9/11: JUST A REAL BAD DAY
I pity David Bell. And, in a way, I envy him. To be so oblivious to the threat posed by organizations like al-Qaeda and the ever burgeoning list of imitators and wannabes involved in international terrorism takes a special sort of myopia, a blissful blindness that lays a blanket of serenity over those who are arrogant enough or delusional enough to indulge in such fantasies.
Bell’s column in today’s Los Angeles Times raises an interesting point: Is the threat of terrorism an existential one? But answering in the negative, Bell proves himself shortsighted, shallow, and in the end, dead wrong.
The provocative headline of his piece - “Was 9/11 Really that Bad?” - is not very original. Several eminent historians have already tackled the subject and with far more depth and intelligence than Bell devoted to this regurgitation of leftist cant about the War on Terror.
First, let’s set up a great big strawman, shall we?
IMAGINE THAT on 9/11, six hours after the assault on the twin towers and the Pentagon, terrorists had carried out a second wave of attacks on the United States, taking an additional 3,000 lives. Imagine that six hours after that, there had been yet another wave. Now imagine that the attacks had continued, every six hours, for another four years, until nearly 20 million Americans were dead. This is roughly what the Soviet Union suffered during World War II, and contemplating these numbers may help put in perspective what the United States has so far experienced during the war against terrorism.
It also raises several questions. Has the American reaction to the attacks in fact been a massive overreaction? Is the widespread belief that 9/11 plunged us into one of the deadliest struggles of our time simply wrong? If we did overreact, why did we do so? Does history provide any insight?
Certainly, if we look at nothing but our enemies’ objectives, it is hard to see any indication of an overreaction. The people who attacked us in 2001 are indeed hate-filled fanatics who would like nothing better than to destroy this country. But desire is not the same thing as capacity, and although Islamist extremists can certainly do huge amounts of harm around the world, it is quite different to suggest that they can threaten the existence of the United States.
It’s been a while since we’ve seen the old “20 million dead Soviets can’t be wrong” meme coming from the left. I actually sort of missed it. When last we left those 20 million dead Soviets, they were being used to assure us that the Russians would never attack America or Western Europe or anybody for that matter because no country suffered more as a result of war. This was about the time that Andropov was trying to convince himself that a nuclear first strike on America was necessary because Reagan was a nut. And we heard the meme repeated ad naseum all during the Soviet’s campaign to split the Europeans from the United States by threatening all sorts of nasty consequences if NATO deployed Pershing II missiles.
The Soviet Union lost 20 million people in World War II because they chose to help Adolf Hitler start the war in the first place. Stalin made a conscious decision (and an immoral secret protocol with Germany that partitioned Poland and divided Europe into “spheres of influence”) to abandon their treaty obligations to France and allow Hitler a free hand in western Europe.
Now we have 20 million dead Soviets being used to tell us that we haven’t suffered enough in the War on Terror to justify our reaction, that indeed, we don’t know what real suffering is. Bell is trying to tell us that the 20 million lost in Stalin’s war of choice should be, if not a benchmark, then certainly a guide to how we should be approaching terrorism. Evidently, the measly 3,000 Americans lost on 9/11 just doesn’t cut it among the “proportional response” crowd.
I could be flippant and ask the Professor to wait a few years until the nightmare of terrorists armed with nuclear and biological weapons becomes a reality but that’s the point of our “overreaction” isn’t it? I guarantee it will be easy for the Bell’s of the world to say, after the first nuke destroys an American city, that the terrorists are not an existential threat, that in the grand scheme of things, what’s one little city when compared to getting the rest of the world upset with us and going into places like Iraq to bust up governments who aid and abet people who want to kill as many of us as possible - something the professor readily acknowledges?
Certainly, if we look at nothing but our enemies’ objectives, it is hard to see any indication of an overreaction. The people who attacked us in 2001 are indeed hate-filled fanatics who would like nothing better than to destroy this country. But desire is not the same thing as capacity, and although Islamist extremists can certainly do huge amounts of harm around the world, it is quite different to suggest that they can threaten the existence of the United States.
Yet a great many Americans, particularly on the right, have failed to make this distinction. For them, the “Islamo-fascist” enemy has inherited not just Adolf Hitler’s implacable hatreds but his capacity to destroy. The conservative author Norman Podhoretz has gone so far as to say that we are fighting World War IV (No. III being the Cold War).
But it is no disrespect to the victims of 9/11, or to the men and women of our armed forces, to say that, by the standards of past wars, the war against terrorism has so far inflicted a very small human cost on the United States. As an instance of mass murder, the attacks were unspeakable, but they still pale in comparison with any number of military assaults on civilian targets of the recent past, from Hiroshima on down.
The “standards of past wars” is an idiotic yardstick to use. What possible “standard” can we point to from any war in our past that would bear any resemblance whatsoever to our situation today? We are fighting extra-state actors who flit from continent to continent, aided and abetted by nations who themselves have sworn to destroy us. What in our past has prepared us to deal with this scenario?
And to say that the terrorists don’t have the capacity to destroy us may be correct - today. But any number of proliferation experts, academics, military and intelligence officials have informed us that it is not a question of if we are going to be hit by a nuclear attack but when. And the time frame most often given is sometime in the next decade.
Would we be “overreacting” if we took the action we are taking now - including the invasion of Iraq - after a couple of our cities are destroyed? This is the essence of our strategy - pre-emption. What good does it do to take the aggressive posture we have now after a couple of hundred thousand American are incinerated? Or perhaps Bell doesn’t believe that the effort we are putting forth to combat terrorism is worth it under any circumstances?
I suspect the latter. And this is because his idea of what an “existential” threat might be is so narrow as to be useless. If 10 nuclear bombs detonated on American soil, there would still be a landmass between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and mapmakers would still probably refer to it as “America.”
But what exactly would “America” look like? Nothing you or I would recognize I assure you. In that sense, al-Qaeda and their ilk are existential threats to the very idea of America - something more precious than any territory and more valuable than any building or artifact.
Besides, says Bell, we’re fighting people who live in caves and are ignorant savages. Well, not exactly. But what’s the point of informing us that the terrorist’s current arsenal includes “guns, knives, and conventional explosives?”
Of course, the 9/11 attacks also conjured up the possibility of far deadlier attacks to come. But then, we were hardly ignorant of these threats before, as a glance at just about any thriller from the 1990s will testify. And despite the even more nightmarish fantasies of the post-9/11 era (e.g. the TV show “24’s” nuclear attack on Los Angeles), Islamist terrorists have not come close to deploying weapons other than knives, guns and conventional explosives. A war it may be, but does it really deserve comparison to World War II and its 50 million dead? Not every adversary is an apocalyptic threat.
I am very happy that Bell is so sure that al-Qaeda hasn’t “come close” to deploying nuclear or biological weapons. A definition of “close” might be appreciated because all signs point to the terrorists getting their hands on these weapons in the very near future - if they haven’t already.. And of course, after they’ve deployed them, the professor will have the satisfaction of knowing that there will be precious few people who will know or care very much that he was so spectacularly wrong.
Is it “overreacting” to try and prevent terrorists from deploying these weapons in the first place? Is it “overreacting” to attempt to break up their networks, smash their infrastructure, deny them funds, and, when necessary, go after the nations that fund them, assist them, support them, and wish them well?
If ever there was an example of the chasm that has opened up between those like Bell who, for all intents and purposes wish to wait for the hammer to fall before we react and those who would do whatever is necessary to prevent it in the first place, this article is it. Bell’s arguments couldn’t be clearer. We are big enough to absorb blows like 9/11 without “overreacting.” Just because al-Qaeda hasn’t launched a WMD attack. they don’t pose an “existential threat” to the United States.
Bell and his ilk will deny that they wish to “wait until we are attacked” before responding. But their solution - treat the terrorists as vicious criminals - has been tried already. All during the 1990’s we captured precious few terrorists, broke up even fewer networks, and al-Qaeda grew into the threat that they are today. Repeating a failed policy for the sake of not “overreacting” is idiocy. You either believe there is a threat or you don’t. And if you do, then you bend every effort to destroy that threat. Bell and his ilk want to manage the threat. If given the opportunity, the professor and his ilk will manage us into disaster:
During the hopeful early years of the 20th century, journalist Norman Angell’s huge bestseller, “The Great Illusion,” argued that wars had become too expensive to fight. Then came the unspeakable horrors of World War I. And the end of the Cold War, which seemed to promise the worldwide triumph of peace and democracy in a more stable unipolar world, has been followed by the wars in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf War and the present global upheaval. In each of these conflicts, the United States has justified the use of force by labeling its foe a new Hitler, not only in evil intentions but in potential capacity.
Yet as the comparison with the Soviet experience should remind us, the war against terrorism has not yet been much of a war at all, let alone a war to end all wars. It is a messy, difficult, long-term struggle against exceptionally dangerous criminals who actually like nothing better than being put on the same level of historical importance as Hitler — can you imagine a better recruiting tool? To fight them effectively, we need coolness, resolve and stamina. But we also need to overcome long habit and remind ourselves that not every enemy is in fact a threat to our existence.
Angell’s thesis was that war was futile because both victor and vanquished would be much worse off economically than if hostilities had not broken out. Essentially, the cost benefit rationale for war had disappeared in the fire and smoke of the industrial revolution. Ironically, what made modern war possible also basically made it obsolete. Of course, that didn’t stop the European powers from savagely killing each other twice during the first half of the century. Whether Angell was right or wrong hardly mattered in the sense that his analysis was fatally flawed because he believed that his kind of logic actually mattered in the long run.
Bell’s fatally flawed analysis begins with the premise that 9/11 wasn’t that bad and that our reaction to it ‘ “overreaction” as Bell calls it - is the result of our failure to apply Angell-like cost benefit analyses to what our policy should be. One wonders how many dead it would take before Bell thought that we were “under reacting.”
