It’s been a few hours since the President’s speech – just long enough for some of the media and smart bloggers I respect on both the left and the right to weigh in with their reactions.
To say that this is just more of the same, a hyped up “stay the course” plan with nothing new in it is one of those ideas that is accurate but incomplete. And the differences between what we’ve done before and what is proposed now are quite telling indeed.
Bush appears to me to be prepared for failure in Iraq. What he has done in promulgating this plan is to place the onus for success or catastrophe on the shaky shoulders of the Iraq Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. He has, in effect, granted Maliki’s wish that Iraqi troops in Baghdad will be under his control:
The plan sketched out by Mr. Bush went at least part way to meeting these Shiite concerns by ceding greater operational authority over the war in Baghdad to the government. The plan envisages an Iraqi commander with overall control of the new security crackdown in Baghdad, and Iraqi officers working under him who would be in charge of military operations in nine newly demarcated districts in the capital.The commanders would report to a new office of commander in chief directly under the authority of Mr. Maliki. The arrangement appeared to have the advantage, for Mr. Maliki, of giving him a means to circumvent the Ministry of Defense, which operates under close American supervision. “The U.S. agrees that the government must take command,†Mr. Abadi said.
And at the same time Maliki is being given command of his own troops, he has thrown down the gauntlet to his biggest political supporter Muqtada al-Sadr:
Iraq’s prime minister has told Shiite militiamen to surrender their weapons or face an all-out assault, part of a commitment U.S. President George W. Bush outlined to bring violence under control with a more aggressive Iraqi Army and 21,500 additional American troops.Senior Iraqi officials said Wednesday that Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, under pressure from the U.S., has agreed to crack down on the fighters even though they are loyal to his most powerful political ally, the radical Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Previously, al-Maliki had resisted the move…
Before Bush spoke, a senior Shiite legislator and close al-Maliki adviser said the prime minister had warned that no militias would be spared in the crackdown.
“The government has told the Sadrists: ‘If we want to build a state we have no other choice but to attack armed groups,’” said the legislator, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak for the prime minister.
And the President made it clear that he would brook no more smoke and mirrors from Maliki who has made a habit these last months of promising tough action against the militias and then either not doing anything or worse, complaining publicly and bitterly when American forces have confronted the Sadrists:
Bush warned that the U.S. expected al-Maliki to keep those promises.“America’s commitment is not open-ended,” Bush said. “If the Iraqi government does not follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the American people and it will lose the support of the Iraqi people.”
The Iraqi government welcomed the new strategy and promised it was committed to succeeding in quelling the violence.
“The failure in Iraq will not only affect this country only, but the rest of the region and the world, including the United States,” said Sadiq al-Rikabi, an adviser to al-Maliki.
“The current situation is not acceptable — not only for the American people but also for the Iraqis and their government. As Iraqis and as an elected government we welcome the American commitment for success,” he added. “The Iraqi government also is committed to succeed.”
The question that has been uppermost in my mind is why should we expect Maliki to act any differently now? Time and time again he has promised action on a host of political reforms, anti-corruption schemes, reconciliation with the Sunnis, and even confrontation with al-Sadr. Not once has he or his government followed through with anything approaching the vigor necessary to improve the security situation in Iraq.
Just last month, a pitiful effort to begin the healing process took place in the Green Zone. Like a party given by the most unpopular kid at school, the invitations went out, the table was set, the band was hired – but in the end, nobody showed up:
None of the extremist Shiite or Sunni factions responsible for most of the violence attended the closed-door meeting, and the government leaders who delivered speeches offered no major new concessions likely to lure insurgents back into the political mainstream.Only a handful of the 20 or so former Baathists and ousted generals expected to attend showed up, and none of the exiled Baathists thought to hold sway over some insurgent groups attended, even though the government offered to pay their way and provide security.
Ultimately, the violence will stop and peace will reign when one of two things happens: Either the 4 million Sunnis left in Iraq will be murdered or flee for their lives leaving Iraq free of them or, the Shia majority will grant protections for minorities, participate in power a sharing arrangement, and make a supreme effort at reconciliation for all Iraqis.
We can send 10 times 20,000 troops to Iraq and not change the basic political calculus that is driving the insurgency; Shia hegemony. The Sunnis fear Shia retribution (for good reason) and are fighting to re-establish their dominance. Since they are outnumbered 4 to 1, this is extremely unlikely. But given that they feel the alternative is death anyway, many thousands are willing to take up arms and fight their tormentors.
And, in fact, the Sunnis have every reason to fear the Shias:
The Shiite leaders’ frustrations have grown in recent months as American commanders have retained their tight grip in Baghdad. While the Americans have argued for a strategy that places equal emphasis on going after Shiite and Sunni extremists, the Shiite leaders have insisted that the killing is rooted in the Sunni attempt to regain power through violence and that Shiite militias and revenge killings are an inevitable response.American officials have warned that with lessening American oversight, Shiite leaders might shift to a sectarian strategy that punished Sunni insurgents but spared Shiite militias. The execution 11 days ago of Saddam Hussein, carried out in haste by the Maliki government over American urgings that it be delayed until the legal paperwork was completed, only reinforced such fears.
How can we expect Maliki to buck the entire Shia establishment on the militia question – especially since he has proven in the past to be a spineless jellyfish when it comes to going after al-Sadr? In fact, is he serious when he says that he wants the Sadrists to lay down their arms or is this just more pablum to placate the Americans?
The arrangements appeared to suggest that Mr. Maliki would have the power to halt any push into Sadr City, the Mahdi Army stronghold that American commanders have been saying for months will have to be swept of extremist militia elements if there is to be any lasting turn toward stability in Baghdad. But along with more authority for Mr. Maliki, the American plan appeared to have countervailing safeguards to prevent sectarian agendas from gaining the upper hand. Bush administration officials said that Americans would be present in the commander in chief’s office and that an American Army battalion — 400 to 600 soldiers — would be stationed in each of the nine Baghdad military districts.
What all this boils down to – the benchmarks, the increase in troops, the granting of more autonomy to the Iraqi government to control their military, and the battle against the sectarian killers – is that Bush and America have now placed the power to make or break our effort in Iraq into the hands of a man who has not performed in the past and who has not proved himself strong enough, smart enough, or politically savvy enough to tackle the problems in Iraqi society head on and with the energy to do what is necessary for his government to succeed. He has limped along these last months, rousing himself only to criticize our troops when we violate al-Sadr’s turf or when an incident involving civilians caught in the crossfire makes headlines.
He has promised much and delivered squat. Should we then continue to work behind the scenes to bring another coalition to power – one that is broader based and includes far more secular elements than the current government not to mention freezing al-Sadr out of the ministries?
I think it is inevitable that we will do so. Once it becomes clear over the next 60 days or so that Maliki is not getting the job done and pressure begins to mount once again for withdrawal, look for this last arrow in Bush’s quiver to be loosed and a new Prime Minister come to power.
What difference it will make is arguable. But anyone will probably be an improvement over the weakling who currently occupies the Prime Minister’s office.
8:01 am
[...] Original post by Rick Moran and software by Elliott Back [...]
9:30 am
Great wrap-up, rick – my sentiments, exactly.
al-Sadr’s presence – regardless of whether he is dormant or active – emboldens Maliki to defy the US when it comes to dealing with the real problem of the militias. Remove al-Sadr and Maliki’s government may very well collapse. True, but the Iraqi Army will remain intact: the political cost is painful but ultimately necessary, because we don’t need a quiescent puppet of al-Sadr to run the country; as long as al-Sadr stays, pretty soon, the entire strategy of clear-and-hold will crumble as Sadrist infiltration starts permeating from the nexus of Sadr City – all with the clandestine aid of Maliki. Remember: al-Sadr is Maliki’s safety net. If the former lives, the latter will always have an option not to cooperate with us.
Sometimes we have to take a good look at who our “allies” are in Iraq – identify who will work with us and who will not. Look at their actions, not their rhetoric.
I believe Bush feels that he must at least portray that we are exhausting all options before either something decisive is done, or – horror of horrors – we decide to withdraw unequivocally. Maliki has this one chance – do it or screw it.
11:38 am
“America have now placed the power to make or break our effort in Iraq into the hands of a man who has not performed in the past and who has not proved himself strong enough, smart enough, or politically savvy enough to tackle the problems in Iraqi society head on and with the energy to do what is necessary for his government to succeed.”
Wow. I never realized how much Maliki had in common with Bush!
11:46 am
HINT: Maliki, Al-Hakim, et al have been trying to transform a `secular’ Iraq (under SH) into a Shiite fundamentalist republic for the last two decades.
So, anyone who thinks Al-Maliki, Al-Hakim, et al are going to abandon their ambitions and allow Iraq to become anthing other than a Shiite fundamentalist republic (with close ties to Iran and Syria) is just plain stupid and/or completely ignorant of the nature and the history of the Al-Dawa party and the Suprme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (sic!!).
11:53 am
harrison Said: Look at their actions, not their rhetoric.
Yes, let’s look at the actions of the Al-Dawa party and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution of Iraq.
They are not pro-USA.
For the last twenty plus years they have not been pro-USA.
Here’s what’s been going on….
Excerpt from “Iraq: Bush’s Islamic Republic” by Peter W. Galbraith
(snip)
SCIRI and Dawa want Iraq to be an Islamic state. They propose to make Islam the principal source of law, which most immediately would affect the status of women. For Muslim women, religious law—rather than Iraq’s relatively progressive civil code—would govern personal status, including matters relating to marriage, divorce, property, and child custody. A Dawa draft for the Iraqi constitution would limit religious freedom for non-Muslims, and apparently deny such freedom altogether to peoples not “of the book,” such as the Yezidis (a significant minority in Kurdistan), Zoroastrians, and Bahais.
This program is not just theoretical. Since Saddam’s fall, Shiite religious parties have had de facto control over Iraq’s southern cities. There Iranian-style religious police enforce a conservative Islamic code, including dress codes and bans on alcohol and other non-Islamic behavior. In most cases, the religious authorities govern—and legislate—without authority from Baghdad, and certainly without any reference to the freedoms incorporated in Iraq’s American-written interim constitution—the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).
Dawa and SCIRI are not just promoting an Iranian-style political system —they are also directly promoting Iranian interests.
11:55 am
harrison Said: Look at their actions, not their rhetoric.
Yes, let’s look at the past action of Al-Dawa:
Keywords: Al Dawa, Islamic Fundamentalism, Sharia, Iran and Iraq, terrorism, US Embassy attack
The party in power (Al Dawa) in Iraq has a long history with Iran and with terrorism.
1) Large Turnout Reported For 1st Iraqi Vote Since ‘58 The Washington Post, June 21, 1980
In another development today, Al Dawa, a clandestine Iraqi fundamentalist Moslem organization, claimed responsibility for yesterday’s grenade attack on the British Embassy here in which three gunmen reportedly were killed.
An Al Dawa spokesman told Agence France-Presse by phone that the attack was a “punitive operation against a center of British and American plotters.”
2) Iraq Keeps a Tight Rein on Shiites While Bidding to Win Their Loyalty The Washington Post, November 30, 1982
Membership in Dawa, which means “the call,” is punishable by execution. Dawa guerrillas were known for hurling grenades into crowds during religious ceremonies, and attacks claimed by the party were frequent until the middle of 1980.
3) U.S. HAS LIST OF BOMB SUSPECTS, LEBANESE SAYS Detroit Free Press, October 29, 1983
The source said the drivers of the two bomb-laden trucks were blessed before their mission by Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, leader of the Iranian-backed Dawa Party, a Lebanese Shiite Muslim splinter group.
4) SHULTZ SEES LINK BETWEEN BEIRUT, KUWAIT ATTACKS OFFICIALS IDENTIFY MAN WHO DROVE TRUCK BOMB, The Miami Herald, December 14, 1983
Secretary of State George Shultz said Tuesday that there “quite likely” was a link between the U.S. Embassy bombing in Kuwait and attacks on American facilities in Lebanon. He warned of possible retaliation.
(snip)
The sources said the investigators matched the prints on the fingers with those on file with Kuwaiti authorities and tentatively identified the assailant as Raed Mukbil, an Iraqi automobile mechanic who lived in Kuwait and was a member of Hezb Al Dawa, a fundamentalist Iraqi Shiite Moslem group based in Iran.
5) KUWAIT NABS 10 SHIITES IN BOMBINGS 7 IRAQIS, 3 LEBANESE ‘ADMIT’ TERROR ATTACKS
The Miami Herald, December 19, 1983
Kuwait Sunday announced the arrests of 10 Shiite Moslems with ties to Iran in the terrorist bombings that killed four people and wounded 66 last week at the U.S. Embassy and other targets.
(snip)
Hussein said fingerprints from the driver who died in the blast at the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait identified him as Raad Akeel al Badran, an Iraqi mechanic who lived in Kuwait and belonged to the Dawa party.
6) 10 Pro-Iranian Shiites Held in Kuwait Bombings, The Washington Post December 19, 1983
Kuwait announced yesterday the arrest of 10 Shiite Moslems with ties to Iran in terrorist bombings that killed four people and wounded 66 last Monday at the U.S. Embassy and other targets.
“All 10 have admitted involvement in the incidents as well as participating in planning the blasts,” Abdul Aziz Hussein, minister of state for Cabinet affairs, told reporters after a Cabinet session, United Press International reported.
Hussein said the seven Iraqis and three Lebanese were members of the Al Dawa party, a radical Iraqi Shiite Moslem group with close ties to Iran.
7) Beirut Bombers Seen Front for Iranian-Supported Shiite Faction, The Washington Post, January 4, 1984
The terrorist group that claimed responsibility for the bombing of the U.S. Marine compound and the French military headquarters here may be a front for an exiled Iraqi Shiite opposition party based in Iran, in the view of a number of Arab and western diplomatic sources.
Authorities in Kuwait say their questioning of suspects in the recent bombing there of the U.S. and French embassies indicates a clear link between Islamic Jihad, a shadowy group that says it carried out the Beirut attacks, and Al Dawa Islamiyah, the main source of resistance to the government of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
Al Dawa (The Call) has been outlawed in Iraq, where it wants to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state to replace the secular Baath Socialist government of Saddam Hussein, who is a Sunni Moslem.
It draws its strength from the large Shiite population in southern Iraq. Thousands of its most militant members were expelled to Iran in 1980 before the outbreak of the Iranian-Iraqi war and joined Al Dawa there. But it also has a large following in Lebanon among Iraqi exiles and sympathetic Lebanese Shiites.
While Al Dawa operates out of Tehran, it is not clear whether its activities abroad are under direct Iranian control or merely have Iran’s tacit acceptance.
8)Baalbek Seen As Staging Area For Terrorism, The Washington Post, January 9, 1984
Al Dawa, according to Arab and western sources, is believed to have had a role in the Oct. 23 suicide bomb attacks on the U.S. Marine and French military compounds in Beirut.
12:03 pm
GC:
Good points. I’ve been writing for a long time about the SCIRI wanting to carve out an independent Shia state in the south and how the writ of Iraqi law does not run in places like Basra.
There have also been clashes with the Mahdi army and the Badr organizations down there. Only once or twice has it really gotten out of hand but once we leave, that’s where the real violence will be; Shia on Shia.
2:07 pm
Rick Moran,
In Iraq, tens of thousands of people have been maimed and murdered and hundreds of billions of dollars have been spent for the sake of a burgeoning fundamentalist Islamic republic which has extremely close and long standing ties to Iran.
That is how it is. That is not going to change.
Plus, when SH was persecuting and murdering pro-Iranian Shiites in the 80s and 90s, the US basically did nothing to stop it.
With that it mind, it is sheer ignorance and/or just plain stupidity to think that Al-Maliki, Al-Hakim, et al are going to become stooges for Bush.
It is a widely known fact that these guys have spent their whole mature lives fighting to transform Iraq into a Shiite fundamentalist republic.
This is into whose hands Bush has thrusted the reins of power?
They sure as hell do not forget the blind eye of the US in the 80s and 90s.
How so?
Well, did you know that before the deposing of SH, Iraqis use to sit in teashops to smoke, etc. A hugely popular topic was Ghenghis Khan, i.e. the “SOB” who invaded sacred Bablyon about seven hundred years ago.
If Iraqis cannot forgive/forget Ghenghis Khan, how are they ever going to forgive/forget about the US’ inaction/action in the 80s, 90s, Abu Ghraib, etc.?
The US is screwed.
Not another drop of blood and treasure should be spent propping up this extremist republic which the US will no doubt have to fight in the future.
Here’s more on Al-Dawa…
Excerpt from “The Iran-Iraq War: Struggle Without End” 1984
The Shiite faction, Al Dawa (the Call), was expelled from Iraq in early 1980 by President Hussein.
Drawing its support from the large Shiite population in southeastern Iraq, Al Dawa attempted to establish a fundamentalist Islamic state to replace the secular Ba’ath Socialist government of President Hussein.
The present leader of Al Dawa, Hojatoleslam Mohammed Baqr Hakim, is operating from Tehran where he has directed terrorist attacks against targets throughout
the Middle East.
It is uncertain if Tehran is directly controlling the
activities of Al Dawa abroad or if it is just giving tacit approval for Al Dawa’s activities.
In either case, Iran’s support of Al Dawa is unacceptable and cessation of hostilities favorable to Iraq is now the preferred option for the White House.
2:12 pm
Bush surrenders Iraq to Maliki’s death squads
by Ahmed Amr
Saturday November 4, 2006
(snip)
The latest media farce is to portray Nouri Al-Maliki as a man out to curb the violence and chaos in our Mesopotamian colony. According to this fable, The Prime Minister is caught between Iraq and a hard place – forced to navigate a treacherous path between a desire to assert the Iraqi State’s monopoly of violence over ‘rogue’ elements in the security forces and the Shia parties that engineered his ascension to power.
There is only one problem with this tale of Maliki’s woes. The Prime Minister is the defacto chairman of the death squads – a radical partisan leader who is out to insure Shia supremacy in the new Iraq. Maliki, Bayan Jabr and Moqtada Sadr are cut of the same ideological cloth. They are men who have spent a lifetime in the quest to convert Iraq into a Shia theocracy – by any means necessary.
The Maliki/Bush videoconference will go down as one of the single most important events that will shape the future of that tormented nation. It was at once a surrender ceremony and a coup d’etat. Maliki walked away with a license to continue operating his death squads and Bush was forced to accept the burden of training more rank and file assassins.
2:19 pm
You put an article by that nutcase Amr on this website?
There is not one shred of evidence that Maliki is tied in with Jabr, the former Interior Minister, and the death squads.
Not One. Amr doesn’t have any. No one has any because Jabr was a Badr Brigade member and left Interior before Maliki took office.
If I want al-Jazeera propaganda or Noam Chomsky idiocy on this site, I’ll ask for it.
4:27 pm
There is not one shred of evidence that Maliki is tied in with Jabr, the former Interior Minister, and the death squads.
C’mon, get real man.
People are being maimed and killed, hundreds of billions are wasted, and you do not even know who is in the Iraqi government.
Bayan Jabr is currently serving as the Finance Minister of Iraq in the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
Bayan Jabr is a senior member of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance and the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
4:31 pm
Are you saying that just because they’re both in the government that this is evidence that Maliki is behind the death squads?
And you’re tellling ME to get real?
Evidence means exactly what it says. Guilt by association is not evidence. It is, in fact, indicative of shallow thinking and paranoia.
4:40 pm
There is not one shred of evidence that Maliki is tied in with Jabr, the former Interior Minister, and the death squads.
Bayan Jabr is tied in with Al-Maliki.
Al-Maliki is tied in with Bayan Jabr.
1) From the CIA (Last Updated: 12/18/2006)
Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments
Min. of FinanceBayan JABR
2) Iraqi Council of Ministers Presented to the Parliament by Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki May 20, 2006
Baqir Jabr al-Zubaydi (a.k.a. Bayan Jabr), Minister of Finance (Unified Iraqi Coalition – SCIRI)
3) New Iraqi Government Approved By Jim Garamone American Forces Press Service BAGHDAD, May 20, 2006
(snip)
Former Interior Minister Bayan Jabr Solagh will serve as finance minister.
4) Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs
October 2006, Background Note: Iraq (www.state.gov)
(snip)
Minister of Finance—Bayan Jabr
5) Iraq is failing to spend billions in oil revenues, by James Glanz, New York Times
12/11/2006
(snip)
Iraq’s total budget is about $32 billion in 2006 and is projected to be more than $40 billion in 2007, said Bayan Jabr, the Iraqi finance minister, in an interview.
4:45 pm
IT’S STILL GUILT BY ASSOCIATION!
Forget it. You have no evidence because there is no evidence. You can believe what ever you want – like Amr and his fantasies.
But please dont insult people’s intelligence by asking them to join you in believing what any rational person rejects.
4:49 pm
How can you write that Bayan Jabr and Al-Maliki are not tied in together?
Is Pres. Bush not tied together with Secretary Paulson ?
There is a lot very public evidence that Bayan Jabr and Al-Maliki are tied together.
4:54 pm
1. You put an article on my website claiming that Maliki was tied in with the death squads.
2. I said there was no evidence to support it.
3. You said that because Maliki and Jabr served in the governmetn together that this was evidence.
4. I still say it is not evidence that Maliki is behind the death squads just because he and the notorious former Interior minister happen to be in the same government.
You can’t change the subject in the middle of the argument. So stop it already. It’s useless trying to discuss someone as scatterbrained as you are.
5:37 pm
If Al-Maliki is not tied in with the death squads, why has he has been so soft and inactive against the death squads?
If Al-Maliki is not tied in with the death squads, why would he `for months promise tough action against the militias and then do nothing, or worse, complain publicly and bitterly when American forces have confronted the Sadrists?
If Maliki is not tied in with the death squads why has `he has proven in the past to be a spineless jellyfish when it comes to going after al-Sadr?’
You seem quite clueless about Maliki.
You are so strangely frustrated about Al-Maliki’s inaction when it is actually highly IRRATIONAL and SCATTERBRAINED to think/expect that Al-Maliki is going to change course after having given the last twenty plus years of his life to the cause of transforming Iraq into a Shiite fundamentalist republic.
Al-Dawa and the SCIRI are not pro-American, pro-Western, etc.
Al-Dawa and the SCIRI are pro-Hizbollah, pro-Iranian, etc.