Despite the fact that Speaker Pelosi has made it very clear that Representative Murtha’s slow bleed the troops plan is a non starter, the Pennsylvania Congressman is evidently determined to bring the issue to the floor for a vote. And at least one influential Democrat is hoping he does:
He described his plan to the Democratic Caucus two weeks ago and again more recently on MoveCongress.org last week.No sooner was the interview aired than Middle East hawks that have been cheerleading this war from its inception (the White House, FOX News and the myriad of entertainers who make up the Republican right-wing noise machine) started licking their chops at the prospect of exposing the Democrats as cut and run peaceniks that don’t support our troops.
They suggest that efforts such as giving our troops 1) mandatory home base time with their families between deployments—365 days for the Army and 270 days for the Marines 2) sufficient training and equipment and 3) mandatory face to face physical, mental and emotional health evaluations upon their return from combat—a standard practice before this Administration came to power—will demoralize our soldiers and turn the Middle East into a cauldron of blood and chaos.
First, an obvious disclaimer: Representative Jim Moran (D-Anti-Semite) is absolutely, positively, and without qualification not related to me in any way, shape, or form. I would hazard a guess and say that our genes diverged millions of years ago – his branch of the Morans ending up evolving with the slugs and slimy things in prehistoric swamps only to emerge quite recently to slither around the halls of Congress. The true and noble branch of the Moran family stayed in the trees and ate nuts and fruit, learning how to walk upright only recently because, obviously, we were waiting for the invention of the automobile. No sense in walking when you can grab a ride, right?
At any rate, Mr. Moran has it all wrong. There are precious few of us who would not vouchsafe our military people sufficient rest, time with their families, health screening, and adequate training so that they can continue to perform in such spectacularly competent fashion in Iraq.
And there certainly is not a monolithic response on the right to Mr. Murtha’s plan. Oak Leaf at Polipundit:
Having 12 months between deployments, ensuring that soldiers are trained to military (not Democrat/Republican) standards and returning stop loss to an emergency measure not a routine personal policy is good for readiness, good for the troops and good for the Nation.If you believe in the Global War on Terror, you will support these reasonable common sense measures and let the military (not politicians) set readiness and training standards.
Not only being the “right thing†it is good politics in the long run.
I, and most others on the right would normally agree with these benchmarks. However, despite what has gone on in the past with deployments, this time around, the stakes are far from normal. We are, in fact, in what I think most people agree – both right and left – is the political crisis of the war.
I say this because it is painfully obvious that regardless of how the present surge strategy plays out, this will be the last opportunity for the Administration to succeed in tamping down the violence in Baghdad (and Anbar province) while giving the Iraqi government some desperately needed political capitol to effect changes in society that will give the Sunnis hope for the future.
The oil revenue sharing plan recently agreed to is an excellent first step – a small one to be sure – but hugely significant. It is the first time the Iraqi government has officially recognized the Sunnis in a positive way. All other recognition of the Sunnis in the Constitution were related to strictures against the Baathists. There have also been some petty local laws that have made the Sunnis feel like outsiders in their own country. This is what has been driving the insurgency; Sunnis believing they have no choice but to die or be herded out of Iraq as refugees or fight the government and the foreign troops that enable their oppressors to survive. As long as the Maliki government can make steady progress on other fronts, the surge will have fulfilled its purpose.
But beyond the surge is the almost dead certainty that we will begin drawing down our forces probably no later than the end of this year and at the latest by the Spring of 2008 regardless of whether the surge works or not. There is no political will in Congress even from Republicans to maintain troop levels beyond that date. There will be no precipitous withdrawal. But neither will there be the desire in Congress – especially by Republicans – for the war to continue at its present level.
There will be “redeployments” and troop rotations back home. Those troops will be replaced by Iraqi troops and police who evidently are benefiting enormously from living with Americans in the neighborhoods where they patrol together, especially the latter.
All of this is in the future. The present situation is an acknowledged crisis and extreme measures are called for – even beyond what has occurred in the past with redeployments. To make a crude analogy, suppose instead of redeploying from the States to Iraq, we were talking about redeploying Patton’s Third Army during the Battle of the Bulge.
Patton’s army was facing east and fighting a pitched battle against the Germans on December 19th when Eisenhower asked the General how long it would take to pull his troops out of the line and march them north to hit the Germans in the flank as they moved farther into the salient or “bulge” made by their rapid advance. Eisenhower, not knowing that Patton had already made plans for such a turn to the north, was surprised when Patton told him that it would take only 48 hours.
The move itself would have the effect of “relieving” Bastogne where the 101st Airborne was hanging on grimly, surrounded as they were by the German army. But, despite the inference made by Patton boosters and popular culture, his move north was not intended to specifically “relieve” anyone. It was an offensive operation aimed at destroying the German army who had finally come into the open. The relief of Bastogne would be a consequence of successful operations carried out against the enemy.
Patton had not only planned the move in advance of his meeting with Ike, he actually started his troops moving before he left for the conference. Thus, 72 hours later, Patton’s Third Army was facing the spearhead of the German attack after pulling his troops out of one fight in south central France, turning them 90 degrees, and marching them more than 150 miles to the north in order to engage the enemy in another battle. It was a truly remarkable achievement in logistics and support not to mention a demonstration of the strength and stamina of the American GI.
Now a careful commander may not have pushed his troops so far so fast. And he almost certainly wouldn’t have engaged the enemy without giving his troops a little rest and a chance to eat a hot meal in the bitter cold. But Patton correctly saw the opportunity to crush the German army and he pushed his exhausted troops into the fight immediately. And despite what I am sure could be defined as severely degraded readiness and efficiency within the ranks of the Third Army, those Americans went into battle because of the enormous opportunity the Germans presented the allies by coming out from behind their defensive positions and going on the offensive.
As I said, a crude analogy but I hope my point is understood. There are times when the die must be cast and the risks taken. This is one of those times. The opportunity we have in Iraq will not come again. And while no one is expecting miracles, there is every hope that the situation can improve dramatically enough so that the Iraqi government can begin to exercise more control over their own capitol while taking the steps necessary to bring the factions together and start the long process toward reconciliation and peace.
I daresay many in the military probably feel as Oak Leaf does and I wouldn’t blame them one bit. But at the same time, you can’t shut the political realities off any more than you can forget the sacrifices of the families and troops who are now bearing the brunt of our past failures and mistakes in Iraq by being forced once again to deploy with less time off and less training than they need or the military may desire.
This, for all practical purposes, is it. Time to realize it and act accordingly.
9:38 am
Another Dem Iraq-Debacle In The Works
The Democrats, having retreated in full from their attempts to (1) push non-binding legislation conveying their opposition to try and win in Iraq, (2) failed debates on whether to just defund the war and (3) the to the “slow bleed” (which …
10:10 am
Well, I’ve seen some curious comparisons in this war, but I’ve never seen one as curious as the Battle of the Bulge with the counterinsurgency efforts in Bagdhad. I’m going to have to congratulate you for that one.
“This, for all practical purposes, is it. Time to realize it and act accordingly.”
While looking back at WWII you have again missed the point of the sort of war you are now fighting. This isn’t the time. There never is a time. The guerillas, militias and death squads can always outlast you. Standard guerilla doctrine from Mao’s time tells you to retreat into the population when your opponent floods the area with troops.
The big difference between WWII and this war is that in WWII someone was always going to surrender eventually, in this war only an accord or virtually total destruction of one party by the other is going to end it.
An accord with the warring parties is impossible as long as there are US troops in place because it is obvious to all that the Green Zone government are US suppported puppets. Even if this were not so it would be impossible to persuade your opponents out there that it wasn’t.
Obviously without the US troops the Green Zone government wouldn’t have any authority. They barely have any at the moment. So this government would fall. This might not be the worst thing that can happen, since at the moment the war is between people who have popular legitimacy in the country and people who are regarded as puppets.
The other option for ending things is the almost complete destruction of one side or the other. It looks like the destruction of the Sunni in Bagdhad is going well for the Iranian friendly Shiites in the Green Zone government what with US forces going in hard against Sunni areas and carefully against their main rival in the Shiite areas. This tactic might well work, in a limited fashion.
But it is worth remembering that it is little more than ethnic cleansing. Your troops are, wittingly or unwittingly engaging in an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Sunnis in Bagdhad. You might not think this, but it is clear that the average Sunni Arab does.
Now, you tell me. How is an accord ever going to be reached with these people when they know that they will outlast you.
And while we’re here. US forces arrested Al-Hakim’s son and released him, remember? On his way from Iran to Iraq. He is senior in the Badr brigade, unquestionably involved in sectarian killings from within the Ministry of the Interior. What happened? Apologies all round, protests, general wringing of hands.
Remember that when you think of US soldiers fighting and dying over there. No matter what the good intentions may be, they are fighting and dying to prop up an Iranian backed and supporting, murderous, obscenely corrupt bunch of Islamists. That’s the reality.
Let’s repeat that.
When you see the next casulaty report try saying to yourself “He died to support an Iranian backed, murderous, obscenely corrupt bunch of Islamists.”
Then tell yourself that you should keep sending more troops in.
11:01 am
1. Read the damn post and don’t put words in my mouth.
2. You wildly overestimate the influence of Iran on many Iraqis – a country that killed more than a million of them in the Iran-Iraq war.
Iranian influence is strongest among the SCIRI leadership, many of whom spent years in exile in Iran building that party. And the Badr Organization also has Iranian influences in both its leadership and rank and file – many of whome have been trained by the IRGC.
But to make a blanket statement about Iranian influence as you do is stupid. There are many Shias in the parliament and the ministries are not under Iranian influence of any kind and some who have feelings of solidarity with their Shia brothers but who are Iraqi nationalists.
3. My Bulge analogy had nothing to do with comparing the surge to World War II but rather the general point that there are times when the exigencies of war require that we go beyond the book and act on the political realities rather than technical requirements. It is a valid point, crudely made as I point out. Sorry it went over your head.
11:50 am
“Read the damn post and don’t put words in my mouth.”
Sorry, no need to swear about it.
“You wildly overestimate the influence of Iran on many Iraqis – a country that killed more than a million of them in the Iran-Iraq war.”
Not on “many Iraqis”, on the people who are running the current Iraqi government. Even many Iraqis have taken to refering to the Green Zone government as ‘Iranians’. You’re fighting and dying for the Iraqi government. That government is wildly Pro-Iranian. This is basic stuff, surely.
“There are many Shias in the parliament and the ministries are not under Iranian influence of any kind and some who have feelings of solidarity with their Shia brothers but who are Iraqi nationalists.”
Ministries not under Iranian influence? SCIRI and DAWA have the prime minister, a VP, Finance, Public Works, National Security, Trade, Labour and social affairs and two others. Until recently they had the interior ministry (now a UIA Indy), and when they did it was running death squads quite openly under the man who is now Minister for Finance.
Are there Shiite Nationalists who are not directly influenced by Iran? Yes, there certainly are. Many of the Shia ones are part of the Sadrist movement, our current avowed enemy.
But the plain fact is that the bosses of the UIA are SCIRI (inc. Badr) and Dawa, both Pro-Iranian groups, and that the UIA is in charge. The fact is also that corruption is rife, death squad activity is clearly supported by some factions in the government, notably Al-Hakim and Jaber, and that the government has very little popular support or authority in the country.
Thus “Iranian backed, murderous, obscenely corrupt bunch of Islamists.”
The trouble is that the more Iraqi Nationalist you are, the less you want foreign troops running everything, and the more Pro-Iranian you are the more you need US troops to keep you in power over the Iraqi Nationalists. A rather elegant Catch 22 all round really. You have to support the Pro-Iranians because the Iraqi Nationalists hate your guts. The pro-Iranians also hate your guts, but they will co-operate as long as you keep them in power with force of arms against the nationalists.
“It is a valid point, crudely made as I point out. Sorry it went over your head.”
No, the point’s fine. I agree with you, there certainly are such times, it was just a very disconnected example, that’s all. I see so many analogies with WWII (Which is bizarre enough when you think about it, could anyone imagine a war more unlike Iraq than WWII?), I just wanted to note that this was the most unconnected one I had seen so far.
Yes, armies have to go against the rule book in times of extreme necessity, but short term efforts cannot make a meaningful difference here, while they could in the Battle of the Bulge. The overuse of your National Guard and Army is pretty obviously starting to upset many of them, particularly the Stop-Lossed ones, and since this surge isn’t going to work anyway, how much longer should these measures be endured?
If this surge fails, are you going to support the pullout of US forces? What would you define as success?
10:29 pm
Obviously, we can’t compare two unlike things, no matter the point. You can’t compare WWII, which we won, with the Iraq war, which we are obviously going to lose. Better to compare it to (wait for it) Mao’s revolution. Which took place in a different country, with a different history, in a different time.
The insurgents always win, don’t you know? Ask the Malaysians. Oh wait, don’t ask them. The British outlasted those insurgents. If only we could muster the force of will they had and we used to be capable of, we might see our way through to victory.
A victory defined not by treaty or ceremony, but by a gradual cessation of political violence in Iraq, a gradual growth of stability, and a gradual reduction of the need for U.S. troops.
4:58 am
“Ask the Malaysians. Oh wait, don’t ask them.”
No, ask them how that insurgency was won. The insurgents were a seperate and generally despised minority group with only a very small base of support. They could be identified by their Chinese ethnicity in a much more direct way than the Sunnis and Shias in Iraq, and the solution was, largely, genocidal towards that ethnic group.
Also, forcewise, we are talking about 40,000 British troops versus about 8000 communist guerillas. Still, it is a better comparison than WWII.
Any more examples of succesful counterinsurgencies in recent times?
“If only we could muster the force of will they had and we used to be capable of, we might see our way through to victory.”
Well, yes genocide and ethnic resettlement in camps is always one answer to insurgency. Are we willing to do it here?
“A victory defined not by treaty or ceremony, but by a gradual cessation of political violence in Iraq, a gradual growth of stability, and a gradual reduction of the need for U.S. troops.”
Well, it has been 4 years and violence, instability and US troop numbers have only gone up. That’s not exactly promising, is it? How much sunk cost to sink in, that’s the question?
11:00 am
Hmm, I failed to mention genocide and resettlement. At least we gave Vietnam 10 years before we pulled the plug, and even then if we would have stuck by our promises to our South Vietnamese allies, we may have won. Or excuse me, “won”.
I guess the stakes in Iraq just aren’t high enough for you, Drango. I disagree. I believe, along with Rick, that we need to finish this fight, and I also believe that tamping down violence so that it doesn’t flare up again, which it has, is a good enough end. Reduction of chaos will allow the Iraqi central government to begin to function “normally”, in that more of the citizens can believe that it can at least handle the country on a day-to-day basis.
How about examples of insurgencies in recent times that worked? How about insurgencies that worked without another state’s support?
3:08 pm
“At least we gave Vietnam 10 years before we pulled the plug, and even then if we would have stuck by our promises to our South Vietnamese allies, we may have won. Or excuse me, “wonâ€.”
No need for quotes. If you had achieved your goals then you would have won. You didn’t because your goals were largely unachievable. The same problem applies to Iraq.
In the meantime the insurgency is making the costs of staying and keeping what minimal achievments you have been able to put together quite high, both politically and economically. They leave you with the choice to either give up and go home or keep paying this price for these minimal gains forever. You think the costs are worth it because you think that you can go from minimal achievements to significant ones, but no-one has any real idea of how to even try that. The best you (your government) are currently aiming for is a vagualy stable Islamist, Iranian friendly government killing enough of its sectarian rivals to not need US troops anymore by the time of the next election. That’s pretty minimalist. Frankly, geopolitically speaking, you’d have been better off with Saddam.
“How about examples of insurgencies in recent times that worked? How about insurgencies that worked without another state’s support?”
Just before we start, we’re going to have to point out that there’s no big reason why we should imagine that the Iraqi insurgents aren’t getting all sorts of support from various states.
So, a list?
The US against the British? On to Mao (Just as a starting point). Move through the IRA in their various guises (though some nice handling at points). On to Cuba. Afghanistan and the Russians. Algeria and the French. The Africans against the white settlers (various). The Africans against the Africans (various). The Indians against the British (Though original tactics from the Indians).
Some with, some without state support. All different in their own ways. All ending in different ways.
Unfortunately the general news of the 20th century was that colonial occupation wasn’t a long term prospect. With the increase of access to media and advanced weapons, this has become more and more the case.
10:48 pm
I have to admit, I was unarmed in the debate about insurgencies. I also have to admit that your take on our goals in Iraq is exceedingly cynical and short-sighted. What would have been the costs of leaving Saddam in power, in terms of American security? I’m really beginning to think that nobody remembers what it felt like immediately after 9/11, waiting for the next shoe to drop, and the next one, and so on.
Allowing a reckless dictator who hated America and had a nearly unblemished record of getting himself and his nation involved in ill-starred foreign adventures was (in the eyes of the early Bush administration, at least) simply unthinkable. If 19 guys with a few hundred thousand dollars could wreak so much havoc, then what would happen when similarly motivated people got a hold of real WMD? What would our response have been to a mass anthrax attack? What will our response be to the growing probability that we lose a city to a nuke?
Is it worth the blood and treasure we are expending in Iraq? Our initial goals have been realized. Saddam no longer controls a nation-state and all of the resources that entails. He is not a threat to aid terrorists in their quest to kill Americans in large numbers. We proved to the world that we were willing to take preemptive action in the name of American security.
The goals that subsequently attached themselves to the Iraq project, of injecting democracy in some form into the Middle East, in destabilizing the region (poking the hornet’s nest, so to speak), taking the fight to the enemy’s turf, have been frustratingly unattainable so far, to be sure. But is it worth the effort? What is the alternative to not trying these things? To wait until our options are reduced to cringing in fear or lashing out in the most violent and general fashion?
I still think the Iraq project has some promise along the lines of reshaping a part of the world that is exporting a death cult. And now that we’re in, I really don’t think we can afford to cut out precipitously.
5:28 am
“What would have been the costs of leaving Saddam in power, in terms of American security?”
Pretty much nothing. To imagine that Saddam was a threat is to buy into the myth. What was he going to do? Commit suicide in order to order some (relatively) pinprick assault on the US because, what? What possible reason could he have had for attacking the US? I cannot imagine one at all. It is pretty obvious that he was desperate to appease the US while not grovelling so much that he was overthrown in Iraq. He was a warmongering, over-reaching murderer, but he wasn’t a complete idiot.
“I’m really beginning to think that nobody remembers what it felt like immediately after 9/11, waiting for the next shoe to drop, and the next one, and so on.”
That would be the 911 that had nothing to do with Iraq, yes? The one done by a bunch of Saudis based out of Afghanistan and Germany with little bitty knives, good planning and a lot of luck?
The idea of overthrowing a relatively stable secular regime that was repressive to Islamic terrorist groups (just like it was repressive to anyone who offered any challenge to its authority) to replace it with an Islamist, anarchic hellhole is an original one in terms of lowering the risk of terrorism.
“What would our response have been to a mass anthrax attack? ”
Well, is seems that it is to largely ignore it. That is after all what happened. Any news on those anthrax attacks in the US?
“Our initial goals have been realized. Saddam no longer controls a nation-state and all of the resources that entails. He is not a threat to aid terrorists in their quest to kill Americans in large numbers. We proved to the world that we were willing to take preemptive action in the name of American security.”
Erm. Your initial goals, as stated, were to remove his weapons of mass destruction. That had been done already. Regieme change is simply not a legitimate reason to invade anyone. Proving that you’ll invade on thin intel and then get bogged down by rabble with RPGs has not done a lot for your credibility.
He wasn’t a threat anyway. I don’t get how afraid you all seem to be. You are America, the biggest, most powerful country in the world, yet rumours of a few nutcases send you into a panic that leads you to make vast strategic mistakes.
“The goals that subsequently attached themselves to the Iraq project, of injecting democracy in some form into the Middle East, in destabilizing the region (poking the hornet’s nest, so to speak), taking the fight to the enemy’s turf, have been frustratingly unattainable so far, to be sure. But is it worth the effort? What is the alternative to not trying these things?”
That’s why they call it a quagmire. Easy to get into, impossible to get out of. All of your palatable options involve staying and bleeding for, I remind you, a Pro-Iran, murderous, obscenely corrupt bunch of Islamists.
I personally wouldn’t sacrifice a single one of my people for that goal, since I consider looking after your own to be central to the responsibilities of any nation state.
“To wait until our options are reduced to cringing in fear or lashing out in the most violent and general fashion?”
Well, one could simply not be afraid. After all, by current standards your risk of dying in a terrorist attack are still rather less than your chances of dying as a result of, say, cancer. 553,768 deaths per year due to cancer compared to 2752 due to domestic terrorist attacks in the last 6 years.
To get a sense of proportion look at spending.
About $5.5Bn per year on cancer research.
That’s 5.5bn/553768 = $9,931 per death
Iraq is costing about $100bn per year. If we assume that we are preventing a 911 per year (pretty pessimistic, since it was the largest terrorist attck of all time, but still) that’s
100bn/2752 = $36,000,000 per death.
That’s what I mean about costs. You have finite resources snd they have to be allocated. What’s worse, we know that cancer research will save lives, we have no idea if the Iraq war is preventing terrorism (rather the opposite in fact).
What to do instead?
Concentrate on a consensus building and policework attitude towards terrorism. Invading and threatening Muslim countries is simply not a good way to stop Islamists from taking action, as has been shown. It is a very good way to inspire them to get involved and to train them in being better and better at it.
(I’ll admit that taking Afghanistan wasn’t a bad idea. Invading the “Graveyard of Empires”, the place that had beaten the Brits and the Soviets, was ambitious (though noone seemed to remember their history at the time) but I thought doable. It would have been better done as an in-out operation with a note left behind saying “If we catch you at this again, you know what’s going to happen”, but nation building is admirable enough.)
“I still think the Iraq project has some promise along the lines of reshaping a part of the world that is exporting a death cult. And now that we’re in, I really don’t think we can afford to cut out precipitously.”
Let’s be honest. Iraq had nothing to do with the death cult that you speak of. It was just another ruthless dictatorship in a world with plenty of ruthless dictatorships. Now Iraq has a lot to do with said death cult. If reducing membership of said death cult was your goal you have failed.
As for getting out, I hear a lot of talk of requiring will, sticking to it, going for the long haul, outlasting them, etc. The problem is that you live in the wrong country. The US has great ability to sacrifice when it (collectively) feels genuinely at risk. If you’re genuinely threatened, you’ll spend lives like water and have people queuing up at the recruiter’s offices.
You’re also quite keen, as a country, to support brief shows of military muscle in a nationalistic manner.
What you’re not so good at is sacrifice when you don’t feel directly threatened. It is no good pretending that you live somewhere else. The American people seem to be deeply disillusioned with this war, and consider it largely not worth the effort. This means that you will be pulling out in one way or another. That’s the glory of democracy, baby
And when you do you will have spent untold billions of dollars and thousands of US (and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi) lives for the grandiose dreams of some Washington intellectuals.
Just imagine the things that could have been done with all that money…your money, that you earned and then handed over to people who seemed more interested in giving it away than in using it for the purposes it was intended.