This post has been swirling around on the outskirts of my conscious mind for months. It has to do partly with the politics of the war but even more so with the strategy for fighting global jihadism. As news from Iraq and Afghanistan gets more grim by the week and it is becoming apparent that anti-western and anti-American sentiment has spawned jihadist networks far beyond anything Osama Bin Laden ever imagined for al-Qaeda, we are confronted with the uncomfortable question of whether or not our actions in the Middle East and elsewhere have exacerbated the problem of terrorism.
In short, is there anything we could have done differently that would have made the United States safer while still dealing effectively with the global threat of terrorism?
In one way, the question opens the abyss beneath our feet in that it calls into question everything we’ve been doing for the past five years to fight terrorism. But in another way, the question challenges the assumptions of those who offer much in the way of criticism but little in the way of alternatives.
In what will possibly be seen as one of the seminal documents in the history of the Global War on Terror, a recently compiled National Intelligence Estimate on terrorism lays out in stark and unbending terms, what 5 years of our efforts in the War on Terror have wrought:
The intelligence estimate, completed in April, is the first formal appraisal of global terrorism by United States intelligence agencies since the Iraq war began, and represents a consensus view of the 16 disparate spy services inside government. Titled “Trends in Global Terrorism: Implications for the United States,’’ it asserts that Islamic radicalism, rather than being in retreat, has metastasized and spread across the globe.
An opening section of the report, “Indicators of the Spread of the Global Jihadist Movement,†cites the Iraq war as a reason for the diffusion of jihad ideology.
The report “says that the Iraq war has made the overall terrorism problem worse,†said one American intelligence official.
More than a dozen United States government officials and outside experts were interviewed for this article, and all spoke only on condition of anonymity because they were discussing a classified intelligence document. The officials included employees of several government agencies, and both supporters and critics of the Bush administration. All of those interviewed had either seen the final version of the document or participated in the creation of earlier drafts. These officials discussed some of the document’s general conclusions but not details, which remain highly classified.
That’s the headline; Iraq War creates more terrorists and terrorism. But there’s much more to ponder, including the notion that terrorist groups today are much more diffused across the world and have little or no connection to the “original” al-Qaeda:
The estimate concludes that the radical Islamic movement has expanded from a core of Qaeda operatives and affiliated groups to include a new class of “self-generating†cells inspired by Al Qaeda’s leadership but without any direct connection to Osama bin Laden or his top lieutenants.
It also examines how the Internet has helped spread jihadist ideology, and how cyberspace has become a haven for terrorist operatives who no longer have geographical refuges in countries like Afghanistan.
In the end, the NIE attributes this scattering of terrorists to both our efforts in taking out the Taliban and the fact that hatred of the west has thrown up many more radicals than most of us thought possible 5 years ago.
I am not disputing the conclusions in this leaked report. I am resisting the implications that some would draw from it; that if only we had not confronted the jihadists or worked to solve the root causes of terrorism, none of this would be true today.
I totally reject that notion. In fact, I believe it delusional thinking to say that we’d be any safer if we hadn’t invaded Iraq or if we had just lobbed a few cruise missiles at Osama Bin Laden following 9/11, or even if we had put enormous pressure on Israel to come to an agreement with the Palestinians. All of this ignores the one overarching truth about the nature of our enemies (and their tens of millions of supporters around the world); what they seek, we cannot give them.
Whether it’s a desire for the west to disengage from the Middle East - a region that supplies the lifeblood of our civilization - or a demand that we change our laws, our values, and our principles to accommodate them, or to simply submit to the will of Allah as they interpret it, we cannot yield. The jihadists wish us to change, to join them in living in the past where women were chattel, holy men dictated lifestyle, and the Muslim Caliphate was the glory of the known world.
The “root causes” crowd is fond of pointing out what they believe the reasons that terrorism is practiced on the west. They rightly repeat ad nauseum that terrorism is a tactic not an ideology and that given the huge disparity in military might between the west and the jihadists, employing the tactics of terrorism makes a good deal of sense. They also point to the extreme poverty of Muslim countries and that in many ways, Muslims are a “people out of time,” a direct result of a post-colonial residual feeling of inferiority and resentment. Terrorism gives the poor jihadis a means to strike back against their former oppressors (or current ones if you believe some of the more radical western leftists).
First of all, identifying “root causes” is all well and good. But short of massive transfers of wealth, overthrowing the despots who are sitting on top of all that oil, and allowing the State of Israel to be destroyed, just what the devil are we supposed to do to assuage this massive rage against us? That’s why this kind of psychobabble applied to people who desire to murder us all is disturbing to those of us whose thinking isn’t muddled by guilt ridden dreams of western imperialism or a belief that if only we could all sit down and exchange views, the jihadis hearts would soften and the problem would disappear.
An unfair exaggeration of the “root causes” crowd’s positions? Perhaps a little. But “solving” the problem of poverty anywhere is a chimera under any circumstances. And given the obvious tension between addressing the concerns of people being oppressed by despots and those same despots holding life in the balance for the western world with their hands clasped around an oil spigot, one can immediately see where the real world so rudely intrudes on the fantasies of the “root causes” crowd. And this goes to another favorite “root cause” of terrorism; our overall foreign policy and the fact that we are, for better or for worse, the only superpower around.
We are a nation of nearly 300 million people with an economy 3 times the size of the next largest producer. The world may hate our support for Israel but they can’t resist McDonalds. They may despise our support for despots around the world but they line up in droves to see Hollywood movies. They may riot over cartoons of the prophet, but they will work for years in order to save up enough to come to the United States for the opportunity to have a better life for themselves and their children.
Our superpower status is the result of the fact that the United States of America exists. Destroy the large corporations, contract the economy, bring every soldier home, dismantle our armed forces, makes ourselves a vassal of the United Nations and America would still be a superpower, still annoying most of the rest of the world. Of course, if we did all of that there wouldn’t be much left of the rest of the world. The world needs America pretty much the way we are now, despite the fact that it suits the nations to pretend this is not so for their own domestic reasons.
But what about radically altering our foreign policy and abjure our own concerns in the interest of world comity? This is an interesting criticism because it presupposes that we elect Presidents not to formulate policies to protect American interests but rather to bow to the interests of other countries. In effect, this critique posits the notion that we would be better off if we forgot about our own vital interests and used our power to injure ourselves, to shoot ourselves in the foot so to speak.
Again, is this an exaggeration of the “root causes” position? Not if you listen to some of its more articulate advocates like Noam Chomsky. The belief, for instance, that solving the Israeli-Palestinian problem can be approached by the United States reversing 60 years of support for the Jewish state by taking the side of the Palestinians in the dispute. Nothing less will satisfy the Palestinians and most of the Arab world so why pretend otherwise? The only “honest broker” desired by the Arabs is an auctioneer who will take bids on the pieces that remain of Israel once their enemies are through with them.
This doesn’t deal directly with the question of whether or not our tactics and strategy that we’ve employed in the War on Terror so far have made the problem worse than if we had gone a different route. But it does highlight the paucity of options between outright confrontation of the terrorists and a kind of middling, muddled, pre-9/11 approach to terrorism that saw us clearly on the defensive and faced with the prospect of future attacks that would use weapons of mass destruction.
Opinions on alternative paths we could have taken after 9/11 are as many as there are Democratic candidates for President. But one thing they will all agree on is that we never should have invaded Iraq. Indeed, the NIE outlined above would seem to indicate that the war was a blunder in that it has created more terrorists, radicalized young Muslims, and generated hate and revulsion against America throughout the Islamic world.
The counterfactual argument is tempting in this regard. No invasion of Iraq would mean fewer terrorists, less hate of America in the Islamic world, and generally speaking, a quieter world.
Even with Saddam? Some think so. In September of 2001, the world was more than ready to lift sanctions against Iraq and welcome Saddam back into the fold. How that would have played out over the next 5 years I leave to imaginations better suited for nightmares than mine but I think it safe to say that a re-invigorated Iraq would have been unpredictable and, given Saddam’s history, extremely dangerous to the neighborhood.
This is no secret which is why the United States Congress was calling for regime change in Iraq as early as 1998. But it important to point out that there would be no box for Saddam if the sanctions were lifted. And when even the Pope was calling for an end to them, as John Paull II did in 2000, you know that eventually the French and Russians, eager to bring their clandestine dealings with Saddam into the open, would have successfully agitated to have to sanctions lifted.
This is old ground, well travelled here and elsewhere. But given the alternatives between confronting Saddam and, despite the myopic and ass covering reports from Congress and our intelligence agencies, his clear support for terrorists (can critics guarantee that Saddam never would have established operational ties with al-Qaeda?), the range of options regarding Iraq narrows considerably. One can argue that the timing was wrong in confronting Iraq. But as something we eventually would have been forced into doing as a result of a general conflict with terror and terror states, it is very difficult to see how we could have avoided it.
Despite the NIE’s conclusions, it should be noted that it is not saying specifically that we should not have invaded Iraq. What it is saying should make us think long and hard about the disadvantages of confronting the terrorism beast without preparing for the fallout. I think even if we had been able to look into the future 3 years ago and have seen this report, the stark choices facing the Administration would have been exactly the same. It may be triumphalism for some to be able to point to the NIE as proof that things would have been different if we had not invaded Iraq. But that doesn’t change what conditions were like in 2003 and what was on the horizon if we did nothing.