full buckskins as did one of his officers who also wore his hair long. Custer had made a show of cutting his hair very short before departure because his wife was afraid he would be scalped. He was not. Custer is depicted firing single action revolvers. At Little Big Horn, he was using state-of-the-art Webley double-action revolvers; the hammer didn’t need to be manually cocked before firing. Custer only needed to pull the trigger until the loads were exhausted.

Reno did attack the south end of the village, but was met with stiff resistence. He ordered retreat to the birch trees, but his men were chased from there. Reno skidaddled leaving his men leaderless. Without orders, Reno’s men retreated across the river as best they could and up the hill in a confused run after Reno. Benteen, arriving at the hilltop some time later, took effective command because Reno was mentally incapacitated and remained so for the many hours until Terry’s men arrived.

Meanwhile, Custer was unable to find a fording location until his command was four miles down river. He led his men single file down Medicine Coulee into the shallow river across from a stand of trees. In the middle of the stream, Custer stopped. He was shot from the saddle with a bullit in the left breast. His younger brother helped put the General back on his horse and tried to retreat up the crowded coulee. The troop, however, had to continue down to the stream in order to turn around for the retreat. This took several minutes for the word to pass to stop coming down the coulee.

Once the command had reversed course, the Indians had already forced Reno to ‘Reno Hill’ and had regrouped to attack Custer at the far end of the encampment. The command continued on a confused and disconcerted retreat up the hill. Many troopers - raw recruits mostly, not the battle hardened 7th Cav troopers of legend - dropped their carbines and surrendered. The Indians weren’t taking prisoners that day. Many other soldiers shot each other in suicide pacts, much to the dismay of the Indians.

The 7th Cav command never reached the top of the hill, but just below the crest. From there they made their stand. Two major charges were made by the Indians, one led by Gall and the second by Crazy Horse. During these attacks, Gen Custer was propped up by a horse carcass, but was able to fire his Webleys. By this time, the brothers of Custer were in command of the small detachment at Custer Hill. Custer was shot once more through the temple. Many believe he shot himself, but many Indians say he was killed by an Indian whose name escapes me at the moment (it wasn’t Gall; the Indians didn’t even believe his claim.) The battle was over very quickly - in the time it takes a man to eat a meal, the Indians said.

The relationship between General Terry and Custer is confused, also. Terry was a regular ranking General, while Custer was a Lt Colonel while in garrison. Custer was given a brevet rank of General during the Civil War and that rank applied when serving in the field after the War. Although Terry gave Col. Custer his orders in garrison, General Custer ranked Terry in the field. Terry knew full well that Custer had the ranking authority to do as he pleased once they left the fort. He left Custer with the instruction to do what he thought best if he encountered the ‘hostiles’. Custer was well within even Terry’s orders to attack the village when he did, as he feared the Indians would decamp and disappear for another season. Which is, in fact, what happened after the battle.

Of course, neither the version presented by Rick Moran nor myself can be conclusively proven. I am sure that Rick has spent many idle hours reading the Custer material as I have and I recognize his story has merit. But, quite naturally, I prefer mine. The story will never be ended.

The evidence for the “suicide pacts” has been largely discredited I think. The most recent survey of the firing by soldiers - the most extensive to date - concluded that “Custer’s last Stand” was actually a running battle from the Coulee to last stand hill - and precious little time there would have been for troopers to stop and kill each other. Prisoners? First I’ve heard of it.

The death of Custer has about 4 different tellings by native Americans - not surprising. Eyewitness accounts of anything are usually unreliable. But Custer was with that last group of about 40 troopers who were more likely picked off one by one by indians using captured rifles from Reno’s ill fated skirmish until there were about a dozen men left at which point they were rushed by several hundred Lakota.

ed.

This idea that Custer wanted to be president which is why he didn’t wait for Terry has been part of revisionist history since the 1960’s. It’s an interesting theory except there’s no evidence Custer wanted to be president and some evidence - his letters to his wife - that he had every intention of staying in the army for a long time.

Custer was a glory hound but it was glory for glory’s sake, not to advance a political career. It may very well be that Custer was interested in becoming president. But I don’t think anyone can prove that it was his basic motivation for attacking that day.

ed.

Rick - Have you ever considered doing an “ask Rick anything” day? We post the questions and you render an answer or opinion.

BTW; your occasional articles on things not political are appreciated.

Um…no. Don’t look for it anytime soon, either.