(This post originally appeared June 25, 2005)
A STYLIZED PORTRAYAL OF CUSTERS LAST STAND
George Armstrong Custer surveyed the low, rolling Montana countryside before him on that brutally hot Sunday afternoon of June 25, 1876 and must have felt a twinge of anticipation. He was a warrior. And prior to every battle he was ever involved in, from his glory days in the Civil War to this, the last battle of his life, Custer felt the tingling of impending combat. He considered himself invulnerable. His confidence – some would say arrogance – inspired both intense loyalty and profound disdain from the men and officers under his command. This, more than anything else, led to his destruction.
The Battle of Little Bighorn (the Lakota call it “The Battle of Greasy Grass Creek”) is the most closely examined battle in American history. Custer’s every known move has been examined, debated, dissected, re-examined and criticized by historians, archaeologists, anthropologists, and scientists. It’s also been one of the most popular subjects for artists as every generation since the battle has had both ridiculous and stylized portrayals as well as historically accurate reproductions. And thanks to Hollywood, just about everyone has heard of Custer and the battle that claimed his life.
The evolution of attitudes toward the battle is one of the most fascinating aspects of its history. Originally seen as a massacre of white soldiers by merciless Indians, the loss of of 267 American soldiers outraged and humiliated a country that was in the process of celebrating it’s Centennial. The resulting outcry sealed the doom of the Lakota, Cheyenne and other plains Indians tribes who had united for one last great war against white encroachment. Custer was portrayed as a great hero, thanks in no small part to his wife Libby’s hagiographic biography of their lives together called Boots and Saddles.
Then in the 1960’s, a welcome re-examination of America’s mythic heroes, including Custer, was initiated by historians eager to take advantage of the American people’s desire for the “truth” about our past. The pendulum swung in the opposite direction and Custer emerged as a vainglorious martinet of an officer, so eager for glory that he sacrificed his men on the altar of personal ambition.
By the late 1970’s, Custer’s image had been slightly rehabilitated thanks to a re-examination of his outstanding career as a Civil War cavalry leader. And along with authors like Jeffrey Wert and Evan McConnel, a new, more personal side of Custer emerged. The arrogant martinet became the loving and devoted husband whose letters to his young wife reveal a playful, likable man with a penchant for teasing.
But on that fateful Sunday, Custer allowed the darker side of his personality to take over. This was a Custer that was unconcerned with the lives of his men. This was the Custer who had been court martialed and suspended for a year for disobeying orders. And this was the Custer whose overweening confidence in his own abilities and suicidal disdain for the fighting skills of his adversary sealed his fate and the fate of so many in his command.
He was not technically in violation of his orders. General Terry, who was making his way to the Little Big Horn with 2,500 infantry, was due the next day but had not specifically ordered Custer to wait. So despite the warnings of his faithful Crow scouts (“Many Sioux” they had told him, a warning he didn’t heed because he thought the Indians couldn’t give an accurate count of warriors), Custer rode to his death.
His survey of the Indian encampment before him was superficial. All he could see from his vantage point was the north end of the village. This was due to a quirk in the topography of the battlefield. If you ever visit the Little Big Horn Battlefield National Monument, you’ll be struck by the gently, rolling hills that give the impression of a single valley stretching out in the distance. What Custer couldn’t see were intervening copses and indentations that hid not the 5,000 or so Indians he believed he was facing, but fully 15,000 men, women and children in a gigantic encampment that stretched for more than 5 miles across the plain.
At the sight of Custer’s men, the Indian warriors rushed to their families and helped to get them out of harms way. Custer interpreted this as a sign that the Indians were preparing to flee and divided his command into 3 sections. He sent Major Reno around to where he thought the south end of the camp was, ordering him to ride through the village and sow confusion while he attacked from the north and the other column commanded by Major Benteen attacked from the east.
It was stupid, rash, and doomed to failure. Reno, an inexperienced (some would say cowardly) officer took one look at the immense village before him and retreated. Some historians believe that if Reno had attacked while the warriors were busy looking after the safety of their families he could have in fact caused the kind of confusion that Custer was looking for. What this would have meant to the outcome of the battle is uncertain. Given that there were other instances on the plains of vastly outnumbered cavalry holding off the tribes, Custer may have been able to save most of his command if he had immediately found defensible ground to make a stand. If Reno had followed his orders, it may have given Custer time to find better defensive ground as his subordinate Major Benteen was able to do, taking up a position on a steep bluff overlooking the Little Big Horn river. But given Custer’s impetuous nature, this probably wasn’t in the cards.
Custer had a reputation during the Civil War of doing whatever it took to win battles. His casualty rate was the highest of any Civil War cavalry general. But as Phil Sheridan’s devastating right arm in the Shenendoah, Custer’s troops won victory after victory – including winning the battle of Yellow Tavern where one of those grim necessities for a Union triumph to come to pass finally happened; Custer’s boys killed the biggest thorn in the Union side in the Eastern theater – Jeb Stuart.
Headstrong, fearless, and also something of a martinet in that he demanded much from his men, Custer was popular with ordinary troopers because he won battles and instilled a sense of pride in his brigades. He was not very well liked among his fellow officers, however, due to his shameless self promotion and perceived sucking up to headquarters. In the end, despite some historians who argue Reno and Benteen failed to come to Custer’s defense even though both those officers were busy trying to keep from being wiped out themselves, Custer’s fate was sealed the moment he divided his command
Custer’s 267 men rode along a bluff that he thought hid him from sight of the village. He was tragically mistaken. The Indians, alerted to his presence by the incompetent Reno were now swarming between the copses and in the shallow depressions that marked the north end of the battlefield. Too late, Custer realized his predicament and ordered his men up to the top of a gently sloping hill northwest of the village. Known as “Last Stand Hill,” approximately 900 Lakota and Cheyenne warriors were able to surround Custer’s command and wipe them out to the last man.
In the aftermath of the battle, General Terry arrived and after hastily burying the dead, started after Sitting Bull and his people. Evading capture for two years by going to Canada, the starving Lakotans finally surrendered on their own and were forced onto reservations.
The spectacular victory of the Indians over the United States army was the last major engagement of the Indian wars of the 19th century. There would be other skirmishes and campaigns – most notably against Goyathlay AKA “Geronimo, the great Chiricahua Apache warrior – but Little Big Horn would be the last time so many warriors on both sides were involved.
As for history’s judgment, Custer’s legacy will be a mixed one. Perhaps it’s unfortunate that Little Big Horn will overshadow his real accomplishments as a cavalry commander during the Civil War. He remains one of the most fascinating characters in American history, reason enough for the continued fascination with the battle that claimed his life.
3:50 pm
I think you’ve got a couple of your facts wrong. Benteen was not leading the 3rd prong of a 3-pronged attack. He himself viewed his assignment to ride off in another direction as a way to get him out of the way so he and his men couldn’t share the glory. And it was Reno who let his troops Hell-for-leather up to the bluff. Reno doesn’t seem to have been particularly competent, but early in his (mistimed) attack he was splattered by the blood and brains of his leading scout and it seems to have panicked him. He was later cashiered from the Army for a Peeping Tom incident. Benteen and his men joined Reno later and appears to have taken operational command from the more senior Reno. The troops on the bluff assumed that Custer had abandoned them to their fate, probably not dreaming that it was more of less the other way around.
It is possible I confused Reno and Benteen’s assignments – should have re read but I distinctly remember Reno’s high tailing it from the south end of the village in a running skirmish up the bluffs where he joined Benteen. Am I misremembering that?
ed.
7:40 pm
One little known fact is that Edward Drinker Cope (or was it O. C. Marsh – I always get those two mixed up) and a guide were dinosaur hunting in the region of the Little Bighorn just hours before the battle. Cope was in a position to get information to Custer, but couldn’t be bothered. He was too busy trying to beat Marsh to the latest dig.
It was one of those miniscule events that would have changed the course of history. Cope & Marsh were so competitive they basically gave up all human decency the once possessed.
SJR
The Pink Flamingo
It was Marsh. And I think it was actually almost a day before Custer arrived – about the time the Indians were gathering. No white man in his right mind would stick around when so many enemies were swarming around the area. Don’t think Marsh could have helped Custer much.
ed.
7:58 pm
At least one historian has suggested that it was not just the number of Indians that surprised and overwhelmed Custer, they also out-gunned him. Many of the Indians had sharps carbine repeating rifles.
I can’t remember where I saw or read that but if true, it might be to Custer’s defense.
Most of the rifles the indians had were picked up a short time earlier from dead cavalry belonging to Reno’s command.
ed.
8:42 pm
Nobody asked me, but…
Rick – Have you ever considered doing an “ask Rick anything” day? We post the questions and you render an answer or opinion.
BTW; your occasional articles on things not political are appreciated.
Um…no. Don’t look for it anytime soon, either.
10:39 pm
Many have wondered why Custer rushed into battle rather than waiting.
Respected historian Stephan Amrose in his book about Custer and Crazy Horse noted that Custer was a democrat. One of the few democratic civil war heroes (sound familiar?)and considered #3 prospect in the coming democratic presidential convention to be held the end of June. A military victory would possibly made him the democratic presidential nominee. A slight change of luck and he would be darling of the left as a democratic war hero.
This idea that Custer wanted to be president which is why he didn’t wait for Terry has been part of revisionist history since the 1960’s. It’s an interesting theory except there’s no evidence Custer wanted to be president and some evidence – his letters to his wife – that he had every intention of staying in the army for a long time.
Custer was a glory hound but it was glory for glory’s sake, not to advance a political career. It may very well be that Custer was interested in becoming president. But I don’t think anyone can prove that it was his basic motivation for attacking that day.
ed.
10:59 pm
The time of the battle is confused. The three primary tribes at the Greasy Grass, Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho were just stirring from sleep and finishing breakfast. However, since they had spent the night dancing they probably had slept later than usual, besides it was a weekend. The young boys were still with the horses for their morning feeding and watering. The time was before the sun was high in the sky, probably sometime between 10 and 11AM.
Custer’s men had stopped earlier for a break from several hours of riding. The General gave permission for fires to brew coffee as he was aware the hostiles already knew he was there. Since leaving the fort, the band had been ordered to remain silent. But now, Custer was convinced the hostiles knew he was there, and on the previous evening Custer allowed the band to play a few songs. Custer reqested the last song, the Doxology.
Custer and his officers indicate the time was about 6AM, but also say that sunrise was 3 hours off. That would place the coffee break about 3-4AM by modern reckoning. There were no time zones yet and Custer’s watch was set to HQ time in Chicago which was roughly the same as Washington DC time.
Between the early morning break and the approach to the encampment, a crate was dropped from a mule in the supply train following the Cavalry. A few Indian boys out playing, watched the supply train pass and saw the crate fall. They went to see the dropped contents and while there a trooper returned for the cargo, fired on the boys, who then ran off. One of the boys, ran to his grandfather, Sitting Bull, telling of the soldiers. The village was now very aware of the soldiers. However, they did not know Yellow Hair was present, not until after the battle and even then were doubtful because of the short hair.
In the painting at the top of the post, Custer is shown in his buckskin pants. But, on this day, he wore the cavalry blue uniform breeches and a red flannel shirt. Just before continuing along the ridgeline, Custer had changed his blue shirt for the red flannel. He thought it important to be visible to his men during battle, hence his flamboyent style. One of Custer’s brothers wore full buckskins as did one of his officers who also wore his hair long. Custer had made a show of cutting his hair very short before departure because his wife was afraid he would be scalped. He was not. Custer is depicted firing single action revolvers. At Little Big Horn, he was using state-of-the-art Webley double-action revolvers; the hammer didn’t need to be manually cocked before firing. Custer only needed to pull the trigger until the loads were exhausted.
Reno did attack the south end of the village, but was met with stiff resistence. He ordered retreat to the birch trees, but his men were chased from there. Reno skidaddled leaving his men leaderless. Without orders, Reno’s men retreated across the river as best they could and up the hill in a confused run after Reno. Benteen, arriving at the hilltop some time later, took effective command because Reno was mentally incapacitated and remained so for the many hours until Terry’s men arrived.
Meanwhile, Custer was unable to find a fording location until his command was four miles down river. He led his men single file down Medicine Coulee into the shallow river across from a stand of trees. In the middle of the stream, Custer stopped. He was shot from the saddle with a bullit in the left breast. His younger brother helped put the General back on his horse and tried to retreat up the crowded coulee. The troop, however, had to continue down to the stream in order to turn around for the retreat. This took several minutes for the word to pass to stop coming down the coulee.
Once the command had reversed course, the Indians had already forced Reno to ‘Reno Hill’ and had regrouped to attack Custer at the far end of the encampment. The command continued on a confused and disconcerted retreat up the hill. Many troopers – raw recruits mostly, not the battle hardened 7th Cav troopers of legend – dropped their carbines and surrendered. The Indians weren’t taking prisoners that day. Many other soldiers shot each other in suicide pacts, much to the dismay of the Indians.
The 7th Cav command never reached the top of the hill, but just below the crest. From there they made their stand. Two major charges were made by the Indians, one led by Gall and the second by Crazy Horse. During these attacks, Gen Custer was propped up by a horse carcass, but was able to fire his Webleys. By this time, the brothers of Custer were in command of the small detachment at Custer Hill. Custer was shot once more through the temple. Many believe he shot himself, but many Indians say he was killed by an Indian whose name escapes me at the moment (it wasn’t Gall; the Indians didn’t even believe his claim.) The battle was over very quickly – in the time it takes a man to eat a meal, the Indians said.
The relationship between General Terry and Custer is confused, also. Terry was a regular ranking General, while Custer was a Lt Colonel while in garrison. Custer was given a brevet rank of General during the Civil War and that rank applied when serving in the field after the War. Although Terry gave Col. Custer his orders in garrison, General Custer ranked Terry in the field. Terry knew full well that Custer had the ranking authority to do as he pleased once they left the fort. He left Custer with the instruction to do what he thought best if he encountered the ‘hostiles’. Custer was well within even Terry’s orders to attack the village when he did, as he feared the Indians would decamp and disappear for another season. Which is, in fact, what happened after the battle.
Of course, neither the version presented by Rick Moran nor myself can be conclusively proven. I am sure that Rick has spent many idle hours reading the Custer material as I have and I recognize his story has merit. But, quite naturally, I prefer mine. The story will never be ended.
The evidence for the “suicide pacts” has been largely discredited I think. The most recent survey of the firing by soldiers – the most extensive to date – concluded that “Custer’s last Stand” was actually a running battle from the Coulee to last stand hill – and precious little time there would have been for troopers to stop and kill each other. Prisoners? First I’ve heard of it.
The death of Custer has about 4 different tellings by native Americans – not surprising. Eyewitness accounts of anything are usually unreliable. But Custer was with that last group of about 40 troopers who were more likely picked off one by one by indians using captured rifles from Reno’s ill fated skirmish until there were about a dozen men left at which point they were rushed by several hundred Lakota.
ed.
6:54 am
Always very impressed with the level of discourse in the comments section of this blog…..thanks, for the original post and the discussion. Always a great read.
9:04 am
My own theory, formed after some study, is that Custer made a large number of serious tactical blunders:
1. First of all, he was on the wrong mission, trying to kill or imprison Indians who might have still been able to be accommodated without bloodshed. While not Custer’s fault, his dedication to this flawed mission led him to other mistakes.
2. He was working on bad intelligence regarding the strength and weaponry of the Indians. He had no idea he was not only outmanned 10 to one, but outgunned. There may have been more Indians with Henry repeating rifles than Custer had in his whole command, who were still using single shot flintlocks.
3. He made a very bad tactical assessment, assuming that the Indians were fleeing when they were actually mounting up to attack. This led him to hasten his attack, which again precipitated further blunders on his part.
4. He failed to follow the sensible Powell doctrine of 150 years later, of mounting overwhelming force against the enemy before an attack. According to his papers, he believed he had that.
5. He failed to establish proper lines of communication, and at one point sent a runner who spoke no English back to bring up reinforcements. The message was misinterpreted and, of course, the reinforcements never arrived.
6. He failed to establish proper logistical support for his attack, leaving behind much of his ammunition and at least one Gatling gun that might have been crucial to the outcome of the battle.
7. He split his forces (into three, not two).
8. He failed to retreat when the nature of the threat became obvious. It may not have been entirely possible once the battle was fully engaged but a commander less bold (or foolhardy depending on your viewpoint) might have avoided total defeat.
9. He cut off his own retreat and mobility by shooting his horses and using them as shields.
Without these mistakes, for whatever personal failings may have created them, he might have survived, to what end no one knows. History is, as we all believe, fixed, and only interpretations differ. I was pleased to see that the National Park Service interprets this battle in reasonably objective terms, as the clash of two great cultures and two heroic leaders.
Good analysis. I agree with almost all of what you’ve written. Some of it was 20/20 hindsight such as shooting horses probably seemed a very good idea at the time to troopers who were exposed on a bluff with no cover and no time to dig in and surrounded by about 1000 Lakota and Cheyenne. But overall, you nailed it; bad intel, bad judgement, bad battle management. All of that equalled disaster.
ed.
12:40 pm
Responding to your question. Benteen arrived at the bluffs later, and the pack train later yet. I know it’s not authoritative, but I double checked with wikipedia, and they confirm the times (I did learn something new from wikipedia, though, because I always thought that Charley Reynolds was a white scout and was the scout whose brains splattered Reno. Wiki says I’m wrong on both counts.)
1:55 pm
I can’t resist correcting a couple mistakes from J. Ewing.
Custer and his men were not armed with “flintlocks.” Some Confederates early in the Civil War were stuck with flintlocks, and as late as Chancellorsville numerous Confederates used smooth-bore muzzle-loading muskets, but by the 1870’s the US Army was using cartridge rifles.
As far as Sioux weaponry is concerned, they couldn’t have picked up much from Reno’s troopers since he lost only about 30 men, give or take, in the dash across the river and up the face of the bluff. The Indians would have had weapons taken from ambushed travelers, and 80 rifles (including at least two 16-shot Henrys) from the Fetterman massacre. Apparently the Sioux got some rifles (called “Laramie carbines” by the soldiers) as trade goods following the 1868 treaty that ended Red Cloud’s War. Given how many Indians (okay if I use that word?) were in the battle, I suspect that the vast majority were armed with bows and arrows.
During the Civil War Custer’s cavalry were armed with 7-shot Spencer carbines, and they carried special cartridge boxes that had 6 tubes, each pre-loaded with 7 more cartridges. That’s a lot of fire-power. However the Army in its wisdom replaced the Spencers with single-shot (but still breech-loading) carbines. I’ve read the analyses of modern gun authorities, and they assert that the new carbine out-ranged the Spencer. However the cartridges were copper, not brass, and continual firing may have heated the firing chamber to the point where the copper cartridges jammed. It would have been hard to clear the jam under any circumstances, and while under attack from mounted enemies … I’ve also read that copper cartridges in leather cartridge boxes are prone to develop a greasy coating that would have burned in a hot firing chamber, making jams even more likely and much more difficult to clear. I don’t know if that’s true, but it does seem plausible. At any rate, after a short while the troopers would have been reduced to using handguns which are outranged by bows.
(And don’t forget that bows and arrows have a much higher cyclical rate of fire than single-shot rifles, so don’t feel bad for the Cheyennes and Sioux that used them in the face of Custer’s troopers.)
It’s not implausible to me that some of Custer’s men—many of whom were raw recruits—broke, threw down their carbines, and ran. I never heard of this happening in Viet Nam, but it seems to have happened in some battles in World War I. Nor is it implausible that some killed themselves or were in suicide pacts. Eyewitness accounts of Indian torture of living captives were well-known from pre French and Indian war days, and even if some tribes didn’t use torture before the coming of the white man, they would have rapidly glommed on to the fact that white men were terrified of torture and could be counted on to kill themselves instead of fighting to very end. Well, what would you do in their shoes (moccasin or cavalry boot, either one)? If you were falling back and saw a friend go down, still alive but too wounded to retreat with you and about to be taken captive—to die slowly and in excruciating pain—would you leave him to his fate or would you put a bullet into his brain? If you were down to your last bullet in your revolver and faced capture and torture how would you use that bullet? (Okay, I’d like to think that I’d use it to kill an enemy and hope to force them to kill me in the hand-to-hand fighting but I’m safely at a desk in front of a computer, some 1000 miles and 232 years removed from the decision faced by a trooper of the 7th Cavalry.)
As regards Custer, he comes across to me as utterly impetuous, and since he was effectively rewarded for it by being made a brevet general only a short time out of West Point, this negative trait was highly reinforced. There’s a story from the Civil War where his commander and staff were on the banks of river debating about whether it was fordable. Custer finally decided to end the debate by riding his horse into the middle of the river, where the water was about a foot below his horse’s belly. They he turned to his commander and yelled “This is how deep it is, General.” (Apocryphal? I can’t find a reference I trust.)
Also, he won the Battle of the Washita with hardly any casualties, so he probably expected to do much the same at Little Big Horn. Certainly the tactics look like a refinement of his attack on Black Kettle’s village. Does that resonate with anybody? The US took down Afghanistan with ease and had no trouble establishing a stable government that looks more like a democracy than anything since the days of Tamerlane. Why wouldn’t it work just as well in Iraq?
Your story about Custer fording the river is not apocraphal. It appears in Catton’s Mr. Lincoln’s Army and the “commander” Custer shouted his “This is how deep it is” remark was none other than General McClellan. Custer was absolutely disgusted with Little Mac’s dilly dallying on the Penninsula (he thought McClellan’s cautious approach cost them a huge victory and the capture of Richmond. He was right). As Catton tells it (gleaned from several regimental histories) Little Mac stopped the entire column and was pouring over a map looking for a place to ford. Custer lost his patience and found out for him.
ed.
4:12 pm
Well, I’ve read Catton (and numerous other Civil War histories, though I have never been able to wade through the turgid prose of “Lee’s Lieutenants”) but I read Catton’s trilogy a long time ago and failed to remember where I first heard the story about Custer. I really love his two-volume study of Grant.
Grant Moves South is one of my favorite Civil War histories. Catton was a master of prose who had no equal until Stephen Ambrose came on the scene.
ed.
12:04 am
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