This story has been given the predictable spin by the Washington Post; that Bush and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are at odds over the strategy of putting up to 30,000 more troops in Iraq.

But if you read the entire article, you realize that, in fact, the Chiefs are worried about how to define the mission as well as placing a time limit on their deployment – not on whether or not the troops should be dispatched:

But the Joint Chiefs think the White House, after a month of talks, still does not have a defined mission and is latching on to the surge idea in part because of limited alternatives, despite warnings about the potential disadvantages for the military, said the officials, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the White House review is not public.

The chiefs have taken a firm stand, the sources say, because they believe the strategy review will be the most important decision on Iraq to be made since the March 2003 invasion.

At regular interagency meetings and in briefing President Bush last week, the Pentagon has warned that any short-term mission may only set up the United States for bigger problems when it ends. The service chiefs have warned that a short-term mission could give an enormous edge to virtually all the armed factions in Iraq—including al-Qaeda’s foreign fighters, Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias—without giving an enduring boost to the U.S military mission or to the Iraqi army, the officials said.

The Pentagon has cautioned that a modest surge could lead to more attacks by al-Qaeda, provide more targets for Sunni insurgents and fuel the jihadist appeal for more foreign fighters to flock to Iraq to attack U.S. troops, the officials said.

These are certainly fair questions and realistic concerns. And it is important to see any surge in troops as an adjunct to the absolutely necessary political progress that must take place in Iraq if our efforts there are to have any impact whatsoever.

Is there anyone in Iraq who can bring all the factions together to hammer out the numerous issues that stand in the way of a peaceful, viable, Iraqi state? There seems to be some progress on the problem with finding an equitable way to share oil revenue But other issues like federalism and autonomy, amnesty for insurgents, justice for the victims of Saddam’s tyranny, as well as how and when US troops will disengage from the country are proving far beyond the ability of the empty suit of a Prime Minister who currently inhabits that office to even begin to deal with.

Nouri al-Maliki has got to go. His craven kowtowing to Muqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army has made the security situation in Baghdad worse by preventing American forces from fully engaging the Mahdis when they catch them stirring the sectarian pot. The Iraq Crisis Group – a European-based informal think tank – has pointed out correctly that Maliki is part of the security problem and not the man we want helping us to get control of the capitol:

“What is needed today is a clean break both in the way the U.S. and other international actors deal with the Iraqi government, and in the way the U.S. deals with the region.”

The Iraqi government and military should not be treated as “privileged allies” because they are not partners in efforts to stem the violence but rather parties to the conflict, it says. Trying to strengthen the fragile government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki will not contribute to Iraq’s stability, it adds. Iraq’s escalating crisis cannot be resolved militarily, the report says, and can be solved only with a major political effort.

The report also offers some interesting solutions, all of which are probably non-starters with the Administration but nevertheless represent some original thinking about the political problems in Iraq:

The International Crisis Group proposes three broad steps: First, it calls for creation of an international support group, including the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Iraq’s six neighbors, to press Iraq’s constituents to accept political compromise.

Second, it urges a conference of all Iraqi players, including militias and insurgent groups, with support from the international community, to forge a political compact on controversial issues such as federalism, distribution of oil revenue, an amnesty, the status of Baath Party members and a timetable for U.S. withdrawal. Finally, it suggests a new regional strategy that would include engagement with Syria and Iran and jump-starting the moribund Arab-Israeli peace process.

Why the foreign policy elites of the world are so enamored of the Palestinian-Israeli “peace process” and believe that any progress (or lack thereof) in that arena will affect what happens in Iraq is beyond me. It’s almost as if both the Iraq Study Group and now the Iraq Crisis Group have included that recommendation to satisfy the internal biases of specific members of their respective groups, bartering its inclusion in both final reports in order to achieve consensus on other matters contained in the documents. That seemed to be the internal dynamic of the Baker Commission and I have little doubt that something similar occurred in the European group.

But the idea of a “Grand Conference” – if it was possible – is intriguing on a variety of levels. Getting the rest of the region as well as the the Security Council involved in what is happening in Iraq in a more direct way may prove to be the best way to deal with both the insurgency and the scourge of sectarian violence at the same time.

If such a conference could take place in the 18 months or so that many analysts are saying that we can safely commit our extra troops; and if the political situation in Iraq can be improved by booting Maliki and replacing him with someone who wants to confront the security and political problems in the country and not run away from them or seek to finesse them; then there is hope that our increased commitment of men will contribute to stability.

The White House sees the Chief’s questions as the normal give and take in any policy discussion of this magnitude, which is the correct way to view the criticism. I would be a helluva lot more worried if the Chiefs didn’t seek to clarify this commitment and pin the politicians down by clearly defining what the mission of these extra troops would be:

A senior administration official said it is “too simplistic” to say the surge question has broken down into a fight between the White House and the Pentagon, but the official acknowledged that the military has questioned the option. “Of course, military leadership is going to be focused on the mission—what you’re trying to accomplish, the ramifications it would have on broader issues in terms of manpower and strength and all that,” the official said.

The official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations, said military officers have not directly opposed a surge option. “I’ve never heard them be depicted that way to the president,” the official said. “Because they ask questions about what the mission would be doesn’t mean they don’t support it. Those are the kinds of questions the president wants his military planners to be asking.”

The concerns raised by the military are sometimes offset by concerns on the other side. For instance, those who warn that a short-term surge would harm longer-term deployments are met with the argument that the situation is urgent now, the official said. “Advocates would say: ‘Can you afford to wait? Can you afford to plan in the long term? What’s the tipping point in that country? Do you have time to wait?’ “

I would say that given the state of the insurgency and the growing influence of the militias, there simply isn’t time; we must act now:

The Pentagon said yesterday that violence in Iraq soared this fall to its highest level on record and acknowledged that anti-U.S. fighters have achieved a “strategic success” by unleashing a spiral of sectarian killings by Sunni and Shiite death squads that threatens Iraq’s political institutions.

In its most pessimistic report yet on progress in Iraq, the Pentagon described a nation listing toward civil war, with violence at record highs of 959 attacks per week, declining public confidence in government and “little progress” toward political reconciliation.

“The violence has escalated at an unbelievably rapid pace,” said Marine Lt. Gen. John F. Sattler, director of strategic plans and policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who briefed journalists on the report. “We have to get ahead of that violent cycle, break that continuous chain of sectarian violence. . . . That is the premier challenge facing us now.”

This report is from our own military. It is not generated by the media. It is not compiled by a left wing think tank. It is not a figment of someone’s imagination.

We are losing the war – on the ground. Not in a tactical sense, of course. We win every engagement in which we are involved. But our efforts are not making the government stronger or the Iraqi people safer.

Driven by sectarian fighting, and a Ramadan surge, attack levels in Iraq hit record highs in all categories nationwide as the number of U.S. and coalition casualties surged 32 percent from mid-August to mid-November, compared with the previous three months, the report said. Over the same period, the number of attacks per week rose 22 percent, from 784 to 959.

Iraqi civilian casualties also increased, “almost entirely the result of murders and executions,” the report said. Since January, before the mosque bombing, ethno-sectarian executions rose from 180 to 1,028 in October; ethno-sectarian incidents rose from 63 to 996 over the same period.

And what of problems with the Iraqi Army and Police? Again – this is from our own military:

The report noted problems with Iraqi forces, however, saying the number of soldiers and police actually “present for duty” is far lower than the number trained and equipped.

Subtracting those Iraqi forces killed and wounded, and those who have quit the force, only 280,000 are “available for duty,” Sattler said. About 30 percent of that number are “on leave” at a time, he said, leaving fewer than 196,000 on the job.

Iraqi police forces in particular are increasingly corrupt, according to the report, which says that some police in Baghdad have supported Shiite death squads. The police “facilitated freedom of movement and provided advance warning of upcoming operations,” it said. “This is a major reason for the increased levels of murders and executions.”

As a result of mass defections or police units being pulled off duty, the number of Iraqi police battalions rated as having “lead responsibility” in their areas fell from six to two, the report said, although officials said that number has since increased.

The Iraqi army has steadily increased the number of its battalions in the lead, from 57 in May to 91 in November, although some units have experienced high attrition when ordered to deploy to different regions of Iraq, such as Baghdad and Anbar.

“High attrition” is an understatement. Most units, according to the Iraqi government itself, refuse to go to either Anbar or Baghdad. Some units simply vote not to deploy – in other words, mutiny. Other units suffer 70% of its soldiers going AWOL and are unable to go.

The point is simple: There is no purely military solution – either American or Iraqi – to the security problems in Iraq.

Sattler implied that no number of U.S. or Iraqi troops would be great enough to quash the revenge killings. “I don’t know how many forces you could push into a country, either U.S. or coalition or Iraqi forces, that could cover the entire country, where these death squads wouldn’t find somebody,” he said.

Indeed, the report documented that major U.S. and Iraqi military operations in the fall did not quell sectarian violence in Baghdad. Attacks dipped in August, but rebounded strongly in September after death squads adapted to the increased U.S. and Iraqi presence.

Any actions we take to increase our troop strength must be taken in concert with political moves by the Iraqi government and – if it can be done – with other countries in the region who have either an involvement in the conflict or a stake in the outcome. I am not overly optimistic about a regional conference to help resolve the problems. But there is simply no alternative to working with the Iraqis on the political problems that fuel the insurgency and the sectarian violence. If the Iraqis refuse to help themselves by trying to heal the numerous cracks in their fractured body politic, I fear that any additional American troops would simply add to the problems and not accomplish much of anything.