Right Wing Nut House

8/13/2006

OF CHESTNUTS AND SUN TZU

Filed under: General — Rick Moran @ 12:50 pm

Is Nasrallah about to pull Prime Minister Olmert’s chestnuts from the fire? Or is he angling to bring down the Lebanese government?

If this report in the J-Post is true, Nasrallah may be making a huge mistake:

A critical Lebanese Cabinet meeting set for Sunday to discuss implementation of the cease-fire between Israel and Hizbullah was postponed, a move that was likely to delay the dispatch of the Lebanese army to the south and an end of the fighting.

A top aide to Prime Minister Fuad Saniora said the meeting had been indefinitely postponed but would give no reason. Published reports said the Cabinet, which approved the cease-fire unanimously Saturday night, had been sharply divided over demands in the cease-fire agreement that Hizbullah surrender its weapons in south Lebanon.

That disagreement was believed to have caused the postponement of the Sunday meeting that was to have taken up the dispatch of some 15,000 troops to the south.

It was always thought that Nasrallah would be able to finesse any stipulation to disarm. And in fact, the cease fire resolution left the question of Hizbullah disarmament for a later date, to be discussed with Israel in the context of a far ranging agreement with the government of Lebanon over a host of issues including prisoner exchange and the Shebaa Farms question.

My own opinion that this tactic by Nasrallah is his first post-war move in what is sure to be a contentious period of domestic Lebanese politics. I would not be surprised if in the next few hours, the 5 Shia ministers in Siniora’s cabinet resign. That would effectively bring down his government although he will probably be given an opportunity to form another one. The Prime Minister will find this very difficult because for all intents and purposes, the entire Shia block is under the control of Nasrallah.

Could Nasrallah manuever himself into a position of greater power as a result of the fall of the Siniora government? There is no major office open to him due to the power sharing arrangements mandated by the constitution. The Prime Minister’s office is reserved for Sunnis so it is extremely doubtful that Nasrallah would be given that office. However, he could very well put himself in the position of being a kingmaker, with ultimate veto power over any cabinet ministers named by Siniora. Needless to say, this would make Hizbullah disarmament even more remote.

Ed Morrissey thinks that Olmert manipulated the cease fire deliberately:

Does anyone not believe that this crisis has been precipitated by Hezbollah’s refusal to leave southern Lebanon and disarm? The cease-fire proposal put the onus on them to cease their attacks on Israel and to dismantle their military wing. I warned earlier that such a requirement would eliminate the need for Hezbollah at all; their entire raison d’etre for the Lebanese people has been as a shield against the Israelis. If the Lebanese Army took that function away from them, they just become another terrorist militia, a construct of which the Lebanese have rightly tired.

Nasrallah knew this. He signaled his approval yesterday of the cease-fire but objected to the arms embargo and the disarming of his organization. Perhaps he thought the Israelis would reject it, but when the Israeli Cabinet adopted it unanimously, it looks like Nasrallah had his bluff called.

This is certainly a valid analysis although as I pointed out, there is no immediate requirement in the cease fire agreement for Hizbullah to disarm. And I also think Ed is ascribing too much wit and wisdom to Olmert who has stumbled his way through this war. Only now has the IDF begun to make good progress against Hiz positions in the south. I think Olmert was taking the best deal he thought he could get and that the kind of subtlety Ed is crediting to Olmert doesn’t stand up to scrutiny.

As I have written many times over the past month, in a military sense, Israel has smashed Hizbullah. This summation by IDF spokesman Daniel Oren speaking to Michael Totten is a partial accounting:

“Look at Nasrallah today,” Michael said. “In 2000 he did his victory dance in Bint Jbail. He can’t do that this time. His command and control south of Beirut is completely gone. We killed 550 Hezbollah fighters south of the Litani out of an active force of 1250. Nasrallah claimed South Lebanon would be the graveyard of the IDF. But we only lost one tenth of one percent of our soldiers in South Lebanon. The only thing that went according to his plan was their ability to keep firing rockets. If he has enough victories like this one, he’s dead.”

Nasrallah should have studied his Sun Tzu:

Build your opponent a golden bridge to retreat across.

If he doesn’t stop fighting tomorrow, he will have given Olmert at least a partial victory what with the IDF overrunning the south. Every day that the Israelis fight on makes him weaker. And anything that makes him weaker destroys his invincibility mystique.

The next 48 hours should be very interesting…

4 Comments

  1. I read the Totten piece too and I don’t completely agree with the Israeli Spokesman. As long as Hezbollah receives support (weapons, training, etc) from the Syrians and Iran, Israel won’t be able to decisively beat them militarily. The bulk of the Hezbollah leadership remains intact, and it won’t take much for them to train replacement fighters, though they’ll admittedly be less experienced. I’m frankly surprised that Israel has said and done so little about Iranian and Syrian support. Fighting proxy wars against state-sponsored guerilla forces has historically been a losing proposition, and this case is no different. There are no easy answers, but Israel must break the bond between Hezbollah and its sponsors if it wants to ultimately win. This is one area that the U.S. could provide direct assistance through a combination of diplomacy, coercion and other methods. Syria and Iran are not natural allies and a all the instruments of influence and power the US and Israel posses must focus on dividing them and ending their support for Hezbollah. Ultimately, though, it may come down to Israel confronting Syria directly and making a similar judgment as we did after 9/11 - that they will no longer make a distinction between the Hezbollah terrorists and the government of Syria, and that Hezbollah targets inside Syria can be attacked. A dangerous course of action, to be sure, but there may be few alternatives.

    As you alluded, the potential for a Hezbollah political victory is certainly there. We’ll have to see if they are able to capitalize on the “victimization” mentality inherent in the Arab world and Lebanon (and enhanced by Israeli operations and civilian casualties) and the lack of a decisive Hezbollah military defeat.

    There are also long-term problems that may play into Hezbollah’s hand - the war has pretty much ended the economic rebirth Lebanon in general, but Beirut in particular, were experiencing. A major part of that now dead economic boom was tourism, which is unlikely to recover anytime soon. The costs associated with rebuilding infrastructure combined with severely decreased economic activity may bring more radical elements into the government, particularly if Hezbollah is seen as the victim along with the rest of Lebanon.

    So if this latest UN agreement fails to work, which I believe is likely, then the entire scenario will probably be a net loss for Israel. They’ll face a reconstituted and potentially more politically powerful Hezbollah, a weaker Lebanese government, and an emboldened Iran and Syria. Add those negatives on top of Israel’s failure to achieve its strategic objectives in this conflict, and the situation looks bleak. I sure hope I’m wrong.

    Comment by Andy — 8/13/2006 @ 1:59 pm

  2. Also, I have to largely agree with the two latest posts from ThreatsWatch:

    http://rapidrecon.threatswatch.org/2006/08/the-warm-up-war/
    http://rapidrecon.threatswatch.org/2006/08/re-warm-up-war/

    Comment by Andy — 8/13/2006 @ 2:08 pm

  3. The next 48 hours will be intensely interesting. I believe Nasrallah comes from the Iranian-theocracy school. He’ll hold the reigns but never actually take the title of the leader of the nation. Now, you leap to the conclusion that this is intended to affect the Lebanese government. It very well might be so. However, Nasrallah has made the appearance of cooperation with the government once the PM stopped complaining about Hezbollah and started to complain about Israel.

    I think this 48 hour of uncertainty is designed to provoke Israel into additional strikes, after agreeing to the ceasefire. Now, I hate Hezbollah and I want them destroyed, but they are attempting to appear like the defenders and not the aggressors to the Arab world. That demographic is so biased that it will work, unfortunately.

    In this case, Nasrallah may have constructed the golden bridge for more attacks.

    But my remarks are pure speculation. Time will tell.

    Comment by Chris — 8/13/2006 @ 2:50 pm

  4. Iran/ Syria provide a nuclear/atmoic weapon to Hiz in Lebanon. They provide a pretext to recommence hostilities. On or around August 22, they let fly with a long range Zelzal or similar to Tel Aviv.

    Possible?

    Comment by Ted — 8/14/2006 @ 11:32 am

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