Right Wing Nut House

It’s almost as inevitable as the daffodils blooming.

Every spring for the past three years, we’ve heard reports that the US intends to bomb Iran’s nuclear sites. While this has proved to be an incorrect prediction in the past, there are some signs that within a month, the United States could initiate hostilities against Iran, thus setting off a chain reaction of events - the outcome of which would be uncertain.

There have been numerous reports since January of this year that point to an April kickoff for such an attack. And in the last 48 hours, two separate foreign news services have pegged April 6 as the date for the attack. And then there was this curious story in the Turkish Daily News talking about using Bulgarian and Romanian air bases where increased activity has been spotted recently:

The United States “could be using its two air force bases in Bulgaria and one at Romania’s Black Sea coast to launch an attack on Iran in April,” the Bulgarian news agency Novinite claimed. Commenting on the report, The Sunday Herald wrote that the U.S. build-up along the Black Sea, coupled with the recent positioning of two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups off the Straits of Hormuz “appears to indicate that U.S. President Bush has run out of patience with Tehran’s nuclear misrepresentation and non-compliance with the U.N. Security Council’s resolution.”

“Whether the Bulgarian news report is a tactical feint or a strategic event is hard to gauge at this stage. But, in conjunction with the beefing up of the America’s Italian bases and the acquisition of anti-missile defense bases in the Czech Republic and Poland, the Balkan developments seem to indicate a new phase in Bush’s global war on terror,” wrote the Scottish paper…

The Bulgarian agency named Colonel Sam Gardiner, “a U.S. secret service officer stationed in Bulgaria,” as the source its story.

Before the end of March, 3,000 U.S. military personnel are scheduled to arrive “on a rotating basis” at the United States’ Bulgarian bases. Under the U.S.-Bulgarian military cooperation accord, signed in April, 2006, an airbase at Bezmer, a second airfield at Graf Ignitievo and a shooting range at Novo Selo were leased to the U.S. Army.

The Sunday Herald noted that last week, the Romanian daily Evenimentual Zilei revealed the U.S. Air Force is to stage several flights of F-l5, F-l6 and Al0 aircraft at the Kogalniceanu Base. According to the story, Admiral Gheorghe Marin, Romania’s chief of staff, confirmed “up to 2,000 American military personnel will be temporarily stationed in Romania.”

At the very least, all of this activity points to getting our ducks in a row militarily so that a decision can be made one way or the other to attack Iran and be followed immediately by military action.

Would Bush attack Iran without Congressional approval? He’s be writing his own articles of impeachment if he did. And given the dwindling support for the President among Republicans on the Hill, it could very well lead to his removal from office.

Ahmadinejad’s most recent outrage - the taking of 15 British sailors hostage - along with our apparent refusal to give him a visa to come to the US and speak before the UN about the planned sanctions against Iran, (It’s possible we issued the visa but Ahmadinejad decided not to come due to the hostage incident which would gain him no friends anyway on the Security Council.) could be significant. Did the Iranians take pre emptive action, believing an attack is imminent and would they use the Brits as human shields for their nuke sites?

Wild speculation to be sure. As is this entire article. But when enough people are whispering that something is about to happen, you can either ignore it as gossip or take it as a sign that things are going on behind the scenes that we, the public, may not be privy to.

UPDATE

Here’s a little levity regarding the prediction of an imminent attack:

Q. Why is the United States being forced into Daylight Savings Time three weeks early?

A. Back in 2005, Bush was planning an attack on Iran for April 2007 and some policy wonk pointed out that the attack would be taking place during the Daylight Savings Time change. It would be crazy to be changing clocks during a shooting war so, Bush’s wonks created a bogus piece of legislation called the Energy Policy Act of 2005 as a cover for early Daylight Savings Time. Now Bush can have his surprise attack on Iran without the fekkups that would be created by time changes right in the middle of an attack.

What do you expect from the English language Pravda forum?

News that a retired Iranian General has defected to the west may prove to be one of the most significant events in the War on Terror to date. While questions surround the issue of who assisted his defection and exactly who he’s talking to, the fact remains that if reports of his past postings and potential knowledge of some of the most closely guarded secrets of the Iranian regime are correct, this defection could lead to an intelligence bonanza that will shake up the Iranian regime while filling in some of the gaps in our knowledge of some of their most secretive programs:

A former Iranian deputy defense minister who once commanded the Revolutionary Guard has left his country and is cooperating with Western intelligence agencies, providing information on Hezbollah and Iran’s ties to the organization, according to a senior U.S. official.

Ali Rez Asgari disappeared last month during a visit to Turkey. Iranian officials suggested yesterday that he may have been kidnapped by Israel or the United States. The U.S. official said Asgari is willingly cooperating. He did not divulge Asgari’s whereabouts or specify who is questioning him, but made clear that the information Asgari is offering is fully available to U.S. intelligence.

Asgari served in the Iranian government until early 2005 under then-President Mohammad Khatami. Asgari’s background suggests that he would have deep knowledge of Iran’s national security infrastructure, conventional weapons arsenal and ties to Hezbollah in south Lebanon. Iranian officials said he was not involved in the country’s nuclear program, and the senior U.S. official said Asgari is not being questioned about it. Former officers with Israel’s Mossad spy agency said yesterday that Asgari had been instrumental in the founding of Hezbollah in the 1980s, around the time of the bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut.

Pajamas Media lays out some of the potential intelligence treasures Asgari might provide:

It is clear that Asgari is a man privy to numerous secrets which Iran desperately does not want revealed. As well as being a former deputy defence Minister, Asgari was also a General in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp (IRGC). The IRGC, more than any other branch of Iran’s armed forces, is aware of, and has access to Iran’s nuclear program. Its members are in charge of monitoring and protecting Iran’s nuclear installations, and scientists.

Furthermore, the IRGC is in charge of developing and testing Iran’s missiles, an arsenal which Iran has threatened to use if attacked. Last but not least, the IRGC is in charge of training and arming Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iraqi Shiite militants in Iraq.

The idea that as head of the Rev Guards Asgari might have been privy to nuclear secrets seems to be contradicted in the WaPo piece by Dafna Linzer above. Linzer reports that his source says that Asgari is “not being questioned” about the Iranian nuclear program. Does this mean they just haven’t gotten around to it yet? Or is it disinformation on the part of the US official?

It actually rings true that Asgari would have limited knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program. The IRGC is not a monolithic organization. It has several quasi-independent commands, including the Qods Force that we’ve heard so much about recently. It wouldn’t surprise me if the vitally important task of guarding Iran’s nuclear infrastructure was given to one of these independent commands that report directly to Supreme Leader Khamenei. Hence, Asgari would probably be in the dark about many of the specifics regarding the nuclear program although he might be able to confirm once and for all whether the regime was truly working on building nuclear weapons.

Richard Fernandez examines some of the side issues to this defection:

To those who have long ago decided that America must withdraw from Iraq, this development must bring some disquiet. First, Asgari’s reception can be regarded as “provocative”. After all, if Teheran’s goodwill is necessary to gain an exit from Iraq, then encouraging the defection of one of their top officials hardly answers the purpose. Second, it underscores the fact that American policy is still vacillating between the polar opposites of creating an Iraq on US terms and withdrawing in good order to save face. It may be all Washington talks about, but on the crucial point of whether to stay and “win” in Iraq or accept it as another Vietnam there has been no closure, nor is any likely until a new President is elected in 2008. Lastly, whatever revelations Asgari may make may be viewed with suspicion by those who fear that the Administration is once again attempting to manipulate the public to support a policy unpopular with the other major party. Nor is this fear entirely unfounded because it is possible, though unlikely that Asgari in some subtle way may manage to project disinformation which will raise more questions than it answers. Like every opportunity, his defection raises both tempting prospects and dangers. Maybe Washington should send Teheran a message: who said life was easy.

This should make the meeting with Iran, Iraq, and Syria this Saturday very interesting. I doubt whether Iran will raise the issue but it will nevertheless color the background of the conversations - especially if the US has some new intel on Iran’s assistance to the militias and Shia terrorists.

Meanwhile, the question of who facilitated Asgari’s defection has taken on an almost comical air as each of the likely suspects either refuses to comment or politely denies any involvement:

Iran’s official news agency, IRNA, quoted the country’s top police chief, Brig. Gen. Esmaeil Ahmadi-Moqaddam, as saying that Asgari was probably kidnapped by agents working for Western intelligence agencies. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that Asgari was in the United States. Another U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, denied that report and suggested that Asgari’s disappearance was voluntary and orchestrated by the Israelis. A spokesman for President Bush’s National Security Council did not return a call for comment.

The Israeli government denied any connection to Asgari. “To my knowledge, Israel is not involved in any way in this disappearance,” said Mark Regev, the spokesman for Israel’s foreign ministry.

An Iranian official, who agreed to discuss Asgari on the condition of anonymity, said that Iranian intelligence is unsure of Asgari’s whereabouts but that he may have been offered money, probably by Israel, to leave the country. The Iranian official said Asgari was thought to be in Europe. “He has been out of the loop for four or five years now,” the official said.

That last statement about Asgari being “out of the loop for four or five years” is almost certainly wishful thinking on the part of the Iranian official - or an outright lie. He was a Deputy Defense Minister for 8 years prior to his retirement in 2005 according to DEBKA who also speculate that rather than defecting, Asgari was kidnapped in retaliation for the raid by the Qods Force in Karbala that ended in the execution style deaths of 5 US servicemen:

The missing general has been identified as the officer in charge of Iranian undercover operations in central Iraq, according to DEBKAfile’s intelligence and Iranian sources. He is believed to have been linked to – or participated in - the armed group which stormed the US-Iraqi command center in Karbala south of Baghdad Jan. 20 and snatched five American officers. They were shot outside the Shiite city.

An Middle East intelligence source told DEBKAfile that the Americans could not let this premeditated outrage go unanswered and had been hunting the Iranian general ever since.

As always, DEBKA offers up entertaining takes on what’s happening in the world. But their track record for accuracy is, shall we say, something less than stellar. Take the above with a grain of salt.

Our record regarding how we have handled high level defections in the past is also something less than stellar. In fact, two famous incidents during the cold war raise the question of why any high value defector would wish to come here in the first place.

In 1964, Yuri Nosenko, the highest ranking officer in the KGB to defect to the west at that time, was at first seen as an intelligence coup, on par with the Soviet’s triumph with “The Cambridge Five” - a shocking penetration of British intelligence that included Kim Philby and Guy Burgess helping to pass nuclear secrets to the Russians following the war. But once in the United States, Nosenko became the target of one of the most irrational and paranoid men ever to serve in the CIA - James Jesus Angleton - who believed the Soviet defector to be part of a Soviet disinformation campaign to throw the agency off the scent of an agency mole that was supposed to be ensconced at the highest levels of the CIA.

A short profile of Angleton shows what Nosenko was in for:

Angleton can do nothing right. Mangold repeatedly shows him making a mess of his marriage, indulging his passion for martinis, turning up at his Langley office at 11 in the morning, or rolling up drunk after lunch. But his innumerable personal failings were nothing to compare with the disastrous consequences of his professional actions. Mangold’s central charge is that Angleton, as a result of his cold-war obsession, fell under the spell of another KGB defector, Anatoly Golitsyn, who persuaded Angleton that the most important step in the Kremlin’s quest for world domination was the takeover of the Western intelligence services. They would become vehicles of Soviet disinformation, both through fake defectors and through “moles” within the services who would seek to ensure that the “disinformation” coming out of the Soviet Union was accepted back home as genuine information. Subscribing to this theory, Mangold asserts, led Angleton to demoralize the Agency and ruin careers through his vain hunt for “moles” burrowing away at Langley. In addition, he prevented the CIA’s Soviet Bloc Division from recruiting spies in the Soviet Union–its raison d’etre–in the fear that they might all be KGB agents. But this assault on paranoia itself bears the marks of the disease.

This led to an unbelievable ordeal for the Soviet defector. From 1964 until 1975, Nosenko was treated not as a defector, but as a Soviet double agent:

Mr. Nosenko is subjected to increasingly harsh and inhuman interrogation and confinement, even locked up in a “dungeon” for three years, tortured by sensory deprivation and physical, psychological and pharmacological abuse, but still never concedes that he’s a K.G.B. plant. Instead, the holes in this narrative are attributed to the sort of innocent mistakes and memory lapses that may have resulted from his trying to build himself up to make himself seem more important.

Nonetheless, Mr. Nosenko becomes the rationale for an Angleton-led witch hunt that tears apart and paralyzes the C.I.A. in its hunt for the Hidden Mole, and results in destructive rebuffs of genuine defectors, because of a paranoid “sick think” mindset that imagined a K.G.B. Master Plan of Deception and Disinformation that succeeded in befuddling the West—all of which resulted in Angleton’s firing, Mr. Nosenko’s rehabilitation and the triumph of the K.G.B. mole in the C.I.A., who had succeeded in turning the C.I.A. “inside out.” Indeed, some of the cult-like Angletonians were so paranoid that they believed the man who fired Angleton, the one-time head of the C.I.A. itself, William Colby, was the mole. (Mr. Bagley, who doesn’t buy it, nonetheless conceded that he’s heard muttering to this effect.)

The gritty details of Nosenko’s ordeal can be found in Gerald Posner’s Case Closed. Nosenko’s defection came on the heels of the JFK assassination and coincidentally, he happened to have been Oswald’s KGB baby sitter while the assassin was in Russia. It was thought by some at the agency who agreed with Angleton, that the Soviets sent Nosenko to assure the Americans that the KGB had nothing to do with the assassination. But that was just more paranoia. Nosenko had been spying for the Americans for months prior to his defection and it was just a good piece of luck that he happened to have had access to Oswald’s files while in Russia.

Nevertheless, Nosenko’s ordeal was truly horrific. And to this day, there are some at the agency who believe he was a plant. His story has been told not only in Posner’s book but also fictitiously in the recent Robert DeNiro film The Good Shepard where the idea that Nosenko was a double agent is advanced. Regardless of Nosenko’s true status (and most experts believe he was genuine) his beastly treatment would have given any potential defector second thoughts.

Then there was the incredibly bizarre story of Vitaly Yurchenko, a man who defected to the US and then, a few months later, simply walked away from his CIA handlers and re-defected back to Moscow. To this day, no one knows whether he was a genuine defector who suffered from second thoughts or a clever Soviet ploy to embarrass the Reagan Administration and learn details of CIA debriefings of defectors.

What makes this case even stranger is that Yurchenko fingered two CIA moles; Ron Pelton and Edward Lee Howard. The CIA let Howard slip through their fingers and escape to Moscow but Pelton was captured and convicted of espionage.

The details of his re-defection are pretty unbelievable:

All that seemed certain about the drama of the turncoat’s return was that the last act began at a casual bistro in bustling Georgetown, Au Pied de Cochon, where he went for dinner with a junior CIA security officer on Saturday night. As his escort was paying the check, Yurchenko suddenly asked a question. “What would you do if I got up and walked out? Would you shoot me?” Replied the CIA agent: “No, we don’t treat defectors that way.” “I’ll be back in 15 or 20 minutes,” Yurchenko said. Pause. “If I’m not, it will not be your fault.”

He did not come back, and it was not until late Monday afternoon that his whereabouts became public. At 4 p.m., Soviet Embassy Press Counselor Boris Malakhov called the Associated Press’s State Department correspondent to inform him that there would be a press conference in 90 minutes. “We’ll have Vitaly Yurchenko,” he said. Replied Reporter George Gedda: “Wait a minute. Did I miss something? He defected three months ago.” Said Malakhov: “Ah, there have been reports that he defected, but come to the embassy to find out what really happened.”

The fact that Yurchenko works as a security guard in a Moscow bank today probably means he was indeed a Soviet plant. But why give up two valuable agents? The simple answer is because around this time (1985) the Soviets recruited their most valuable asset and the worst traitor in CIA history - Aldrich Ames. By sacrificing the two lower level spies, the KGB would have thrown all suspicion away from Ames - at least for a while. After nearly 10 years of doing extraordinary damage to US national security (including giving the KGB information that led to the deaths of several Russian citizens who were spying for the United States), Ames was finally caught after a lengthy investigation by the FBI.

Any potential defector may have seen the incredibly lax security around Yurchenko that allowed him to just walk away as a red flag. An Iranian defector’s life especially would be in constant peril from Rev Guard “special action” squads (which President Ahmadinejad was reportedly part of when he was a commander in the Qods Force) that target dissidents and defectors. It would certainly have given Asgari pause which may be why he worked through the Israelis to plan his defection.

I should also point out that there have been other high level defectors who were treated very well and handled expertly by our intelligence people and proved to be a font of information that no doubt helped us win the cold war. But the Nosenko and Yurchenko cases have been publicized far and wide, no doubt impressing on foreign intelligence types the potential problems with giving themselves up to the Americans.

As the inevitable leaks from Asgari’s interrogation start flowing, it will be important to keep in mind the political context in which these leaks are taking place and not to give unnecessary weight to revelations that show the Iranian government in either a good or bad light. By definition, the leaks will be coming from people with an agenda - pro or anti military action against the Iranians - and thus they will be trying to influence what we should be doing about the regime. Unless there is some truly actionable intelligence gleaned from Mr. Asgari’s debriefings, it is best that we wait and see until more of the story of his defection can be told.

UPDATE

Allah has been on this story for two days:

Israel denies involvement. Alas, Asgari seems not to have been involved in the nuclear program so this isn’t quite the intel coup for which we’d hoped. Sounds like he was the man to know if you were a Shiite terrorist in Lebanon as of a few years ago, though, which should be of use to the IDF and Mossad. Plus there’s the propaganda windfall, plus the paranoia this must be seeding among the mullahs. How’d you like to be an officer in the Revolutionary Guard who was friendly with Asgari? Sleep with one eye open, jerkies.

Heh.

I might also mention that Hizbullah has been expanding their foriegn operations in the last couple of years. Some names of Hizbullah operatives working overseas that Asgari might be able to pass along to us would, I’m sure, prove interesting and useful.

Ed Morrissey highlights the fact that Asgari served under President Khatami and may not have been able to stomach Ahmadinejad’s radicalism:

The tie to the Khatami regime could be significant. Khatami is what passes as a reformer in Iran, which means that he favored a more measured approach to international relations. Calling the US the “Great Satan” and Israel the “Little Satan” sufficed for stirring up anti-Western sentiment amongst the rabble for Khatami and his clique. They saw no need to dive into the waters of Holocaust denial and openly advocating for war with Israel and the US.

Asgari may have become disenchanted with the direction Mahmoud Ahmadinejad provided for Iran after the mullahs staged his election in June 2005. That appears to be around the time that Asgari left the Iranian government, although it seems he continued his work in intelligence. That would make Asgari one of the most valuable defections for Western intelligence in decades, not just in information but also in motivation. The mullahs not only have to stop all programs of which Asgari has knowledge, but they also have to wonder how many other disaffected Asgaris they are creating with their reckless domestic and foreign policy.

UPDATE II: THE WTF EDITION

Allah reports that there is some question whether Asgari is in custody. One US source is telling Fox News and ABC’s The Blotter that we don’t have him and don’t know where he is:

A former Iranian deputy defense minister who disappeared from Turkey last month is not cooperating with Western intelligence agencies and his whereabouts remain a mystery, a U.S. official told FOX News Thursday…

[A] senior U.S. official flatly denied the [Washington Post’s] report…

The official did not rule out the possibility that Asgari, who once commanded Iran’s elite Revolutionary Guards and served as the country’s deputy defense minister, was conducting negotiations with an intelligence organization, but denied that there was any type of cooperation with the U.S.

Stop. My head hurts.

Anything is possible including the idea that his defection was made public way too soon and US officials are trying to throw the Iranians for a loop. A high value defection like this takes months, perhaps even years to debrief properly. Of course, the longer the Iranians are in the dark, the more information gleaned from interrogations can be confirmed and even used to gather more intel. But once the cat is out of the bag the Iranians will change their methods and sources - perhaps even roll up some operations in foreign countries that may have been at risk. That last possibility would be a huge disappointment because western intelligence could have latched on to the Iranian cells and observed them for months, spreading the net as wide as possible before springing the trap.

Or, WaPo’s Linzer may have been taken by a little disinformation campaign hatched by American intelligence to panic the Iranians into thinking we had Asgari. Watching what the Iranians do in response to that kind of news is an intelligence windfall in and of itself.

The idea that Asgari may be negotiating his defection also is possible. Asgari evidently has a family and if they’re still in Iran, he may want us to approach the Iranians about getting them out. Some reports have suggested they’re already gone but no confirmation as of yet.

Appropos of my title, I sure hope we haven’t screwed the pooch with this guy somehow.

It’s one thing for an hysteric like Seymour Hersh to go off the deep and and talk about the real possibility that we would use nuclear weapons to destroy Iranian nuclear research and development sites. We expect such stupidity from the man who accused the American government of deliberately testing the Soviet Union’s air defenses by sending a passenger plane into Russian air space only to have it shot down much to our propaganda advantage.

But when the theory is advanced by “experts” like George Lakoff, well. . . all we can do is bow to the superior intelligence and perspicacity of the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley and start digging bomb shelters:

The stories in the major media suggest that an attack against Iran is a real possibility and that the Natanz nuclear development site is the number one target. As the above quotes from two of our best sources note, military experts say that conventional “bunker-busters” like the GBU-28 might be able to destroy the Natanz facility, especially with repeated bombings. But on the other hand, they also say such iterated use of conventional weapons might not work, e.g., if the rock and earth above the facility becomes liquefied. On that supposition, a “low yield” “tactical” nuclear weapon, say, the B61-11, might be needed.

If the Bush administration, for example, were to insist on a sure “success,” then the “attack” would constitute nuclear war. The words in boldface are nuclear war, that’s right, nuclear war — a first strike nuclear war.

We don’t know what exactly is being planned — conventional GBU-28’s or nuclear B61-11’s. And that is the point. Discussion needs to be open. Nuclear war is not a minor matter.

At the very least, we can gather from his writing that the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley is concerned about nuclear war. It’s just a shame that a Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley is a little deficient in the cognitive and not very adept at the linguistic.

But then, it takes a Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley to understand the nuances and “Euphemisms” of the enemy (that’s the White House to those uninitiated into leftist doublespeak) in order to wrest the truth from the dark corners of the Bush Administration so that the glorious light of reason can be shone and the nefarious plans of Bushco destroyed:

As early as August 13, 2005, Bush, in Jerusalem, was asked what would happen if diplomacy failed to persuade Iran to halt its nuclear program. Bush replied, “All options are on the table.” On April 18, the day after the appearance of Seymour Hersh’s New Yorker report on the administration’s preparations for a nuclear war against Iran, President Bush held a news conference. He was asked,

“Sir, when you talk about Iran, and you talk about how you have diplomatic efforts, you also say all options are on the table. Does that include the possibility of a nuclear strike? Is that something that your administration will plan for?”
He replied,

“All options are on the table.”

The President never actually said the forbidden words “nuclear war,” but he appeared to tacitly acknowledge the preparations — without further discussion.

I see the cognitively challenged Professor’s point. The President also never actually said the forbidden words “Hillary is a slut” but that doesn’t mean he doesn’t wholeheartedly believe it.

Or maybe, this linguistics expert missed the President’s point. Do you think that when he said “All options are on the table” he really meant “I’m gonna nuke them suckers back to the stone age?” Or did he mean “All options are on the table?”

It’s a tough call which is why I’m glad we have a Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley working on the translation problem. In this case, not just any old High School English teacher will do. We need someone with not only the linguistic skills to decipher the President’s cryptic comments but also someone very well versed in cognitive dissonance - er, theories that is.

As for the aforementioned Hillary Clinton, the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley helps in translating her rather obscure pronouncements on Iran:

Hillary Clinton, at an AIPAC dinner in NY, said,

“We cannot, we should not, we must not, permit Iran to build or acquire nuclear weapons, and in dealing with this threat, as I have said for a very long time, no option can be taken off the table.”

Translation: Nuclear weapons can be used to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear weapons can also be used to make excellent scrambled eggs but that doesn’t mean we will use them for that purpose - or for any reason for that matter. But our cognitiveless professor can see beyond the nuance, beyond the horizon, even beyond reason to glean the truth from the utterances of the powerful. Or so he thinks.

The nomenclature “All options are on the table” has been used in one form or another for centuries. The idea of using that phrase has never been to threaten or even hint at the use of nuclear weapons in any situation but rather to 1) state the obvious; and 2) keep a potential adversary guessing about your intentions. To make the gigantic leap of illogic as the professor does that all of a sudden this innocuous, boilerplate response - a response fully expected by the questioner - somehow is revealing of the deep, dark plans of the Bush Administration to use nuclear weapons on Iran is absurd on its face. It is idiotic. And it is embarrassing for anyone with more than a 6th grade education to advance such puerile drivel.

Perhaps it is the result of this Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley being so far out of his depth that he is unable to see the nose in front of his face. But that simply doesn’t matter. It is the superior goodness, the purity of heart, the absolute moral certitude of the professor that counts when coming to grips with the problems of . . . dare I say the words that none dare say?

To use words like “low yield” or “small” or “mini-” nuclear weapon is like speaking of being a little bit pregnant. Nuclear war is nuclear war! It crosses the moral line.

Any discussion of roadside canister bombs made in Iran justifying an attack on Iran should be put in perspective: Little canister bombs (EFP’s — explosively formed projectiles) that shoot a small hot metal ball at a humvee or tank versus nuclear war.

Incidentally, the administration may be focusing on the canister bombs because it seeks to claim that the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 permits the use of military force against Iran based on its interference in Iraq. In that case, no further authorization by Congress would be needed for an attack on Iran.

The journalistic point is clear. Journalists and political leaders should not talk about an “attack.” They should use the words that describe what is really at stake: nuclear war — in boldface.

First of all, I agree with the professor. From now on, when writing the words “nuclear war” on this site, I will place a smiley face immediately after it (boldface can get old very quick - especially when you consider how many times every day I write the words “nuclear war” on this site, being the war mongering, bloodthirsty neocon that I am.)

As far as the Bush Administration believing that the AUMF is all that is needed for an attack on Iran, isn’t it strange that the only ones making that argument at the moment are liberals in the blogosphere? I have yet to hear anyone from the Administration advance that rather novel theory - especially as the professor frames the issue as being Iran’s interference in Iraq. So far, the Administration has used what they consider evidence of Iran’s assistance to the militias and death squads only to crack down on Iranians in Iraq and not to threaten an attack on Iran itself. That certainly may change. I sincerely hope not. But Bush would almost certainly find the political rug pulled out from underneath him if he attacked Iran without specific Congressional authorization. Even many Republicans have made that clear.

Lakoff is pathetic. His rationale for not using nuclear weapons is self evident and simple minded. What is truly stupid is his belief that he’s somehow saving the world by writing about it - as if the rest of us had become so enamored of destroying Iran’s nuclear weapons facilities that we have lost sight of the consequences of using nuclear weapons. It takes someone awfully full of themselves to presume to lecture the rest of us about the immorality of using nuclear weapons or even the practical consequences that would flow from nuclear war :-).

Nor is the professor’s list of worst case scenarios complete - not by any means. No word from the Richard and Rhoda Goldman Distinguished Professor of Cognitive Science and Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley about what Vlad the Impaler in Moscow might think of a radioactive cloud wafting over Russian territory. Such a turn of events would almost certainly spoil family outings in southern Russia for quite a while. For that reason alone, despite the claim that “all options are on the table,” I think that we can all stop digging those new bomb shelters and emerge from the darkness with a fair amount of assurance - if not absolute rock solid certainty - that we will not use nuclear weapons if we decide to take out Iranian nuclear sites, thus avoiding “nation destruction” and - heaven help us - nuclear war!

UPDATE

From the milblog ARGGHHH!!:

Sometimes it’s best to actually study the subject before you go off screaming, ‘Bush is going to start a nuclear war!’ Just being smart doesn’t make you a polymath with a deep grasp of everything you know.

And why are these guys taken seriously? I can only guess ignorance.

Actually, reader Patrick Murray just emailed to remind me that Lakoff was hired in 2004 by the DNC to “reframe” the message coming from the Democratic party for the election.

We know how well that worked out.

During the 2004 campaign, Lakoff suggested that instead of talking about how Bush had run up the national debt, Democrats should label it a “baby tax” the Republican president had imposed on future generations.

He has suggested that same-sex marriage should be referred to as “the right to marry.” Trial lawyers like vice presidential nominee John Edwards should instead be called “public protection attorneys,” and the term environmental protection, which brings to mind big government and reams of regulations, should instead be termed “poison-free communities.”

Excuse me while I call my public protection attorney about suing my poison free community so that my partner and I have the right to marry and allow us to work together, hand in hand, cheek to cheek, to lower the baby tax.

Is this a great country or what?

In this excellent overview of the Israeli’s view of the Iranian nuclear program in the Daily Telegraph, it’s made very clear by the government that attacking Iran before they can acquire a nuclear weapon is not a question of if, but of when:

Having already suffered a near-apocalypse in the form of the Holocaust, the Jewish people have no intention of being the hapless victims of Ahmadinejad’s genocidal designs. Ehud Olmert, the Israeli Prime Minister, last month gave his most explicit warning to date that Israel was prepared to use military force to prevent Teheran from obtaining a nuclear weapon: “The Jewish people, with the scars of the Holocaust fresh on its body, cannot afford to allow itself to face threats of annihilation once again.”

That single sentence sums up the consensus among most of the Israeli people. If the wider world is not prepared to take pre-emptive action to stop Iran from fulfilling its nuclear ambitions, then Israel is ready to act alone.

There are those who do not take the Iranian President at his word that he will “wipe Israel off the map.” But if you are an Israeli government official charged with the safety and security of your tiny nation, you cannot afford the luxury of wondering whether Ahmadinejad is serious or not. He is the leader of a nation that at the very least, is about to get his hands on the technology - uranium enrichment - that can be used for both peaceful and military purposes. If you can enrich uranium for fuel to drive a nuclear reactor, then you can certainly enrich it enough to build a bomb.

The process is exactly the same. The only difference is is in the percentage of isotopes that are converted from U-235 to U238. In short, all you have to do is run the centrifuges for a longer period of time.

Since the Iranians have not shown any willingness to allow for the very intrusive inspections and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which would give confidence to the Israelis that the Iranian program is peaceful, it is a virtual certainty that they will attack and take care of what they perceive to be a problem themselves:

As for Israel’s offensive plans against Iran, the Iran Command team’s task is to demonstrate that Israel has the capability to act unilaterally.

“No one is going to take this threat seriously until the State of Israel can demonstrate to the outside world that we have the ability to deal with this menace on our own,” said a senior security official who serves on Iran Command.

“The only way we can put pressure on the outside world to deal effectively with Iran’s nuclear programme is to demonstrate that we can do this ourselves.

”Of course, we hope it doesn’t come to a military solution, and we hope that this can be resolved through diplomacy. But Iran’s track record is not good.”

If the Israelis do go through with their attack on Iranian nuclear sites, the United States will almost certainly suffer for the Israeli action. The Iranians have made it clear that they consider the US and Israel interchangeable in this matter and that an attack by either one will require a response against both countries.

Given this set of circumstances, the Bush Administration may very well be thinking that if they are going to get blamed by Iran for an Israeli attack on Iran, why not carry out the attack themselves? In for a penny, in for a pound.

Of course, our attack on Iran would set in motion a series of events in Iraq and elsewhere that would have consequences far more costly than a “pound.” The resulting turmoil in the Middle East could have a catastrophic impact on our interests not to mention any interruption in the oil supply deeply affecting our economy.

But it is in Iraq where we would suffer most from our attack on Iran. Some Shia militias would almost certainly turn on us and make any efforts to stem the violence there futile. For this reason, as well as all the other downside probabilities, I believe that we are not seriously contemplating a military strike on Iran.

In fact, we may be playing a willing cats paw for Israel. While we send more and more naval assets to the Persian Gulf while keeping up a constant drumbeat of charges and allegations about the Iranians assisting in the killing of Americans in Iraq, Israel can carry out the enormously complex planning involved in their own attack on Iran largely below the radar of world scrutiny:

For the Israelis, taking out Iran’s nuclear facilities is a very different proposition to the 1981 attack on Iraq’s nuclear reactor. Back then, the Israelis had the element of surprise - the last thing the Iraqis expected to see was a squadron of Israeli warplanes in their airspace.

Iraq’s nuclear programme also posed a relatively straightforward target in that all the facilities were concentrated at the Osirak complex, south of Baghdad. A few well-targeted bombs released in a single air raid were sufficient to do the job.

The Iranians, on the other hand, learning the lessons of the Osirak debacle, have scattered their resources around the country. Obvious targets, such as the controversial uranium enrichment complex at Natanz, are set in specially constructed bomb proof bunkers that would require high-precision, bunker-busting bombs to inflict any serious damage.

Yet another challenge is presented by the recent arrival of the Russian-made Tor M1 anti-aircraft missile system as part of an arms deal signed between Moscow and Teheran last year.

The military challenges may seem like a picnic when Israel considers the diplomatic nightmare of what the world’s reaction would be to their attack. Although the Jewish state can hardly be more isolated, actual sanctions would almost certainly be considered by the UN (and vetoed promptly by the US). And the idea of Israel attacking Muslim country would almost certainly roil the Arab street, although it would meet with secret approval in several Arab capitols where Sunnis dominate.

There simply are no consequence-free options on Iran for either Israel or the United States. But for the Israelis, who believe that Iran is willing and will be capable of carrying out another Holocaust of the Jewish people, the only consequence they fear may be from not doing anything at all.

Christiane Amanpour is one of the most respected foreign correspondents in the business. She has literally been everywhere and done everything - from wars, to famines, to natural disasters, to weighty meetings between world leaders - Amanpour, with a combination of tenacity and courage, has reported on most of the transformational events over the last 25 years. She has received 9 Emmys and numerous other awards recognizing her outstanding achievements in broadcast journalism.

She is also a left wing hack, at times willing to shill for anti-American Europeans as well as promote a clearly biased agenda against Republican Presidents. Some of her less distinguished moments include a fawning interview with former President Bill Clinton and her self-congratulatory rant about the press coverage of hurricane Katrina - since shown to be wildly inaccurate and little better than rumormongering. Some conservatives point to her marriage to former Clinton State Department spokesman James Rubin as proof of her bias but frankly, I find such charges based on who somebody is in love with ludicrous. One need only look at the Carville-Matlin partnership to give the lie to that canard.

When she plays it relatively straight, I find her a truly awesome reporter. Her coverage of the Balkans was searing. Her exposing the plight of women in Afghanistan under the Taliban prior to 9/11 was groundbreaking. I found her reports from Iraq in the aftermath of the first Gulf War heartbreaking. She was, I believe, the first journalist to report on how George Bush 41 abandoned the Kurds and Shias after urging them to overthrow Saddam, a betrayal that haunts US foreign policy to this day. And her reporting of elections in Iraq in 2005 for CNN was, I believe more nuanced and in-depth than any other media outlet. She didn’t downplay the sheer joy of the Iraqis nor the courage of the American and Iraqi soldiers and police who helped protect the voters from terrorists who had vowed to disrupt the vote. I remember thinking at the time that Amanpour is probably at her best in this milieu; great events illustrated by using human interest stories to highlight the magnitude of what was going on.

The point of this short look at Amanpour’s record is to show that she is much more than a journalist with an agenda. Although her bias is certainly part of the total package she brings to her reporting, it shouldn’t blind us to her real accomplishments nor to the reputation she has around the world among friend and foe alike. And she is usually no lackey when interviewing the thugs of the world, challenging them on human rights as well as some of their more outspoken criticisms of the United States.

But what to make of this interview with a “senior Iranian government official,” I just don’t know:

As I sat down recently with a senior Iranian government official, he urgently waved a column by Thomas Friedman of The New York Times in my face, one about how the United States and Iran need to engage each other.

”Natural allies,” this official said.

It was a surprising choice of words considering the barbs Washington and Tehran have been trading of late.

“We are not after conflict. We are not after crisis. We are not after war,” said this official, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “But we don’t know whether the same is true in the U.S. or not. If the same is true on the U.S. side, the first step must be to end this vicious cycle that can lead to dangerous action — war.”

He confided that what he was telling me was not shared by all in the Iranian government, but it was endorsed so high up in the religious leadership that he felt confident spelling out the rationale.

“This view is not off the streets. It’s not the reformist view and it’s not even the view of the whole government,” he replied.

But he insisted he was describing the thinking at the highest levels of the religious leadership — the center of decision-making power in Iran.

I asked whether he meant Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself.

“Yes,” he said.

A couple of things should be noted here, not least of which is that there have been rumors for months coming out of Iran of a deep split between Supreme Leader Khamenei and President Ahmadinejad. Khamenei’s criticisms are more related to the President’s style rather than substance but he has also gotten an earful from what western reporters refer to as “moderates” in the regime - the old guard of original revolutionaries who were quite comfortable in their corruption and positions of power. Ahamdinejad blew into office and immediately began to get rid of most of the bureaucratic conduits used by the old guard to siphon money from the ministries, replacing them with men of little or no experience but who had the true faith.

And then last December, Khamenei, with the help of the Odd Couple of Ayatollah Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami, both former Presidents and Ahmadinejad’s most vocal critics, engineered an electoral set back for the Iranian President as his lists for local and regional office as well as many of his radical candidates for the powerful Assembly of Experts went down to defeat. There have also been moves in the Iranian Majlis to shorten Ahmadinejad’s term of office as well as resistance to some of his more radical appointments to the ministries.

Taken together, all of this points to Khamenei trying to marginalize his outspoken President. But does this automatically mean a change in attitude toward the United States?

John Hinderaker isn’t buying what Khamenei is selling, pointing to recent statements by Iran’s Supreme Leader that are belligerent and threatening. Indeed, Khamenei’s rhetoric and the actions of the Iranian government have been far from friendly toward the United States in recent years. And, as John also points out, Amanpour allows the Iranian to give the impression it’s evil George’s fault:

Amanpour’s breathless report implies that only the belligerence of the President Bush, who unaccountably included Iran in the “Axis of Evil,” frustrates a full alliance between these nations, both of whom, she says, are bitterly opposed to al Qaeda.

Many others, of course, believe that top al Qaeda leaders are now inside Iran. And it is not hard to argue that from 1979 to the present, the foreign power that has most consistently been at war with the U.S. is Iran. Further, what are we to make of the claim that Ayatollah Khamenei considers his country to be a “natural ally” of the U.S.?

We have heard this “natural ally” theme for 25 years from those who wish to engage Iran in dialogue. It is said that the people of Iran have an abiding affection for Americans and wish to re-engage and requite this love affair so that they can benefit from trade and other contacts with the west.

The only problem with pushing this meme is that the Iranian leadership could give a fig what their people think about America and the west. In fact, every move they have made over the last 25 years has been to insulate themselves further from what they see as the degrading, sinful culture and influence that the west has on the third world.

Ahamadinejad is the synthesis of this movement. One need only read his “letter” to President Bush asking him to convert to Islam to realize what this 25 years of insularity has wrought; a leadership so out of touch with the real world that they have no clue how real nations interact with one another. When Ahmadinejad expresses surprise at the fierce opposition to his anti-Semitic rants by western governments, he is genuinely confused that they can’t see the logic and truth of what he is saying. When he suggests that the Jewish state should be lifted from the Middle East and set down someplace in Europe, the Iranian President actually believes that he is doing both Israel and the rest of the world a favor. He is genuinely surprised that people find his proposal monstrously insane.

So the question Amanpour should have asked is why the change of heart? What has happened recently to cause the Iranian government (at least the Khamenei faction) to approach a world-renowned journalist in order to carry a message of peace to President Bush?

I truly believe that the more pragmatic fanatics in the Iranian leadership are frightened of what might transpire in the near term. And it is more than the threatened military action by the United States. Surprisingly, the United Nations sanctions seem to be having a disastrous effect on the Iranian economy, far beyond either their intent or actual impact. Basics like food and fuel have skyrocketed in price in recent months as speculators believe that the current sanctions regime is just the tip of the iceberg. So too, may Khamenei. He is not oblivious to the voices of leaders like Chancellor Merkel of Germany who have made it clear that the west will do almost anything (short of military action one presumes) to prevent the Iranians from building a nuclear weapon.

And then there is the apparent stalling of the Iranian uranium enrichment program. After promising that they would have 3,000 centrifuges up and running by the end of February, it appears that the Iranians haven’t even started installing the machines. Given the technological challenges, most experts are not surprised. It may take a year or more for those centrifuges to become operational - and that’s if everything goes fairly well. And then perhaps another year and a half to two years before there is enough Highly Enriched Uranium and a workable bomb design. So, if Ahmadinejad thought that he would have a working nuke by the time the Americans were ready to attack, he’s coming up a little short.

Amanpour tried to draw out the Iranian on what exactly had changed recently to lead the Iranians to extend this olive branch:

When the official waved the column by Friedman in my face at the start of the conversation, his point was this:

That despite disagreement over Iran’s nuclear program, despite accusations that Iran is supporting anti-American killers in Iraq, despite even the 1979 hostage crisis, Iran and America are “natural allies” and the time has come to restore relations.

“We are natural allies. Why?” he said. “Because now the major threat for both Iran and the U.S.A. is al Qaeda…”

I pressed him about Iran’s sudden interest in extending an olive branch. “Why now? What’s motivating you?” I asked.

“Peace for the Iranian people,” he said. “But not only peace, peace with security. Peace based on mutual respect, mutual benefit and mutual security.”

Mindful of the heated rhetoric flying between Tehran and Washington — between both presidents no less — this official said: “If we give the impression that we welcome a battle, this is not because it is our first option. It’s our final option.”

All of this goes unchallenged by Amanpour - at least in the article on CNN’s website. Presumably, more complete answers would be forthcoming if there ever was a low level exchange of views between Americans and Iranians.

And it appears to me that the Iranian is broaching the very thing I wrote about here (and was roundly derided for by many of my friends) regarding a quid pro quo that included a guarantee of sovereignty for the Iranian regime in exchange for “peace with security” - perhaps intrusive and regular inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities?

This would be a non-starter at the present but could signal a real desire (or fear) on the part of the Iranians to talk. This is why I would not dismiss this interview out of hand despite the bias of Amanpour and the recent pronouncements of Khamenei. I respect the view of those who think that talking to Iran is worse than useless, that it would be delusional to believe that any agreement could be reached with the fanatics in Tehran. But does this mean we should close our minds to the possibility that, for the first time perhaps in 25 years, the Iranians have some good reasons to put out feelers to the west?

The so-called overtures made by Iran in 2003 can safely be dismissed for what they represented at the time; an attempt to drive a wedge between the US and our European partners by freezing the EU “Big Three” of Germany, France, and Great Britain out of any bi-lateral talks with the United States and weaken their resolve on the nuclear issue. As our negotiations with North Korea proved, multi-lateral and regional solutions to dealing with rogue states is the way to success - or at least the way to paper over conflict.

But this effort appears to be of an entirely different nature. The Iranians may be asking far more than we would be willing to give up at this point. But given the alternative of bombing and perhaps even military action that would facilitate regime change and the downside that would accrue to American interests in the region as well as our economy and our security, I would hope that the Administration looks upon this unusual demarche seriously and give it careful consideration.

UPDATE

Jules Crittenden doesn’t think much of the offer. This seems to be a pretty universal reaction from my conservative friends putting me once again at odds with the right on Iran. And since the left doesn’t think much of me either, it gets very lonely out on this here limb. I would appreciate it if no one sawed it off.

UPDATE II

Just as I was about to wallow in self-pity and whine about how lonely it is out here, up steps my brave friend Dave Shuler who, while not agreeing with me 100%, at least is a little more flexible than some:

Still, I have no argument with holding talks. I’ve heard Madeleine Albright say that the Iranian regime repeatedly snubbed the advances of the Clinton Administration. I guess that’s ancient history, too.

Talks are good. They don’t necessarily mean that you’re willing to surrender anything nor does it mean that they will be allowed to be used as a stalling tactic.

I might add that I oppose talking simply for the sake of negotiating. There must be an agenda and a framework before we sit down with a regime like the Iranians. Otherwise, Dave’s fears of the Iranians using negotiations as a stalling tactic would almost certainly be realized.

When I read this on Glenn Reynold’s blog this morning, I could hardly believe it. In response to an Ed Morrissey piece on Austrian weapons sold to Iran ending up with the insurgents in Iraq, the Professor drops his normally mild mannered personae and advocates hitting the Iranians with targeted assassinations:

I don’t understand why the Bush Administration has been so slow to respond. Nor do I think that high-profile diplomacy, or an invasion, is an appropriate response. We should be responding quietly, killing radical mullahs and iranian atomic scientists, supporting the simmering insurgencies within Iran, putting the mullahs’ expat business interests out of business, etc. Basically, stepping on the Iranians’ toes hard enough to make them reconsider their not-so-covert war against us in Iraq. And we should have been doing this since the summer 2003. But as far as I can tell, we’ve done nothing along these lines.

The outrage from all the usual suspects had to have been anticipated by Reynolds. He’s too experienced in the ways of the blogosphere not to have realized the second he wrote those words about assassinating “radical mullahs” and atomic scientists that a full blown blogswarm wasn’t in the offing. Sure enough, leading the pack of finger waggers and tsk-tskers is the number one hysteric in the blogosphere:

Just think about how extremist and deranged that is. We are not even at war with Iran. Congress has not declared war or authorized military force against that country. Yet Reynolds thinks that the Bush administration, unilaterally, should send people to murder Iranian scientists and religious leaders — just pick out whichever ones we don’t like and slaughter them. No charges. No trial. No accountability. Just roving death squads deployed and commanded by our Leader, slaughtering whomever he wants dead.

How Lambchop managed to wangle a column at Salon is a mystery. They obviously haven’t been reading his shallow, calumnious, hate filled rants toward conservatives and Bush supporters. His generalized assaults on people who disagree with him are wildly beyond the pale of decency and common sense - coarse, exaggerated, full of laughably simplistic analysis coupled with nauseating, moralistic lecturing. Lambchop is a Calvinist without the redeeming belief in God’s mercy.

“Cartoonish,” Goldstein correctly avers:

What I do find repugnant, however, is people like Greenwald(s) who hide their immense contempt for “the values of this country” behind pieties and outrage offered in bad faith, a rhetorical position intended to keep those who are trying to puzzle through difficult issues on the defensive, making them endlessly “prove” they aren’t “rogue” elements in the war against Islamism. And for all of Greenwald’s(’s) constant carping about how Bush supporters “routinely” label the loyal opposition “traitors,” he is fairly quick to insist that those who float the idea of covert warfare tactics are somehow hostile to individual liberty, freedom, representative government, and rule of law.

Lambchop’s absolutist, unyielding, unbending logic when it comes to anything the United States might do to protect itself does not carry over into criticizing the barbarians who violate every known international codicil that relates to establishing comity between nations. Nor does his resolute moral compass allow him to take the enemies of civilization to task for trying to achieve their goal of, if not destroying us, most certainly grievously injuring our interests and killing our citizens.

And we have no acknowledgement from Lambchop about Iran’s declaration of war against the United States on November 4, 1979 when they violated his precious international law, international tradition, and the rules of civilized behavior by attacking United States soil, capturing our diplomats, torturing them, and holding them hostage for more than a year. That, my dear sock puppet, is an act of war as surely as anything that has occurred in the international arena since the end of World War II. The fact that you choose not to recognize it as such is immaterial. For someone who pretends to be “reality based,” Lambchop’s concept of what is real seems to depend entirely on what he believes - which puts him in the same league as the holy rollers, the evangelicals, and other conservative Christians he takes such delight in savaging on a regular basis.

Leaving aside Lambchop’s bloviations, is it ever morally permissible to act like a barbarian to defeat a barbarian?

Conventional wisdom says no, that once started down that road we lose our identity as a nation and become exactly what we are fighting. I don’t know about that. We did some pretty horrific things in World War II to defeat Japan and Germany and managed to maintain our democracy while retaining a certain moral authority in the world left over from the Wilsonian era. The fact that we appear to have lost some of that authority today says more about the rest of the world’s refusal to acknowledge the threat of radical Islamism than it does about any actions we’ve taken to fight that menace.

By its nature, war is barbaric. I find it curious that absolutists like Lambchop somehow believe there is a “civilized” way to fight and win. We don’t target civilians. We don’t bomb cultural or religious symbols. We don’t behead our captives. Torture is a stain on our honor but it is apparently not a widespread problem. How much more “civilized” should we be? Idiots like Lamchop won’t be happy until we start warning the jihadis we’re coming because surprise attacks are barbarous.

From a purely practical standpoint though, Reynold’s proposal won’t work. Mathew Yglesias gets it about right:

I mean, how is this going to work? We’re talking, presumably, about the clandestine branches of the same intelligence agencies who can’t decide what the state of the Iranian nuclear program is, don’t know where Iran’s nuclear facilities are, and are unsure who, if anyone, in the Iranian government is responsible for Iranian weapons winding up in Iraq. Nevertheless, Reynolds believes they have an off-the-shelf plan for placing assassins in close proximity to key Iranian nuclear scientists. But not only for doing this, but for doing it quietly! American agents are infiltrating Iran killing Iranian scientists and religious leaders and none of them get caught. How? Are there really dozens of Farsi-speaking ninjas working for the CIA? I was going to compare this to a fun-but-stupid movie like The Bourne Identity but the point of that movie (and its sequal) is actually that if you somehow did build a hyper-competent utterly secret government agency it would likely become a cesspool of corruption and abuses of power.

Actually, I’m pretty sure our Special Forces boys, if tasked with specific targets, would probably have the capability to carry out a couple of missions. After that, I daresay the Iranians would increase security to the point that the question of assassinations would be moot.

And, at the risk of agreeing with Lambchop, how do you define “radical” mullah? You don’t get to be a mullah in Iran without possessing some fairly radical views like opposing the existence of Israel. How radical is too radical? What factors or beliefs do your base your targeting criteria?

Lamchop highlights the Executive Order outlawing assassination, something every President since Ford has followed. And if you lift that stricture, why target some obscure mullah? Why not go for the gold and kill Khamenei or Ahmadinejad? For the same reason no President has lifted the Executive Order on assassinations; what goes around, comes around. We kill one of theirs, don’t you think they’d do their damndest to kill one of ours?

And I’m not sure targeting atomic scientists is such a good idea either. The Iranians have had help from a number of countries including North Korea, Pakistan, and there is some evidence that former Russian scientists have also worked on the Iranian nuclear program. Besides, would it really do any good? Would it really cause the program any damage? Would it really make the mullahs think twice about helping the insurgents in Iraq? I doubt it.

I understand Reynold’s frustration with our inaction regarding Iran. We’ve dithered for 28 years about working to establish a genuine democratic movement there. It’s not like we haven’t done it before. One need only look at Poland or the former Czechoslovakia where we clandestinely set up a democratic facade for potential reformers that allowed for an indigenous movement to sweep those countries when the time was right. Of course, that type of operation takes patience and a lot of spade work.

The problem has always been that anything we do to Iran will result in counter measures that have the potential of hurting us even more. And anything we do to Iran will enormously complicate if not totally doom our efforts in Iraq. Fighting a Shia insurgency against our occupation along with war against the Sunnis and al-Qaeda would be a disaster. If Professor Reynolds believes that assassinations of the kind he is suggesting won’t set off the Shias in Iraq, he should read some recent speeches from al-Sadr where he warns against any American actions against Iran. And of course, the political situation - already tenuous - would go to hell in a handbasket. Forget about the Shias sharing power with the Sunnis or Kurds at all. In fact, that turn of events would make staying in Iraq a complete exercise in futility.

I too wish to avoid a generalized conflict with the Iranians. But assassination isn’t the way. And I believe that despite the sabre rattling by the Administration in sending 3 carrier battle groups to the Gulf, they too wish to avoid military action because of the consequences domestically and in the Middle East. In fact, it appears to me that the Administration may be willing to allow the Iranians their enrichment program, hoping that the technical problems they have been experiencing will continue while working to undermine the regime from the inside.

Short of war, that’s the best we can do.

UPDATE

Hugh Hewitt applauds Reynold’s idea while drawing a conclusion about Hizbullah:

Note that Hezbollah hasn’t kidnapped any Israeli soldiers lately. There’s a reason.

Nasrallah has his own reasons for not tweaking Israel’s tail at the moment, not the least of which is that he needs his militia to assist him in his efforts to overthrow the Siniora government and not trying to fight off Israel’s retaliation for such an act. For the last several months, Hizbullah has been trying to show that they are good Lebanese citizens who only want what they believe they deserve; increased representation in the Lebanese cabinet. Of course, that’s a crock. But that, plus the UNIFIL force have kept Hizbullah from any confrontations with Israel recently.

French President Jacques Chirac shrugs off Iranian nukes in response to a question at a press conference held yesterday.

The last time I did a post on French President Jacques Chirac readers walked away with the impression that I hate the French people and treat them unfairly when I make fun of some of their national peculiarities.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Like P.J. O’Rourke, I have a soft spot in my heart for the French:

The French are a smallish, monkey-looking bunch and not dressed any better, on average, than the citizens of Baltimore. True, you can sit outside in Paris and drink little cups of coffee, but why this is more stylish than sitting inside and drinking large glasses of whiskey I don’t know.
O’Rourke, P.J. (1989), Holidays in hell. London (Picador), 199

Perhaps if the French drank more whiskey and tried harder not to undermine the United States on Iran, we would quit calling them “cheese eating surrender monkeys” and simply refer to them as weasels:

President Jacques Chirac said this week that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a big danger, and that if Iran were to launch a nuclear weapon against a country like Israel, it would lead to the immediate destruction of Tehran.

On Tuesday, Mr. Chirac summoned the same journalists back to Élysée Palace to retract many of his remarks.

Mr. Chirac said repeatedly during the second interview that he had spoken casually and quickly the day before because he believed he had been talking about Iran off the record.

“I should rather have paid attention to what I was saying and understood that perhaps I was on the record,” he said.

I shouldn’t have insulted weasels so.

To say that the French are being unhelpful with regards to Iran wouldn’t be true. They have been of enormous help to the Iranians. The only possible way to convince the Iranian government to cease enriching uranium or, at the very least, allow for intrusive, on site inspections of the enrichment process is for the Big Three in Europe - Great Britain, France, and Germany - to stand shoulder to shoulder and speak with one voice along with the United States on the question of Iranian nukes.

The United States worked extremely hard last summer and early fall trying to reach a consensus with our European partners on Iran. We worked even harder to bring the Russians and Chinese on board for even the limited, watered down sanctions that were eventually passed by the Security Council. All the major players in the game seemed to agree on at least one thing; no nuclear weapons for Iran under any circumstances at any time.

This united stance actually seemed to be having a limited effect in Iran as prices for basics went through the roof because speculators were worried that even harsher sanctions would be in the offing thanks to the unity of the major powers. Ahmadinejad lost some prestige and perhaps even some support as a result of the sanctions regime being passed by a united Europe and America.

And now Mr. Chirac has detonated a bomb right in the middle of this coalition. It doesn’t matter that he tried to take it back. What matters is that the Iranians know that when push comes to shove at the United Nations, the chances are good that France will abandon consensus and once again pursue its own agenda. Not out of any over riding national interest but because they feel it their duty to oppose the Americans while pretending that France still has influence in the world beyond their former colonies and certain segments of what we used to call the “Non-Aligned Nations.” By giving a wink and a nod to Tehran on their nuclear program, Chirac has almost single handedly guaranteed that someone - either the Israelis or us - will have to go in and take out the Iranian nuke program before it can build a bomb.

Granted the chances of the Iranians giving in to the Security Council demands were remote even before Chirac’s casually stupid remarks. But Chirac’s comments guarantee that those chances now sink to near zero.

Chirac will be gone in a couple of months. It will be interesting to see if his successor continues the game of “now you see our support and now you don’t” that Chirac has played for years on a variety of issues. Just about anything would be an improvement over this insufferably arrogant man.

Following up my post from Sunday where I linked Bill Roggio’s piece on the possibility of the Karbala attack that killed 5 Americans being an operation carried out by the Qods Force of Iranian Revolutionary Guards, it appears that the Pentagon is indeed taking a closer look to see if the Iranian footprint can be detected:

The Pentagon is investigating whether a recent attack on a military compound in Karbala was carried out by Iranians or Iranian-trained operatives, two officials from separate U.S. government agencies said.

“People are looking at it seriously,” one of the officials said.

That official added the Iranian connection was a leading theory in the investigation into the January 20 attack that killed five soldiers.

The second official said: “We believe it’s possible the executors of the attack were Iranian or Iranian-trained.”

Five U.S. soldiers were abducted and killed in the sophisticated attack by men wearing U.S.-style uniforms, according to U.S. military reports.

Both officials stressed the Iranian-involvement theory is a preliminary view, and there is no final conclusion. They agreed this possibility is being looked at because of the sophistication of the attack and the level of coordination.

“This was beyond what we have seen militias or foreign fighters do,” the second official said.

The investigation has led some officials to conclude the attack was an “inside job” — that people inside the compound helped the attackers enter unstopped.

One of the commenters from my Sunday piece offered some interesting speculation; that the attack was carried out by former Iraqi Special Ops members. It makes sense since what the Pentagon is looking at is the level of training and planning that went into the operation. And while not indicative of militia or insurgent participation due to the operation’s sophistication, it might point the finger at units in the old Revolutionary Guard who were among Saddam’s most effective troops.

After some investigation, I had to conclude that this is not likely. We haven’t seen many operations that showed the kind of intensive training and discipline that would be the hallmark of Special Forces. In fact, the insurgents and militias are so ill trained and undisciplined that whenever they stand toe to toe with our boys, we win easily. Unless one speculates that this is among the first operations carried out by a Special Ops force that has been in hiding for nearly 4 years, it just isn’t likely that Saddam era commandos were involved in the Karbala attack.

The possibility of a traitor operating inside the compound would partly answer one question I had when I first read of the attack; how could the enemy penetrate our security? But for these guys to have talked their way past a couple of checkpoints is still a mystery. Unless security was just so lax that the cruised through based on the color of their uniforms. If that were the case, I hope some heads are rolling in that command.

But what of Iran? I speculated on Sunday, based on reports I linked to from Bill’s site, that it may have been a hostage situation gone bad. The enemy seized our soldiers and took off toward the Iranian border with them. After acting suspiciously at a checkpoint, Iraqi troops gave pursuit. It was during the chase that the Americans were apparently executed by their captors. And there was a report that 4 suspects had been arrested, although we haven’t heard anything since then about their nationalities or whether they were even involved.

Time’s Robert Baer speculates that the motive may have been revenge:

The speculation that Karbala was an IRGC operation may have as much to do with Iraqis’ respect for IRGC capacity for revenge as it does with the truth. Nevertheless, we should count on the IRGC gearing up for a fight. And we shouldn’t underestimate its capacities. Aside from arming the opposition, the IRGC is capable of doing serious damage to our logistics lines. I called up an American contractor in Baghdad who runs convoys from Kuwait every day and asked him just how much damage.”Let me put it this way,”he said.”In Basra today the currency is the Iranian toman, not the Iraqi dinar.”He said his convoys now are forced to pay a 40% surcharge to Shi’a militias and Iraqi police in the south, many of whom are affiliated with IRGC.

Mindful of the spreading chaos in Iraq, President Bush has promised not to take the war into Iran. But it won’t matter to the IRGC. There is nothing the IRGC likes better than to fight a proxy war in another country.

This also makes sense. The Qods Force has a clandestine arm that has been involved in several assassinations of Iranian dissidents in Europe and the Middle East. Our buddy President Ahmadinejad cut his bones as a senior commander in the Force and it has been charged but never proven that he participated in the assassination of Iranian Kurdish leader Abdorrahman Qassemlou in Vienna in 1989. I have no doubt that Ahmadinejad sees our raid on the “consulate” in Irbil and the taking and holding of 5 Qods Force members as a personal affront and a national humiliation. It would make sense that he would send some of his old friends into Karbala to avenge this blow to Iranian honor.

On a related note, it appears that the Bush Administration will not reveal specifics of Iranian involvement in the violence in Iraq after all. The press conference that was scheduled for today which would have supplied chapter and verse of Iranian assistance to the militias and the insurgents has been postponed:

A plan by the Bush administration to release detailed and possibly damning specific evidence linking the Iranian government to efforts to destabilize Iraq have been put on hold, U.S. officials told FOX News.

Officials had said a “dossier” against Iran compiled by the U.S. likely would be made public at a press conference this week in Baghdad, and that the evidence would contain specifics including shipping documents, serial numbers, maps and other evidence which officials say would irrefutably link Iran to weapons shipments to Iraq.

Now, U.S. military officials say the decision to go public with the findings has been put on hold for several reasons, including concerns over the reaction from Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — as well as inevitable follow-up questions that would be raised over what the U.S. should do about it.

This stinks of State Department meddling. Their concern is that there is a possibility Ahmadinejad is on the ropes in Iran thanks to his spectacularly incompetent rule and the restlessness of some of his supporters and any serious charges made regarding Iranian complicity in the violence in Iraq will only strengthen the President and unite the Iranians behind him.

I will admit to not knowing enough about internal Iranian politics to enable me to make an informed judgement as to whether that is true or false but I know enough to believe that reports of President Ahamdinejad’s demise could be greatly exaggerated. He’s not going anywhere anytime soon. Most of these reports about unrest regarding his rule are coming from predictable sources - ex-Presidents Ayatollah Ali Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami. Rafsanjani’s lists did very well in local elections last month and Khatami has been a font of criticism of Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy for a long time. The only person Ahmadinejad has to keep happy is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Only the Big Tuna could engineer his ouster in the Iranian Majlis.

This from an Iranian insider:

“I don’t think Ahmadinejad will leave the presidency before his mandate expires but I am also convinced he will not succeed in winning a second term,” added Saharkhiz. “Many factions and personalities who supported Ahmadinejad’s candidature at the 2005 presidential elections have already abandoned him and don’t spare criticism, even harsh and direct, of the president and his government.”

One other possibility for the delay in releasing the evidence of Iranian perfidy in Iraq may be that they want to complete the investigation into what happened in Karbala. The problem there is that could take weeks. And I assumed that one reason the Administration wanted to get this information out there was to stiffen some Congressional spines about our involvement in Iraq. With Iran contributing to the deaths of Americans and Iraqis, it makes pacifying the country even more of an imperative.

This situation with Iranian meddling in Iraq has grown intolerable. Despite cries from some Iraqi quarters to stop the round up of Iranians, as long as Maliki supports it (and perhaps even if he doesn’t) we should continue to aggressively pursue them.

Perhaps a better headline for this post should have been: Is there anything to be done about Iran?

But since I am an inveterate warmonger and fire breathing neo-con - at least according to some of my more unbalanced critics - the idea that there actually is something to be done militarily about Iran appeals to my militaristic soul.

Unfortunately, warring with the Persians would not solve any of our problems in Iraq and would probably even make things worse in the Middle East. The thought of not only fighting an insurgency against Sunni Islamists, al-Qaeda terrorists, and unreconstructed Baathists but adding to the mix several tens of thousands of enraged Shias joining the revolt against our occupation would make any troop increase in Iraq a futile exercise. And like it or not, Iran is now a regional power in the Middle East - an inevitable outgrowth of their own growing aggressiveness over the past decade and not as a result of anything the US has done in Iraq - and an attack on Iran would have unforeseen and unintended consequences for the region.

Since I firmly believe this to be the case, allow me to let my softer, feminine side dominate this discussion. Who knows. Maybe they’ll let me join the “Glenn Greenwald Fan Club” or perhaps even invite me to a shindig sponsored by Code Pink.

In truth, we are in a bind when it comes to doing anything about Iran. I reject the notion that one course or another proposed so far would “solve” anything. “Diplomatic overtures” made to the insular, treacherous, and fanatical mullahs who currently are in control of Iran would only reveal our weakness and, in the end prove futile. This is because Iran has absolutely no reason to talk to us. When negotiating, it is usually a prerequisite that both sides could benefit by coming to some kind of agreement - unless you’re a liberal or a denizen of Foggy Bottom. Then negotiating simply for the sake of talking becomes a goal in and of itself.

In the case of negotiating with Iran, there is nothing the US can concede consistent with our national interest while the issues we want resolved with the mullahs - a halt to nuclear enrichment and their assistance in stabilizing Iraq - are both non starters with the regime. Those who advocate negotiations to resolve these matters are delusional dreamers. It is much more likely that any bi-lateral talks we undertake with Iran will end up in delay, stalemate, and total failure. Iran will build their bomb and come to dominate Iraq no matter how long we negotiate or what we give up in return for any vague promises of cooperation by the mullahs.

We can’t bomb them. We can’t talk to them. Can we contain them?

As unsatisfactorily a course of action it may appear to be on the surface, containment would seem to be the only viable option open to the United States consistent with our interests in the region. For this, we have history and tradition on our side - elements that for once can work for us in the Middle East instead of against us. The fact is, Arab states have a laundry list of grievances against the Iranians going back hundreds of years not to mention the fear of Shia nationalism that the mullahs have unleashed in Iraq, Lebanon, and among the Shia minorities in other Arab states. The major powers in the region - Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia - would welcome our assistance in trying to block Iranian ambitions to dominate the Middle East with their nuclear weapons and unsavory brand of Shia hegemony.

Would we have to arm those countries with nuclear weapons or allow them to develop their own nuclear program to counter the Iranian threat? Not necessarily. Extending America’s nuclear umbrella to include protecting our friends in the region from Iranian nuclear blackmail would be considered a radical escalation but, at the same time, better than the alternative of going to war. The question would be whether nations like Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and the Gulf States would welcome such a guarantee of their sovereignty. And at the moment, that would appear to be unlikely. Our slow, painful egress from Iraq is not instilling much confidence in our friends regarding American steadfastness or staying power.

More likely, we could work to upgrade the conventional militaries of our Arab friends. This will not sit well with the Israelis but they will probably acquiesce without too much grumbling. They should realize that our efforts to stymie the Iranians would benefit their strategic position as well. And most of the Arab states at risk would welcome our relaxing the stringent rules against exporting some of our more advanced weapons systems.

But of overarching importance would be to get the Europeans on board with any containment effort. It isn’t a question of sanctions although more stringent penalties meted out by the United Nations would be helpful. By having our NATO allies signing on to a policy of containment as they did during the cold war, the west would be presenting a united front to the Iranians. This would probably not convince them to halt enrichment or deter them from meddling in Lebanon or Iraq. But it would definitely affect their calculations if they attempted to interfere in other states where Shia minorities are growing increasingly restless - largely at Iranian instigation but also as a result of a rise in Shia pride and Shia nationalism.

This is an historical movement that has been rising since even before the Iranian revolution and many of the states affected, especially in the Gulf region, are already dealing with Shia aspirations in the political sphere in one way or another. Change comes slowly but change is coming. And the last thing countries like Yemen, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia need is Iran flagging the latent mistrust and feelings of oppression felt by Shias all across the Middle East.

I realize how unsatisfactory a policy containing the Iranian menace is seen by many of my friends on the right. But when the alternatives are unacceptable or would cause more problems than they solve, there are times when only bad choices present themselves and we must choose the least awful among them.

UPDATE

What about fomenting revolution in Iran?

This, unfortunately, is also a non starter at this point. As in Russia during the reign of communists, the Iranians have brutally suppressed and eliminated democratic organizations and individuals with the potential to lead them. Any effort to supplant the mullahs would take many long years of carefully laying the groundwork for democratic groups to gain any ground at all. With the stranglehold on elections the mullahs enjoy (they say who runs for office not to mention their practicing fraud, intimidation, and outright stealing of elections), any peaceful transformation of Iranian society is a long term project with an uncertain outcome.

How about funding an insurgency? I suppose if we want to support groups already fighting the regime like the MEK (Mujahedin-e Khalq), we could take them off the State Department list of terrorist organizations and give them money and arms. But the question is what kind of leaders would be thrown up by backing such groups? Our efforts in eastern Europe succeeded because we supported a democratic opposition that, in the end, was in favor of a peaceful transition of power. Needless to say, it worked beyond anyone’s expectation although it took a quarter of a century to bear fruit.

I don’t think it would take that long in Iran but I do believe it will happen as a result of a combination of forces - death of the old guard, rise of material expectations that the mullahs can’t meet, and an opening of Iran to new ideas - all of which could take a decade or more.

By all means we should be supporting freedom in Iran. But to expect results anytime soon is unrealistic.

The Associated Press is reporting that diplomats and intelligence agencies are at a loss to explain an apparent pause in Iran’s drive to enrich nuclear fuel:

Iran’s uranium enrichment program appears stalled despite tough talk from the Tehran leadership, leaving intelligence services guessing about why it has not made good on plans to press ahead with activities that the West fears could be used to make nuclear arms, diplomats said today.

Outside monitoring of Iran’s nuclear endeavors is restricted to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of declared sites, leaving significant blind spots for both the agency and intelligence agencies of member countries trying to come up with the full picture.

Still, Tehran’s reluctance to crank up activities at its declared enrichment site at Natanz when it seems to have the technical know-how is puzzling the diplomatic and intelligence communities. Some say it is potentially worrisome.

Diplomats accredited or otherwise linked to the Vienna-based IAEA, speaking on condition of anonymity in exchange for discussing restricted information on the Iranian program, said some intelligence services believed that the Natanz site was a front.

While the world’s attention is focused on Natanz, Iranian scientists and military personnel could be working on a secret enrichment program at one or more unknown sites that are much more advanced than what is going on at the declared site, they said.

I think the most likely reason for the apparent pause in the Iranian program is very simple; they are having problems overcoming the technological hurdles involved in making 3,000 centrifuges work the way they’re supposed to.

Having the technical “know how” and then actually carrying out the experiment are two totally different kettles of fish:

IAEA inspectors arrived at Natanz yesterday for a routine round of monitoring.

But one of the diplomats said they were unlikely to find anything but the status quo — two small pilot plants assembled in 164 centrifuge “cascades” but working only sporadically to produce small quantities of non-weapons-grade enriched uranium and other individual centrifuges undergoing mechanical testing. That essentially has been the situation at Natanz since late November, he said.

There have been no signs of any activity linked to Iranian plans to assemble 3,000 centrifuges at Natanz and move them into an underground facility as the start of an ambitious program foreseeing 50,000 centrifuges producing enriched material, said the diplomats.

We tend to forget that Iran is a third world country, one of the most insular nations on earth. Ever since we exposed the A.Q. Khan nuclear black market network 3 years ago, it is likely that the kind of technical expertise that could help the Iranians get over the hump and start those centrifuges whirring also dried up. Since intelligence agencies (along with the IAEA) keep a close watch on nuclear scientists from countries like Pakistan and North Korea, they would know if Iran was receiving the kind of technical assistance that would help keep their nuke program on track.

In short, the Iranians may have hit a technological road block - temporarily. Given time and money, they will almost certainly be able to work through their problems.

This, in fact, was foretold by nuclear experts a year ago:

So, the real question, however, is how quickly Iran could assemble and operate 1,500 centrifuges in a crash program to make enough HEU for one bomb (say 15-20 kg).

Albright and Hinderstein have created a notional timeline for such a program:

Assemble 1,300-1,600 centrifuges. Assuming Iran starts assembling centrifuges at a rate of 70-
100/month, Iran will have enough centrifuges in 6-9 months.

Combine centrifuges into cascades, install control equipment, building feed and withdrawal systems, and test the Fuel Enrichment Plant. 1 year

Enrich enough HEU for a nuclear weapon. 1 year

Weaponize the HEU. A “few” months.

Total time to the bomb—about three years.

And that was based on things going relatively smoothly. What could go wrong?

Iran might not be able to meet such a schedule for bringing a centrifuge plant into operation. The suspension of manufacturing and operating centrifuges could be reestablished, or Iran might have trouble making so many centrifuges. In addition, Iran does not appear to have accumulated enough experience to operate a cascade of centrifuges reliably. Iran had assembled 164 centrifuges into a cascade just before the suspension, but it did not acquire sufficient experience in operating the cascade to be certain it would perform adequately. Centrifuges can crash during operation, causing other centrifuges in the cascade to fail—in essence, destroying the entire cascade. Thus, Iran might need a year or more of additional experience in operating test cascades before building and operating a plant able to make HEU for nuclear weapons.

In the last year, Iran has operated those 164 centrifuges successfully and enriched an extremely small amount of uranium about 5%. In order to build a bomb, they would have to operate a cascade using 10 times the number of centrifuges, for at least 12 months of constant, flawless operation in order to enrich a much, much larger amount of uranium to 85-90%.

Does this mean they don’t have a “dual track” program - a civilian program that is being inspected by the IAEA (at present) and a secret military program that no one knows about?

The CIA considered such a possibility but could find no evidence to support it although there were troubling indications of military research and development of centrifuge technology. It would come as a huge surprise indeed if the Iranians were enriching uranium using sophisticated cascades and thousands of centrifuges in secret while appearing to make only marginal progress publicly.

Could the CIA be that wrong about the Iranian program? Considering their track record, the answer is yes. The Israelis believe the Iranians are less than 2 years from having a workable bomb, hence their own sabre rattling recently.

Anthony Cordesman may have divined the real reason for the slowdown in the Iranian nuclear program:

Anthony Cordesman, an Iran specialist at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, suggested an additional possibility linked to theories that Tehran was forging ahead with its enrichment program at undisclosed locations: fear that any major progress at Natanz could provoke military action by Israel or the United States.

“It’s a known facility and more and more of the subject of discussion as a possible Israeli or U.S. target,” Mr. Cordesman said from Washington. “So, do you use this facility now or wait to see what threat you face?”

I think the left is right about this one. I think Bush fully intends to attack the Iranian nuclear facilities before he leaves office - especially if he thinks his successor won’t. Considering the possible problems that the Iranians are having with their program, this just doesn’t make any sense.

We have time - time to build the kind of international coalition that we failed to do on Iraq. The Europeans are already on board. Even Russia and China agree that a nuclear Iran is unacceptable. Bombing them at this point without applying progressively more painful sanctions is stupid. If necessary, we could blockade their ports or if worse came to worse, destroy their oil facilities. Yes, these are both acts of war - acts committed against a country that declared war on the United States 28 years ago. But even bombing their oil facilities would be far preferable to the kind of sustained, massive air attack that would be necessary to interrupt the Iranian drive for nuclear weapons.

I agree that a nuclear armed Iran is as bad as it gets for the peace and security of the world. But they’re not there yet and may be nowhere near the point where they are a threat.