Right Wing Nut House

Muqtada al Sadr is a name familiar to most Americans who have been following the Iraq war closely. His “Mahdi Militia” has twice foolishly tried to take on the US military and been slaughtered - once in Najaf where Sadr’s chestnuts were pulled out of the fire at the last minute by a sickly Ayatollah al Sistani and again in Baghdad’s impoverished Sadr city where the radical cleric was forced to agree to a cease fire to save what was left of his militia.

Despite those two setbacks, Sadr’s militia has become the sharp end of the stick for his brand of Iraqi nation building. In a story that’s been developing for months and has gone largely unreported in this country (although British newspapers have done a good job in keeping tabs on Sadr’s political ploys) Sadr’s militia has followed the age-old axiom of politics - power abhors a vacuum - and moved into cities and hamlets in southern Iraq where Iraqi government forces have either been too weak or too scared to challenge him. They have introduced the strictest form of Islamic law, segregated the sexes, forced women to wear the burqa, and adopted an Islamic code of justice for local jurisprudence.

In effect, Sadr has been trying to set up an autonomous region in the south. Part of the reason for doing this is that he believes that the largest Shia party in Iraq, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) is getting too close for comfort to the Iranian Mullahs. Sadr fears Iranian influence almost as much as he opposes the American occupation. Hence, as a hedge against that influence (and as a way to have more influence himself) his militia has carved out a sizable slice of Iraq where neither the national government or American’s have much sway.

The wrangling over the new constitution has put Sadr into something of a bind. Relegated to a backseat in negotiations with the Sunni’s and Kurds, Sadr has decided to play an extraordinarily dangerous political game. He has actually cast his lot with the Sunni’s in opposing the constitution based on the concept of federalism as defined in the drafts. Sadr evidently believes that by granting too much autonomy to a Shia federal state, the SCIRI will dominate the politics of the state government leaving he and his followers out in the cold.

To assess his influence within the Shia community, al Sadr fomented an armed clash this past Wednesday between his Mahdi militia and the militia backing SCIRI, the Badr Brigade:

The violence erupted after al-Sadr loyalists tried to reopen an old office belonging to the al-Sadrite movement. The attempt to open up an office met with resistance from al-Sadr’s main rival group, the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI’s armed wing, the Badr Brigades, and al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army are the only two noteworthy militias among the Iraqi Shia.

Almost everyone in the Shiite political spectrum took serious note of the clash and has been quick to placate al-Sadr. His opposition comes from SCIRI, not the entire Shiite community — and even SCIRI publicly denies involvement in and condemns the attack. Satisfied that he is taken seriously by the more established groups among the Shia, al-Sadr then decided to back off and call for peace and harmony within the community. In other words, al-Sadr generated a mini-crisis to assess his current political status and the future of his movement.

This move also puts al-Sadr closer to the Sunnis, who have accused the Badr Brigades of engaging in violence against their community. Al-Sadr knows that if he is to rise within the ranks of the Shia, resistance will come from SCIRI — which means future clashes between Shiite militias are likely. For now, however, the Shiite movers and shakers have brought things under control.

By fighting with the SCIRI, whose revenge killings against Sunnis for Shia deaths due to the insurgency have been rising in recent months, al Sadr has actually gained some support among important Sunni leaders. In addition, while Sunni’s have taken to the streets to protest provisions in the constitution that outlaw Saddam’s Baath Party, Sadr’s politicos also ordered demonstrations and in an impressive show of political muscle, more than 100,000 al Sadr supporters poured into the streets in several cities on Thursday protesting against US interference in the constitutional process as well as proclaiming opposition to the federalism clauses in the draft document.

So far, Sadr himself has kept his position on the fate of the draft constitution to himself. In a way, he has painted himself into a corner and will have no choice but to oppose it. If the constitution is passed by parliament as is, Sadr will find himself in a quandary. If he supports the constitution, his influence in the Shia community will be reduced significantly. If he opposes it, he’ll be seen as an impediment to progress. What’s more, Sadr’s opposition will likely not take the form of sitting on the sidelines with his militia. Armed conflict with the SCIRI could be in the offing.

In short, al Sadr is a wildcard in the whole constitutional mess. His choices are narrowing the closer the constitution gets to ratification. And despite his militia’s questionable military capabilities, they are fanatical enough to cause a host of problems for both US troops and the SCIRI. Al Sadr will not go quietly into political oblivion.

Is there a way to satisfy the radical cleric while maintaining the integrity of the constitution? Some observers believe that most of what al Sadr is doing can be explained by a desire to be taken seriously by the entire Shia community. They point to Sadr’s religious standing (he’s too young to have the experience and years of religious study to become a respected Shia cleric) as a major cause of his frustrations. Could he be appeased by Ayatollah al Sistani who could elevate his standing as a cleric? It’s possible but not likely. As in all religions there are rules and procedures, not to mention traditions, that must be followed. It’s doubtful that even if Sistani wanted to he could satisfy al Sadr’s desires in this regard.

Could al Sadr’s Mahdi militia join with the Sunni insurgency and make common cause against the coalition? This has been a fear of the US military since Sadr emerged as a player following the US shut down of his inflammatory newspaper Al Hawza. And al Sadr’s flirtation with Sunni support in opposition to the constitution is troubling indeed. However, unless Sadr has gone off the deep end, it’s unlikely not only that he would actually join forces with the unreconstructed Baathists but that the Sunni’s would trust him in the first place.

What is possible is that Sadr would initiate a low level insurgency in the months leading up to the October 15 nationwide vote on ratifying the constitution which would be designed to highlight his political position as well as attempt to weaken support for the SCIRI. This too would be a dangerous game with Sadr running the risk that the Badr Brigades and the US military would think him too troublesome and try to destroy his militia and thus his influence. But it’s also possible that by carrying out attacks on both US military targets and Badr Brigade cadres, his influence would skyrocket among the Shia population.

Muqtada al Sadr presents an enormous problem for both the United States and the new Iraqi government. At the moment, they’re desperately trying to placate him so that his fanatical followers don’t disrupt the constitutional process that’s balanced on a knifes edge. But Sadr has his own balancing act to worry about. Which way the radical cleric goes may determine the future of constitutional government in Iraq.

Information in this article was obtained from Lebanonwire.com, a subscription only mideast news service.